SOUTH AFRICA: HISTORY AND CULTURE

A Summer Institute for School Teachers
Funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities
Hosted in South Africa by Rhodes University, Grahamstown
Sponsored by the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences,
University of Arkansas at Monticello

JUNE 21-JULY 27, 2013

CHAPTER 1

SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS

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AMERICAN FACULTY MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE

1. Ms. Kay Grant, Drew Central High School, Monticello, Arkansas 71655 (retired); high school social studies and English; home address: 122 Groce Lane, Monticello, Arkansas 71655; home phone - 870/367-3642; email - kgrant71655@yahoo.com

2. Dr. Richard Corby, School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, P.O. Box 3619 UAM, 562 University Drive, University of Arkansas at Monticello, Monticello, Arkansas 71656; two-semester survey of world history and upper division courses on Africa and the Middle East; school phone: none at the moment, cell - 870/723-9281 (day), land - 870/367-9281 (evening); email - corby@uamont.edu

CHAPTER 2

DAILY SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

JUNE 21-JULY 27, 2013

Wednesday, June 19

Leave the U.S. for flight to Cape Town.

Thursday, June 20

Continue flight to Cape Town.

Friday, June 21

Upon arrival go to the Check Inn Hotel in central Cape Town.

Saturday, June 22

AM Walk to the Victoria and Alfred Mall to ATMs to get South African rand or visit American Express to cash travelers checks; get acquainted with the V&A, which is on the waterfront, and has shops, restaurants, etc. Eat lunch at the V&A.

PM Mr. Richard van Rooy, driver of our chartered bus for the five weeks in South Africa, will meet us at the V&A to take us to Rosebank College in Mowbray for the afternoon sessions.

1:15-1:30 American Faculty Members Introduce Themselves

Ms. Kay Grant
Education Consultant and Curriculum Development Specialist
Social Studies and English Teacher at Drew Central High School,
Monticello, Arkansas (Retired)
Institute Faculty Member

Dr. Richard A. Corby
Professor of History
University of Arkansas at Monticello
NEH Institute Director

1:30-2:45 Teachers Introduce Themselves, Their Professional and Personal Background

2:45-3:00 Break

Seminar 1: Geography and History

3:00-4:15 Lecture 1: The Geographical and Ecological Setting

Mark Boekstein

Department of Geography

University of the Western Cape

Readings:

Paul Bohannan and Philip Curtin, *Africa and Africans*, 1995, chapter 2, "The African Continent" and chapter 3, "Mapping Africa."

Robert Thornton and Rita M. Byrnes, "The Society and Its Environment: The Physical Setting," in Rita M. Byrnes, ed., *South Africa: A Country Study, 1997*, pp. 89-135.

Sunday, June 23

AM Go in our chartered bus to the cableway which goes to the top of Table Mountain, the iconic site most associated with Cape Town. Nelson Mandela wrote during his years on Robben Island that Table Mountain "…was a beacon of hope. It represented the mainland to which we knew we would one day return." During the five-minute ascent to the top the cableway offers a 360 degrees view of Cape Town, the Atlantic, and the neighboring peaks. The mountain is an important part of the Cape Floral area and is a World Heritage Site.

PM Drive to Stellenbosch, one of the oldest towns in the interior, established 1679 by Governor Simon.

Visit the Village Museum which features four adjacent historical buildings in different architectural styles, all well preserved and furnished in period style. Walk through the center of town with its gabled buildings and huge oaks.

Drive to Franschhoek, settled by French Huguenots in a beautiful valley almost 300 years ago. See the Huguenot Memorial Museum and the Huguenot Monument. Eat lunch here.

Return to Cape Town for the night.

Monday, June 24

AM In our chartered bus drive to Cape Agulhas, the southernmost point on the African continent, with its extremely treacherous waters where the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans meet; climb to the top of one of the oldest light houses in the country and visit the museum.

PM Drive on to Arniston, a charming fishing village where a row of limewashed cottages is now a National Monument. Women of the village will fix a meal for us which features fish. It's a notable cultural experience. Spend the night in Arniston.

Two Days of Orientation in Arniston

Tuesday, June 25

9:00-10:15 Two Americans' Experiences in South Africa

Ms. Grant

Dr. Corby

Reading: Carolyn Meyer, Voices of South Africa, 1996, "Prologue: Langa and Samuel Mkunqwana," chapter 1 "Cape Town," and chapter II "Stellenbosch."

10:15-10:30 Break

10:30-11:45 One South African's Suggestions to Twenty-Seven Americans on How to Experience a Successful Five Weeks in My Country

Dr. Liesel Hibbert Professor and Head of the Department of Applied Language Studies Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Summerstrand, Port Elizabeth Institute Faculty Member

Reading:

Lonely Planet: South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland, "Facts about the Region." OR Rough Guide: South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland, "Basics."

11:15-12:45 Lunch

12:45-1:30 Keeping the Daily Journal and the Group Journal

Ms. Grant

Dr. Corby

Wednesday, June 26

9:00-10:15 Discussion of the Curriculum Projects, Session I

Led by Ms. Grant with the Teachers Participating

10:15-10:30 Break

10:30-11:45 Discussion of Curriculum Projects, Session II

Ms. Grant and Teachers

11:45-Noon Break

Noon-1:15 Highlights of South African History of the Last Several Hundred Years

Dr. Corby

PM Free

Stay overnight in Arniston.

Thursday, June 27

AM Drive to Mossel Bay and see the Bartlomeu Dias Museum complex which features a replica of the vessel Dias used on his 1488 voyage.

PM Go on to Plettenberg Bay and spend the night.

Friday, June 28

AM and PM Visit New Brighton Township outside Port Elizabeth. This township was the birthplace of umKhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the armed wing of the ANC, the home of leading political activists such as Govan Mbeki, and a backdrop for many of the noted playwright Athol Fugard's plays about black South African life.

Visit the Red Location Museum in New Brighton Township. The manifesto of the museum is to serve the local people as well as visitors. The project, which is partly funded by Sweden's Museum of World Culture, is currently building a library, marketplace, and housing. Inside the museum are twelve "memory boxes" or themed rooms. One is dedicated to the unsung heroes of apartheid, ordinary people's poignant stories of the part they played in the struggle. Community heroes such as Danny Jordaan, South Africa's World Cup chief executive, have prominent exhibits in the entrance hall where a glass case also displays Nelson Mandela's prison diaries. A particularly affective exhibit is a list of every South African who died in police detention during the apartheid era.

PM Visit the Missionvale Care Center, a really remarkable institution. It runs after school programs for children, a clothing warehouse, community gardens, and much more. Go to www.missionvale.co.za Eat with the women at the Red Location Lodge. Go on to Grahamstown and Rhodes University

Saturday, June 29

AM and PM Attend events of the Grahamstown National Festival of the Arts, the largest on the continent. There are exhibitions of arts and crafts, most of them for sale, open air markets selling products from throughout the continent, and performances of South African and Western music, plays, and films. It's always a highlight of our institute in South Africa.

Sunday, June 30

AM and PM Attend events at the National Arts Festival

Lectures at Rhodes University at the Arts Major Lecture Theater, 1st Floor, New Arts Block

Seminar 1: Geography and History (lecture on geography given in Cape Town)

Monday, July 1

8:30-9:00 Welcome to Rhodes University, Grahamstown, and South Africa

Professor Russell Kaschula

Belelwa Nosilela

Professor Fred Hendricks

Rhodes University

9:00-10:15 Lecture 2: South Africa from Earliest Times to c.1800

Lecturer TBA

Readings:

Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa, 3rd edition, 2000, chapter 1, "The Africans"; chapter 2, "The White Invaders: The Cape Colony." William H. Worger, chapter 1, pp. 1-24, "The Historical Setting," Byrnes, ed., South Africa.

10:15-10:45 Break

10:45-Noon Lecture 3: South Africa from c.1800 to 1948

Lecturer TBA

Readings:

Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa, chapter 3, "African Wars and White invaders: Southeast Africa"; chapter 4, "Diamonds, Gold, and British Imperialism"; chapter 5, "The Segregation Era, 1910-1948." William H. Worger, Chapter 1, pp. 24-54, "The Historical Setting," in Byrnes, ed., South Africa.

Noon-1:00 Lunch

1:00-2:15 Lecture 4: South Africa from 1948 to 1994

Dr. Cornelius Thomas Cory Library Rhodes University

Readings:

Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa, chapter 6, "The Apartheid Era, 1948-1978"; chapter 7, "Apartheid in Crisis, 1978-1989"; chapter 8, "The Political Transition," 1989-1994." Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, Part Four, "The Struggle Is My Life," and Part Eight, "Robben Island: The Dark Years," 1995. William H. Worger, chapter 1, pp. 53-86, "The Historical Setting," in Byrnes, South Africa.

PM Attend events at the National Arts Festival

Tuesday, July 2

8:30-9:45 Lecture 5: South Africa from 1994 to the Present

Lecturer TBA

Readings:

Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa, chapter 9, "The New South Africa, 1994-2000." Richard Stengel, "Mandela: His 8 Lessons of Leadership," Time, July 21, 2008.

9:45-10:15 Break

10:15-11:00 A committee of teachers discusses and synthesizes the lectures and readings of Seminar 1.

Hollie Bosse, Laing Middle School, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina

Stephen Buzzell, Stowe Middle School, Stowe, Vermont

Tanya Crawford, Sammy E. Coan Middle School, Atlanta, Georgia

Jeffrey Ellis-Lee, School for Arts, Imagination, and Inquiry, New York, New York

Christine Fryer, High School for Law Advocacy and Community, New York, New York

Jeffrey Gaynor, Clague Middle School, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Timothy Kiser, Roosevelt High School, Chicago, Illinois

11:00-11:15 Break

11:15-12:30 Curriculum Development Seminar: Approaches for Infusing South African Content into the Classroom

A. Discuss what experiences have been most similar to your expectations.

B. Discuss what experiences have been the most unexpected.

C. Discuss what impact A and B above might have on your curriculum plans.

D. Discuss ways to use Seminar 1 content in your curriculum plans.

Ms. Grant

PM Attend events of the National Arts Festival

Seminar 2: Culture and Society

Wednesday, July 3

8:30-9:45 Lecture 6: South African Music

Lecturer TBA

Readings:

Paul Bohannan and Philip Curtin, Africa and Africans, chapter 4, "African Arts."

Isabelle Leymarie, "Music from South Africa," UNESCO Courier, 51, 2 (February 1998).

9:45-10:15 Break

10:15-11:30 Lecture 7: South African Literature

Dewald Koen Language Teacher Kings College Grahamstown

Readings:

Alex La Guma, A Walk in the Night, the title story and any others that you want to read; most of these short stories are set in Cape Town. Michael Chapman, "More Than Telling a Story: Drum and Its Significance in Black South African Writing," in Michael Chapman, ed., The Drum Decade: Stories from the 1950s, 2001. Henry Nxumalo, "Mr. Drum Goes to Jail," in Michael Chapman, ed., The Drum Decade.

Nadine Gordimer, July's People.

11:30-Noon Break

Noon-1:15 Lecture 8: Health in South Africa

Lecturer TBA

Readings:

Robert Thornton and Rita M. Byrnes, chapter 2, ppl 156-64, "The Society and Its Environment: Health and Welfare," in Byrnes, South Africa. Clare Kapp, "South Africa Heads into Elections in a Sorry State of Health," The Lancet, Jan. 24 – Jan. 30, 2009. Sam Mhlongo, "Aids and Poverty," New African, July/August 2001. 10 "Unions Tackling AIDS in Southern Africa," American Teacher, May/June 2009.

1:15-2:00 Lunch

PM Attend events of the National Arts Festival.

Thursday, July 4

8:30-9:45 Lecture 9: Social Problems in the New South Africa Angela Hibbert Child Welfare and Hospice Professional and Trainer Grahamstown

Readings:

Robert Thornton and Rita M. Byrnes, chapter 2, pp. 164-67, "The Society and Its Environment: Women in Society," in Byrnes, South Africa. Liz McGregor, "Everybody Has Got It Wrong about My Country," New Statesman, 9, 1 (2003). Valerie Moller, Helga Dickow, and Mari Harris, "South Africa's 'Rainbow People,' National Pride and Happiness," Social Indicators Research, 47, 3 July 1999).

9:45-10:15 Break

10:15-11:00 A committee of teachers discusses and synthesizes the lectures and readings for Seminar 2.

Christine-Jean Blain, Kurt Hahn Expeditionary Learning, Brooklyn, New York

Ami Relf, Buffalo Grove High School, Buffalo Grove, Illinois

Emily Rodriguez, Canarelli Middle School, Las Vegas, Nevada
Jennifer Turner, Carl Hayden High School, Phoenix, Arizona
Kim Vinh, Sequoia High School, Redwood City, California
Robert Wood, Oakridge High School, Muskegon, Michigan
11:00-12:15 Curriculum Development Seminar: Approaches for Infusing South African Content into the Classroom
A. Ms. Grant will discuss South African literature and its applications in the classroom.
B. Discuss ways to use Seminar 2 content in your curriculum plans.
Ms. Grant
12:15-1:15 Lunch
Seminar 3: Religion and Education
1:15-2:30 Lecture 10: African Systems of Religion and Thought
Bulelwa Nosilela Rhodes University
Readings:
C.C. Stewart and Donald Crummey, Religions in Africa, 1994, chapter 1, "African Traditional Religions." Paul Bohannan and Philip Curtin, Africa and Africans, chapter 9, "African Religion." Robert Thornton and Rita M. Byrnes, chapter 2, pp. 135-38, "The Society and Its Environment: South African Traditional Religion," in Byrnes, South Africa.
PM Attend events of the National Arts Festival.

Friday, July 5
8:30-9:45 Lecture 11: Christianity in South Africa
Thandeka Mapi
Lecturer, Department of African Languages
Rhodes University
Readings:
Elizabeth Isichei, A History of Christianity in Africa, 1995, chapter 4, "Southern Africa to c.1900"; chapter 11, "South Africa and Its Neighbors since 1900"; chapter 12, "Independent Black Africa since 1960: Church, State, and Society." Basil Davidson, The African Genius, chapter 29, "New Redeemers." 12 Robert Thornton and Rita M. Byrnes, chapter 2, pp. 138-45, "The Society and Its Environment," in Byrnes, ed., South Africa. US State Department, "International Religious Freedom Report 2011."
9:45-10:15 Break
10:15-11:30 Lecture 12: Education in South Africa

Pamela Masiko Department of African Languages Rhodes University

Readings:

Robert Thornton and Rita M. Byrnes, chapter 2, pp. 146-56, "The Society and Its Environment: Education," in Byrnes, South Africa. Clive Slaser, "'We Must Infiltrate the Tsotsis': School Politics and Youth in Soweto," Journal of Southern African Studies, 24, 2 (June 1998).

Note: We will visit schools in Cape Town.

11:30-Noon Break

Noon-12:45 A committee of teachers discusses and synthesizes the lectures and readings.

Michael Anderson, St. John School, St. John, Washington

Sarah Cook, Southeast Middle School, Meridian, Mississippi

Laura Heikkila, Longfellow Middle School, Norman, Oklahoma

Jennifer Koszyk, Prosser Career Academy, Chicago, Illinois

Katchina Martin, Muhlenberg High School, Laureldale, Pennsylvania

Amanda McClure, Hotchkiss School, Lakeville, Connecticut

12:45-1:45 Lunch

1:45-3:00 Curriculum Development Seminar: Approaches for Infusing South African Content into the Classroom

A. Discuss an experience you have had which gave you an insight to a particular aspect of South African history or culture.

B. Discuss ways in which Seminar 3 content would be useful in developing curriculum materials.

C. Discuss your field study activities and ways to use your knowledge and experience in developing curriculum materials.

Ms. Grant

PM Prepare for field study in South Africa.

FIELD STUDY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Saturday, July 6

AM and PM Drive to Mthatha and stay overnight.

Sunday, July 7

AM and PM Go on to Pinetown and spend the night.

Monday, July 8

AM and PM Continue on into the Drakensburg, southern Africa's highest mountains, to Didima Camp near Cathedral Peak. There are many beautiful views and much to see of the San culture here. Visit the museum and then hike into the mountains to see San rock art. The Didima camp sleeping units from the outside look like Hobbit houses right out of Tolkien. Spend the night at Didima Camp.

Tuesday, July 9

AM and PM Stay at Cathedral Peak and continue exploring aspects of San culture. Spend the night at Didima Camp.

Wednesday, July 10

AM and PM Drive to Hluhluwe-Imfolozi Park, the oldest in Africa.

Stay overnight in the park at Hilltop Camp.

Thursday, July 11

AM and PM Conservationists world-wide acclaim this park as an outstanding example of responsible ecological management. The park's management is especially famous for the difficult reestablishment of a white rhino population. On a game drive you're likely to see buffalo, elephants, giraffes, and other animals but probably no lions. Stay overnight at Hluhluwe-Imfolozi.

Friday, July 12

AM and PM Drive to the Ezulwini Valley in Swaziland.

PM Visit the Manzini Market, a large outdoor area with booths and larger pavilion-like buildings where men and women sell their various wares. These markets are found almost everywhere on the continent and are a must-see for every visitor to Africa. Go on to the Ezulwini Valley and the Mantenga Cultural Village and Nature Reserve located in a wooded, hilly area to spend the night.

Saturday, July 13

AM Go through the replica of a Swazi village on the grounds of the Mantenga Cultural Village and attend a performance of Swazi dancing.

PM Visit a candle factory, weaving shop, and craftspeople selling their products.

Stay overnight at the Mantenga Cultural Village.

Sunday, July 14

AM Drive to the Ngwenya Glass Factory near the Swazi-South African border. All the glass creations are made from recycled glass. It's a fascinating place.

AM and PM Continue on to Johannesbsurg to spend the night.

Monday, July 15

AM and PM Mandy Mankazana will be out knowledgeable, delightful guide for the day. Visit the Apartheid Museum, one of the most significant sights in South Africa. Go on to Soweto Township where we'll see the Nelson Mandela residence, now a museum, Regina Mundi church, and the Hector Pietersen memorial (the first student killed in the protests of June 1976 against the ministry of education's decision to switch to Afrikaans as the language of instruction instead of using English). We'll eat lunch at Wandie's Place which serves a buffet of South African and Western cuisine. At some point Ms. Mankazana will divide us into groups of 4 or 5 and assign a local person to give each group a short walking tour of a residential section of Soweto. These minitours end with a visit to a typical house. Ms. Grant and Dr. Corby have been on Ms. Mankazana's study tours before and this day will be one of the highlights of the five weeks in South Africa.

Stay overnight in Johannesburg.

Tuesday, July 16

AM and PM Drive the short distance to Pretoria, the administrative capital of the country. This drive goes by the largest concentration of high tech establishments on the continent. See the Union Buildings, the seat of the South African president. Go on to the Voortrekker Monument and Museum. The latter is an enormous monument, built in 1938 to commemorate the Afrikaners' victory at Blood River. The museum has an excellent reconstruction of an Afrikaner homestead, with wagons, photographs, and clothing. Return to Johannesburg to spend the night.

Wednesday, July 17

AM and PM Drive to Kimberley.

Visit the Open Mine Museum and the "Big Hole." The latter is the world's largest human-made hole. Much of the museum consists of a collection of historic buildings of diamond mining in the 1860s and 70s. Exhibits also show the diamond mining process and DeBeers Hall displays a dazzling collection of diamonds. Stay overnight in Kimberley.

Thursday, July 18

AM and PM Drive to Matjiesfontein to spend the night.

Friday, July 19

AM Walk around Matjiesfontein which has not changed much in over a century; nearly every building is Victorian with a grand railroad station, now an interesting,eclectic museum, and houses with tin roofs, pastel walls, and wellkept gardens. The Lord Milner Hotel is like stepping backward into the Victorian period.

AM and PM Continue to Cape Town. Near Paarl we'll be on the scenic Du Toitskloof road, a pioneering effort in road building in mountainous area in the early 20th century.

In Paarl visit the Afrikaans Taal Museum, a monument to the Afrikaans language. Upon arriving in Cape Town go to the Check Inn.

Saturday, July 20

AM Visit Robben Island in Cape Town harbor. A prison dates from early days of the Dutch East India Company and lasted until the mid-1990s. Nelson Mandela was its most famous inmate. The guides through the prison and around the island are all former political prisoners from the apartheid era. PM Visit the South African National Gallery or the South African Museum and Planetarium as they're right together. The SA National Gallery includes Western and contemporary South African art; also instructive is the collection of traditional art from southern Africa that consists of beadwork, carvings, and crafts. Walk through the Company Gardens (the "Company" being the Dutch East India Company) to St. George's (Anglican) Cathedral, Archbishop Desmond Tutu's church, and a stronghold of anti-apartheid sentiment and action.

Sunday, July 21

AM and PM Free

Possible activities for the day include a visit to a big Sunday market. Also very fascinating is the South African Jewish Museum which features the Great Synagogue and the Cape Town Holocaust Center. We would have put this visit on the program yesterday but it's closed on Saturday.

Monday, July 22

AM Preparation for Visiting a South African School: An Overview of Educational-Policy and Practice in South Africa

Ms. Geraldine Goldblatt

Curriculum Advisor for English at Metropole Central (Retired) Formerly Vice Rector Western Cape College of Education Cape Town

AM and PM Visit to five secondary schools, coordinated by Ms. Goldblatt.

She will arrange visits to a variety of schools, some well equipped with excellent teachers and others, located in Khayelitsha Township, will lack nearly everything. Five of the participants will go to each school. At the school the principal will probably discuss important aspects of the school's operation. Then the NEH teachers will visit classrooms, answer questions posed by the students and teacher, and then teach a short lesson on some aspect of American society.

PM Late lunch at the Rhodes Memorial overlooking Cape Town.

Debriefing of school visits in Ms. Goldblatt's conference room.

Seminar 4: Economy and Government

Here are some readings from your notebook that pertain to the general subjects of the economy ad government:

Readings:

Simon Robinson, "Smile, Beloved Country, A Decade after Its First Free Election Slammed the Door on Apartheid, the Rainbow Nation Is Shining Brighter Than Ever…," Time International, April 19, 2004. Celean Jacobson, "S. African Party Loses Two-Thirds Hold," Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, April 26, 2009. Pusch Commey, et. al, "He'll Take It from Here," BBC Focus on Africa, April-June 2009. (several articles on Jacob Zuma coming to power). R.W. Johnson, "Zuma's First Year," Current History, May 2010 (and the last three years have been more of the same). Alex Perry, "How the ANC Lost Its Way," Time, January 16, 2012. South Africa's Desmond Tutu: "I Will Not Vote for ANC," BBC News Africa, May 10, 2013.

Tuesday, July 23

8:30-9:45 Lecture 13: The Economy in Contemporary South Africa

Ms. Elizabeth Stoltz Lecturer in Economics Department of Economics University of the Western Cape

Reading:

Nancy L. Clark, "The Economy," chapter 3 in Byrnes, ed., South Africa.

9:45-10:15 Break

10:15-11:30 Lecture 14: The Political State in South Africa since 1994

Professor Keith Gottschalk Chair, Department of Political Studies University of the Western Cape

Readings:

Allister Sparks, Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside of South Africa's Road to Change, 1995. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, Part Nine, "Robben Island: Beginning to Hope," Part Ten, "Talking with the Enemy," and Part Eleven, "Freedom," 1995. Joshua Sinai, "Government and Politics," chapter 4, pp. 249-304, in Byrnes, ed., South Africa.

11:30-1:00 Lunch

1:00-4:30 Visit District Six Museum, on the site where lived a vibrant community of about 55,000 residents, mostly Colored/Mixed Race people, whom the apartheid government forced to move out. The entire area was bulldozed, but was never developed. The museum houses a collection of documentary photographs, a huge map of the area before the bulldozing, and a collection of original street signs. These exhibits will be one of the most affective experiences for the teachers during our five weeks in South Africa. Our guide will be Basil Brown.

Mr. Brown will also guide us in a study tour of Khayelitsha and Guguletu, two townships on the Cape Flats, the area outside of Cape Town where the apartheid government forced Africans and Colored/Mixed Race people to live. Highlights will be a visit to Vicky's Bed and Breakfast, a soup kitchen for school children, and to Golden's small shop at his home in Khayelitsha where he makes flowers from discarded tin cans to sell to customers such as our group and he also has contracts with several businesses in Cape Town. Golden is even branching out with recent sales in Europe. Mr. Brown is very knowledgeable and informative as he discusses all aspects of economic and social life in the townships.

Wednesday, July 24

8:30-9:45 Lecture 15: South Africa s Foreign Policy

Professor Gottschalk

Readings:

Joshua Sinai, "Government and Politics: Foreign Relations," chapter 4, pp. 304-27, in Byrnes, ed., South Africa. Peter J. Schraeder, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From International Pariah to Leader of the African Renaissance," Round Table, 2001.

9:45-10:15 Break

10:15-11:30 Lecture 16: South Africa's Prospects for the 21st Century

Lecturer TBA

11:30-Noon Break

Noon-12:45 A committee of teachers discusses and synthesizes the lectures and readings of Seminar 4.

Kathryn DeWitt, Lexington High School, Lexington, Massachusetts

Troy Hamilton, Wendell High School, Wendell, Idaho

Manuel Lopez, Everett Alvarez High School, Salinas, California

Eric Mendoza, Saint Columbkille Partnership School, Brighton, Massachusetts

Scott Mooney, St. Thomas Aquinas High School, Fort Lauderdale, Florida

Michelle Swanger, Newport Middle School, Newport, North Carolina

12:45-1:45 Lunch

1:45-3:00 Curriculum Development Seminar: Approaches for Infusing South African Content into the Classroom

A. Discuss ways to use the content in Seminar 4 in your classroom.

B. Discuss the field study throughout South Africa and ways to use your knowledge and experience in developing curriculum materials.

Ms. Grant

3:00-3:15 Break

3:15-4:30 A Retrospective Look at Our Five Weeks in South Africa

A dialogue among the teachers and the faculty. Teachers may read from their journals if they choose to do so.

Led by Ms. Grant and Dr. Corby

Evening Final group dinner at a Cape Town restaurant.

Thursday, July 25

AM Visit Green Market Square in Cape Town's business district. The market features African crafts and goods from all over the continent.

AM See the Castle of Good Hope. This is Cape Town's oldest building, completed in 1679 and which for 150 years served as the heart of the Cape administration and the center of social and economic life. It now contains a Military Museum, the Secunde's House (deputy governor) with original furnishings and paintings, and the William Fehr Collection, one of the country's most important exhibits of decorative arts.

PM Visit Kirstenbosch Botanical Gardens, among the outstanding gardens in the world. Featured are fynbos, plants native to the Cape, the most famous being the proteas (South Africa's national flower). A highlight is the wild almond hedge which the first Commander of the Cape Colony, Jan van Riebeeck, planted in 1660 to serve as a

barrier between the indigenous Khoikhoi and the Dutch settlers, the original attempt to physically separate indigenous people from European settlers.

PM Go on to Groot Constantia, one of the oldest wineries in the country and located in suburban Cape Town. Visit the museum in its 18th century Dutch-gabled building which contains quite a bit of period furnishings. Participate in a wine tasting if you like.

Friday, July 26

AM Drive in our chartered bus to the Cape of Good Hope National Park via spectacular Chapman's Peak Drive (and let's hope it's open as it's often closed); take the funicular or walk to the top of the original lighthouse at the Cape. The park incorporates excellent examples of fynbos, the major vegetation type of the botanical region known as the Cape Floral Kingdom. One of only five other floral kingdoms on earth, this one is by far the smallest in area.

PM Go on to Boulders Beach to see the African penguins; continue into Simon's Town for lunch. Simon's Town is the home port for the South African navy and there are always a number of ships docked.

Return to Cape Town.

Saturday, July 27

Go to the airport to fly to the US.

CHAPTER 3

MANDELA: HIS 8 LESSONS OF LEADERSHIP

RICHARD STENGEL, *TIME*

Nelson Mandela has always felt most at ease around children, and in some ways his greatest deprivation was that he spent 27 years without hearing a baby cry or holding a child's hand. Last month, when I visited Mandela in Johannesburg — a frailer, foggier Mandela than the one I used to know — his first instinct was to spread his arms to my two boys. Within seconds they were hugging the friendly old man who asked them what sports they liked to play and what they'd had for breakfast. While we talked, he held my son Gabriel, whose complicated middle name is Rolihlahla, Nelson Mandela's real first name. He told Gabriel the story of that name, how in Xhosa it translates as "pulling down the branch of a tree" but that its real meaning is "troublemaker."

As he celebrates his 90th birthday next week, Nelson Mandela has made enough trouble for several lifetimes. He liberated a country from a system of violent prejudice and helped unite white and black, oppressor and oppressed, in a way that had never been done before. In the 1990s I worked with Mandela for almost two years on his autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom. After all that time spent in his company, I felt a terrible sense of withdrawal when the book was done; it was like the sun going out of one's life. We have seen each other occasionally over the years, but I wanted to make what might be a final visit and have my sons meet him one more time.

I also wanted to talk to him about leadership. Mandela is the closest thing the world has to a secular saint, but he would be the first to admit that he is something far more pedestrian: a politician. He overthrew apartheid and created a nonracial democratic South Africa by knowing precisely when and how to transition between his roles as warrior, martyr, diplomat and statesman. Uncomfortable with abstract philosophical concepts, he would often say to me that an issue "was not a question of principle; it was a question of tactics." He is a master tactician.

Mandela is no longer comfortable with inquiries or favors. He's fearful that he may not be able to summon what people expect when they visit a living deity, and vain enough to care that they not think him diminished. But the world has never needed

Mandela's gifts — as a tactician, as an activist and, yes, as a politician — more, as he showed again in London on June 25, when he rose to condemn the savagery of Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. As we enter the main stretch of a historic presidential campaign in America, there is much that he can teach the two candidates. I've always thought of what you are about to read as Madiba's Rules (Madiba, his clan name, is what everyone close to him calls him), and they are cobbled together from our conversations old and new and from observing him up close and from afar. They are mostly practical. Many of them stem directly from his personal experience. All of them are calibrated to cause the best kind of trouble: the trouble that forces us to ask how we can make the world a better place.

No. 1: Courage is not the absence of fear — it's inspiring others to move beyond it

In 1994, during the presidential-election campaign, Mandela got on a tiny propeller plane to fly down to the killing fields of Natal and give a speech to his Zulu supporters. I agreed to meet him at the airport, where we would continue our work after his speech. When the plane was 20 minutes from landing, one of its engines failed. Some on the plane began to panic. The only thing that calmed them was looking at Mandela, who quietly read his newspaper as if he were a commuter on his morning train to the office. The airport prepared for an emergency landing, and the pilot managed to land the plane safely. When Mandela and I got in the backseat of his bulletproof BMW that would take us to the rally, he turned to me and said, "Man, I was terrified up there!"

Mandela was often afraid during his time underground, during the Rivonia trial that led to his imprisonment, during his time on Robben Island. "Of course I was afraid!" he would tell me later. It would have been irrational, he suggested, not to be. "I can't pretend that I'm brave and that I can beat the whole world." But as a leader, you cannot let people know. "You must put up a front."

And that's precisely what he learned to do: pretend and, through the act of appearing fearless, inspire others. It was a pantomime Mandela perfected on Robben Island, where there was much to fear. Prisoners who were with him said watching Mandela walk across the courtyard, upright and proud, was enough to keep them going for days. He knew that he was a model for others, and that gave him the strength to triumph over his own fear.

No. 2: Lead from the front — but don't leave your base behind

Mandela is cagey. in 1985 he was operated on for an enlarged prostate. When he was returned to prison, he was separated from his colleagues and friends for the first time in 21 years. They protested. But as his longtime friend Ahmed Kathrada recalls, he said to them, "Wait a minute, chaps. Some good may come of this."

The good that came of it was that Mandela on his own launched negotiations with the apartheid government. This was anathema to the African National Congress (ANC). After decades of saying "prisoners cannot negotiate" and after advocating an armed struggle that would bring the government to its knees, he decided that the time was right to begin to talk to his oppressors.

When he initiated his negotiations with the government in 1985, there were many who thought he had lost it. "We thought he was selling out," says Cyril Ramaphosa, then the powerful and fiery leader of the National Union of Mineworkers. "I went to see him to tell him, What are you doing? It was an unbelievable initiative. He took a massive risk."

Mandela launched a campaign to persuade the ANC that his was the correct course. His reputation was on the line. He went to each of his comrades in prison, Kathrada remembers, and explained what he was doing. Slowly and deliberately, he brought them along. "You take your support base along with you," says Ramaphosa, who was secretary-general of the ANC and is now a business mogul. "Once you arrive at the beachhead, then you allow the people to move on. He's not a bubble-gum leader — chew it now and throw it away."

For Mandela, refusing to negotiate was about tactics, not principles. Throughout his life, he has always made that distinction. His unwavering principle — the overthrow of apartheid and the achievement of one man, one vote — was immutable, but almost anything that helped him get to that goal he regarded as a tactic. He is the most pragmatic of idealists.

"He's a historical man," says Ramaphosa. "He was thinking way ahead of us. He has posterity in mind: How will they view what we've done?" Prison gave him the ability to take the long view. It had to; there was no other view possible. He was thinking in terms of not days and weeks but decades. He knew history was on his side, that the result was inevitable; it was just a question of how soon and how it would be achieved. "Things will be better in the long run," he sometimes said. He always played for the long run.

No. 3: Lead from the back — and let others believe they are in front

Mandela loved to reminisce about his boyhood and his lazy afternoons herding cattle. "You know," he would say, "you can only lead them from behind." He would then raise his eyebrows to make sure I got the analogy.

As a boy, Mandela was greatly influenced by Jongintaba, the tribal king who raised him. When Jongintaba had meetings of his court, the men gathered in a circle, and only after all had spoken did the king begin to speak. The chief's job, Mandela said, was not to tell people what to do but to form a consensus. "Don't enter the debate too early," he used to say.

During the time I worked with Mandela, he often called meetings of his kitchen cabinet at his home in Houghton, a lovely old suburb of Johannesburg. He would gather half a dozen men, Ramaphosa, Thabo Mbeki (who is now the South African President) and others around the dining-room table or sometimes in a circle in his driveway. Some of his colleagues would shout at him — to move faster, to be more radical — and Mandela would simply listen. When he finally did speak at those meetings, he slowly and methodically summarized everyone's points of view and then unfurled his own thoughts, subtly steering the decision in the direction he wanted without imposing it. The trick of leadership is allowing yourself to be led too. "It is wise," he said, "to persuade people to do things and make them think it was their own idea."

No. 4: Know your enemy — and learn about his favorite sport

As far back as the 1960s, Mandela began studying Afrikaans, the language of the white South Africans who created apartheid. His comrades in the ANC teased him about it, but he wanted to understand the Afrikaner's worldview; he knew that one day he would be fighting them or negotiating with them, and either way, his destiny was tied to theirs.

This was strategic in two senses: by speaking his opponents' language, he might understand their strengths and weaknesses and formulate tactics accordingly. But he would also be ingratiating himself with his enemy. Everyone from ordinary jailers to P.W. Botha was impressed by Mandela's willingness to speak Afrikaans and his knowledge of Afrikaner history. He even brushed up on his knowledge of rugby, the Afrikaners' beloved sport, so he would be able to compare notes on teams and players.

Mandela understood that blacks and Afrikaners had something fundamental in common: Afrikaners believed themselves to be Africans as deeply as blacks did. He

knew, too, that Afrikaners had been the victims of prejudice themselves: the British government and the white English settlers looked down on them. Afrikaners suffered from a cultural inferiority complex almost as much as blacks did.

Mandela was a lawyer, and in prison he helped the warders with their legal problems. They were far less educated and worldly than he, and it was extraordinary to them that a black man was willing and able to help them. These were "the most ruthless and brutal of the apartheid regime's characters," says Allister Sparks, the great South African historian, and he "realized that even the worst and crudest could be negotiated with."

No. 5: Keep your friends close — and your rivals even closer

Many of the guests Mandela invited to the house he built in Qunu were people whom, he intimated to me, he did not wholly trust. He had them to dinner; he called to consult with them; he flattered them and gave them gifts. Mandela is a man of invincible charm — and he has often used that charm to even greater effect on his rivals than on his allies.

On Robben Island, Mandela would always include in his brain trust men he neither liked nor relied on. One person he became close to was Chris Hani, the fiery chief of staff of the ANC's military wing. There were some who thought Hani was conspiring against Mandela, but Mandela cozied up to him. "It wasn't just Hani," says Ramaphosa. "It was also the big industrialists, the mining families, the opposition. He would pick up the phone and call them on their birthdays. He would go to family funerals. He saw it as an opportunity." When Mandela emerged from prison, he famously included his jailers among his friends and put leaders who had kept him in prison in his first Cabinet. Yet I well knew that he despised some of these men.

There were times he washed his hands of people — and times when, like so many people of great charm, he allowed himself to be charmed. Mandela initially developed a quick rapport with South African President F.W. de Klerk, which is why he later felt so betrayed when De Klerk attacked him in public.

Mandela believed that embracing his rivals was a way of controlling them: they were more dangerous on their own than within his circle of influence. He cherished loyalty, but he was never obsessed by it. After all, he used to say, "people act in their own interest." It was simply a fact of human nature, not a flaw or a defect. The flip side of being an optimist — and he is one — is trusting people too much. But Mandela rec-

ognized that the way to deal with those he didn't trust was to neutralize them with charm.

No. 6: Appearances matter — and remember to smile

When Mandela was a poor law student in Johannesburg wearing his one threadbare suit, he was taken to see Walter Sisulu. Sisulu was a real estate agent and a young leader of the ANC. Mandela saw a sophisticated and successful black man whom he could emulate. Sisulu saw the future.

Sisulu once told me that his great quest in the 1950s was to turn the ANC into a mass movement; and then one day, he recalled with a smile, "a mass leader walked into my office." Mandela was tall and handsome, an amateur boxer who carried himself with the regal air of a chief's son. And he had a smile that was like the sun coming out on a cloudy day.

We sometimes forget the historical correlation between leadership and physicality. George Washington was the tallest and probably the strongest man in every room he entered. Size and strength have more to do with DNA than with leadership manuals, but Mandela understood how his appearance could advance his cause. As leader of the ANC's underground military wing, he insisted that he be photographed in the proper fatigues and with a beard, and throughout his career he has been concerned about dressing appropriately for his position. George Bizos, his lawyer, remembers that he first met Mandela at an Indian tailor's shop in the 1950s and that Mandela was the first black South African he had ever seen being fitted for a suit. Now Mandela's uniform is a series of exuberant-print shirts that declare him the joyous grandfather of modern Africa.

When Mandela was running for the presidency in 1994, he knew that symbols mattered as much as substance. He was never a great public speaker, and people often tuned out what he was saying after the first few minutes. But it was the iconography that people understood. When he was on a platform, he would always do the toyi-toyi, the township dance that was an emblem of the struggle. But more important was that dazzling, beatific, all-inclusive smile. For white South Africans, the smile symbolized Mandela's lack of bitterness and suggested that he was sympathetic to them. To black voters, it said, I am the happy warrior, and we will triumph. The ubiquitous ANC election poster was simply his smiling face. "The smile," says Ramaphosa, "was the message."

After he emerged from prison, people would say, over and over, It is amazing that he is not bitter. There are a thousand things Nelson Mandela was bitter about, but he knew that more than anything else, he had to project the exact opposite emotion. He always said, "Forget the past" — but I knew he never did.

No. 7: Nothing is black or white

When we began our series of interviews, I would often ask Mandela questions like this one: When you decided to suspend the armed struggle, was it because you realized you did not have the strength to overthrow the government or because you knew you could win over international opinion by choosing nonviolence? He would then give me a curious glance and say, "Why not both?"

I did start asking smarter questions, but the message was clear: Life is never either/or. Decisions are complex, and there are always competing factors. To look for simple explanations is the bias of the human brain, but it doesn't correspond to reality. Nothing is ever as straightforward as it appears.

Mandela is comfortable with contradiction. As a politician, he was a pragmatist who saw the world as infinitely nuanced. Much of this, I believe, came from living as a black man under an apartheid system that offered a daily regimen of excruciating and debilitating moral choices: Do I defer to the white boss to get the job I want and avoid a punishment? Do I carry my pass?

As a statesman, Mandela was uncommonly loyal to Muammar Gaddafi and Fidel Castro. They had helped the ANC when the U.S. still branded Mandela as a terrorist. When I asked him about Gaddafi and Castro, he suggested that Americans tend to see things in black and white, and he would upbraid me for my lack of nuance. Every problem has many causes. While he was indisputably and clearly against apartheid, the causes of apartheid were complex. They were historical, sociological and psychological. Mandela's calculus was always, What is the end that I seek, and what is the most practical way to get there?

No. 8: Quitting is leading too

In 1993, Mandela asked me if I knew of any countries where the minimum voting age was under 18. I did some research and presented him with a rather undistinguished list: Indonesia, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea and Iran. He nodded and uttered his highest praise: "Very good, very good." Two weeks later, Mandela went on South Afri-

can television and proposed that the voting age be lowered to 14. "He tried to sell us the idea," recalls Ramaphosa, "but he was the only [supporter]. And he had to face the reality that it would not win the day. He accepted it with great humility. He doesn't sulk. That was also a lesson in leadership."

Knowing how to abandon a failed idea, task or relationship is often the most difficult kind of decision a leader has to make. In many ways, Mandela's greatest legacy as President of South Africa is the way he chose to leave it. When he was elected in 1994, Mandela probably could have pressed to be President for life — and there were many who felt that in return for his years in prison, that was the least South Africa could do.

In the history of Africa, there have been only a handful of democratically elected leaders who willingly stood down from office. Mandela was determined to set a precedent for all who followed him — not only in South Africa but across the rest of the continent. He would be the anti-Mugabe, the man who gave birth to his country and refused to hold it hostage. "His job was to set the course," says Ramaphosa, "not to steer the ship." He knows that leaders lead as much by what they choose not to do as what they do.

Ultimately, the key to understanding Mandela is those 27 years in prison. The man who walked onto Robben Island in 1964 was emotional, headstrong, easily stung. The man who emerged was balanced and disciplined. He is not and never has been introspective. I often asked him how the man who emerged from prison differed from the willful young man who had entered it. He hated this question. Finally, in exasperation one day, he said, "I came out mature." There is nothing so rare — or so valuable — as a mature man. Happy birthday, Madiba.

CHAPTER 4

MUSIC FROM SOUTH AFRICA

ISABELLE LEYMARIE, *UNESCO COURIER*

South African traditional popular music has taken the international music scene by storm

These days South African music is known all over the world. It emerged on the international scene at the end of the 1960s with Myriam Makeba and Hugh Masakela and really took off after apartheid was abolished.

Now we have the wonderful sounds of Joseph Shahalala's a cappella Latlysmith Black Mambazo group, Mahlathini anti the vivacious Mahotella Queens, the lively jazz of Dollar Brand, Chris McGregor, Dudu Pukwana, Jonas Gwangwa and

Bheki Mseleku, as well as the dynamic multiracial group Jnluka, led by Johnny Clegg and Sipho Mchunu.

Influenced by gospel and soul music, the ancient indigenous choral traditions-especially among the Zulu and the Xhosa-developed rich vocal harmonies which arc the basis of the country's modern popular music.

The black townships-artificial ghettos swollen by migrants from the countryside who were forcibly resettled under apartheid-are especially fertile ground for musicians. Soweto, for example, is one of the most lively musical centres in the country, where the mbaqanga, a combination of South African rhythms, jazz, soul and old European tunes, with a throbbing bass sound, is still very popular.

The Africa Cultural Centre

Last summer, the Musiques de Nuit festival in France invited nineteen young musicians, dancers and artists from Johannesburg's Africa Cultural Centre to come and run workshops for teenagers in various suburbs of Bordeaux. They also organized discussion groups on philosophical and humanistic subjects.

The Centre, a lively cultural spot and symbol of liberated Africa, was founded in the 1980s in the west Johannesburg suburb of Newton Bay by Benjy Francis, a man of the theatre who was born in a Durban township in the year apartheid was officially introduced. Since the end of the 1970s, he has been the standard-bearer of rebellious black culture, along with others like the producer Barney Simon. After the Soweto mas-

sacre of 1976, Francis decided "to give the struggle another dimension with new cultural projects."

With limited resources, he founded the Market Theatre, which started out in the street before becoming what is now the Centre a few years later. It was shut down several times by the authorities, but survived thanks to the perseverance of Francis and to funding by progressive organizations. Its repertoire was then expanded to include other disciplines and several artists gave their time freely. In 1980, Francis opened an artists' centre to encourage exchanges between various forms of expression, and the Africa Cultural Centre grew out of this initiative. A repertoire of South African plays was put together, notably Duzab 's Night of the Long Wake.

The Centre is well known in Johannesburg but also organizes courses anti workshops in other towns, teaching music, tiance (traditional and hiphop), percussion, drama and the plastic arts. The aim, says Francis, a colourful figure with a beard and a beret, is "to channel young people's energies towards artistic expression which can free them. We are offering our approach and we are ready to learn as well. We don't close our doors, we don't commercialize and we don't downsize our dreams."

Citing the example of Nelson Mandela, Francis opts for dialogue rather than confrontation, for tolerance anti openness rather than revenge and hostility. Two years ago, the Centre staged Africus, the continent's first biennial modern art exhibition, on the theme of "Let's decolonize our Minds".

In 1994, the Centre opened its Children's Museum, which will soon have a scientific section and a library. The Centre has also welcomed performers such as Whitney Houston and organized a children's parade ("Heal Humanity") aimed at encouraging young people's creativity. Francis is likewise planning to launch a social awareness project, to look at problems like battered children, poverty, hunger and teenage pregnancy.

Last autumn, the Cite de Ia l\Iusique in Paris welcomed some other South African musicians, who also displayed the country's cultural richness and diversity. They included the Nzalabantu Choir, a physically striking group of traditional female singers from Kwazulu Natal who usually perform at initiation rites, marriages and village festivals. There was also the diva Sihongile Khumalo, who comes from the same part of the country but grew up in Soweto. Accompanied by a quartet featuring the talented young jazz pianist Moses Mololckwa, she sings from a repertoire which blends the lyrical with traditional Zulu chants. There was also a troupe of ingoma dancers (the

Lamontville Group) and the Shukuma Black Mambazo All Star Flutes.

Choirs, dances and penny whistles

On Sundays, ingoma, a collection of dancers that takes its name from a drum, is put on by Zulu miners living in the mine hostels. The songs and dances, which hark back to those of ancestral warriors and are warlike and initiatory, are performed to the accompaniment of a large drum made of a double cowhide stretched over a metal oil drum.

Lamontville, after the name of a Durban township, is a group of young dancers who keep alive the famous gumboot dance beloved of Zulu workers during their leisure time. The dancers wear rubber hoots adorned with tinkling bottle caps which they slap with their hands. The rhythm of the steps, the hand-slapping and the shouts and exhortations of the group's leader arc the only musical accompaniment.

The Shukuma Black Mamhazo All-Star Flutes, which blossomed in the Johannesburg township of Alexandra between 1956 and 1963, came together again specially for the Paris concert. With acoustic guitars and penny whistles, they recreate the sound of the kwela groups. Kwela! in Zulu means "scram!" and is used to warn that the police are coming. This musical style, popular in the 1940s and 1950s, is a street version of township jazz. It has gathered other instruments along the way, such as the saxophone, electric guitar, bass and piano, and influenced many performers, including Myriam Makeba.

CHAPTER 5

"SOUTH AFRICA HEADS INTO ELECTIONS IN A SORRY STATE OF HEALTH"
CLARE KAPP, *THE LANCET*

South Africa's ruling African National Congress has singled out health as one of the top five priorities for the next government. With good reason. Clare Kapp reports from Cape Town.

President-in-waiting Jacob Zuma addressed 60 000 adoring supporters at the launch of the African National Congress' (ANC) election manifesto on Jan 10, vaunting the social progress that has been made since the party came to power. He said that 88% of the population had access to running water, up from 62% in 1996; 12·5 million received social grants, up from 3 million; free primary health care was expanded, 1600 more clinics were built, and more than half the 400 public hospitals were refurbished.

But the ANC, which is expected to sweep April's elections, is acutely aware of a grimmer set of statistics: around 5·7 million South Africans are infected with HIV/AIDS; life expectancy is 12 years lower than in 1996; maternal mortality is worse than Iraq's; child mortality is more than three times higher than Brazil; and more than a third of public sector posts are vacant.

"It is clear that the health of the South African population has worsened. South Africa can be considered to have a quadruple burden of disease, including diseases and conditions relating to poverty and under-development, chronic diseases, injuries and HIV and AIDS", said the Medical Research Council's Debbie Bradshaw in the South African Health Review 2008, published in December by the Health Systems Trust. She said between 1997 and 2005, there was "a relentless increase in the young adult and child deaths" because of HIV/AIDS. The death rate among women aged 30—34 years quadrupled between 1997 and 2005. South Africa is one of only 12 countries in the world where child mortality is worsening, at 69 per 1000 livebirths.

After a decade of HIV/AIDS denialism by President Thabo Mbeki and his health minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, South Africa has finally turned the corner. New health minister Barbara Hogan has appointed HIV/AIDS activist Fatima Hassan as an adviser and has declared fighting the dual HIV/tuberculosis epidemic and speeding up the provision of dual therapy to prevent mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV/AIDS as her top priorities. In scenes unthinkable even a few months ago, govern-

ment, civil society, big business, and trade unions joined forces on World AIDS Day, 2008. Banks ceased business and there were work stoppages to persuade employees to be tested. “We have to mourn the lives of those we have not saved”, said Hogan. Delays in rolling out antiretroviral therapy cost more than 330 000 lives between 2000 and 2005, according to estimates from the Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA.

Whether Hogan will remain health minister after the elections is unclear. She was appointed by interim president Kgalema Motlanthe in September and has won universal praise. If Zuma is elected, he may opt for an inner circle member like Zweli Mkhize—a doctor who heads the ANC's education and health subcommittee and hails from Zuma's native KwaZulu-Natal province. But the momentum gained over the past few months looks irreversible. “Things are moving in the right direction but the real challenge will be implementation in a very complex environment. Because of the legacy of a decade of mismanagement, the health system is a mess”, says Mark Heywood, the vice chairman of the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC).

Hogan wants to speed-up the provision of dual therapy to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV

The ANC manifesto echoes the 2007—11 National Strategic Plan in vowing to reduce the rate of new HIV infections by 50%, expand access to treatment, care, and support to at least 80% of all HIV-positive people and their families, and upscale PMTCT. More than 500 000 South Africans are estimated to be on antiretrovirals but figures vary because of absence of monitoring and evaluation. But, according to a forthcoming report prepared for SANAC, the need for antiretroviral therapy is also expanding by half a million people per year. South Africa will have to double the number of people on therapy every year until 2012 to reach all those who need it. And in the best case scenario, an estimated 1·2 million will die of HIV/AIDS by 2012, according to the report edited by Heywood, Making Progress Against AIDS? It says that the most promising hope is offered by PMTCT dual therapy.

SANAC looks set to gain some much-needed teeth with its pending move from the ministry of health to the apolitical Development Bank of Southern Africa. There are plans to appoint a chief executive and increase the professional staff from four to 35. SANAC last year agreed to take on tuberculosis, following recommendations that HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis should be tackled together rather than as separate diseases.

South Africa had a tuberculosis prevalence of 940 per 100 000 people in 2006, according to WHO. Between 1997 and 2005, the number of people dying each year

from the disease rose from 22 071 to 73 903, a 334·8% increase, according to a report prepared for SANAC. The number of new cases doubled between 2001 and 2006, to 342 315 cases and rose again to 382 000 cases in 2007. The nationwide cure rate is 57·6% and only 45·2% in the worst affected province of KwaZulu-Natal—hence South Africa's high rate of drug resistant cases. The report said existing policy of hospitalising drug-resistant cases was impractical. Rather, it would be better to treat people in the community, with infection-control education for their families and contact tracing. This model has been implemented in KwaZulu-Natal's Tugela Ferry. In a community where 87 patients are being treated for multidrug-resistant (MDR) tuberculosis, 403 community members were contact traced. After 6 months, no adult had contracted MDR or extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis but six children had contracted tuberculosis.

South Africa was dealt a cruel blow when the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)—yet again—rejected its Round 8 grant proposals for US$260 million for 5-year HIV/AIDS programmes, and $196 million for tuberculosis control. Insiders put the blame firmly on Tshabalala-Msimang—notorious for her dislike of foreign donors—for shoddy documents thrown together at the last minute by her department. “It was completely botched”, said Francois Venter of Wits University's Reproductive Health and HIV Research Unit, which made submissions. “It was gross, gross, gross incompetence.”

Hogan said the decision was a setback to efforts to scale up prevention, care, and treatment. “The one positive aspect of being rejected is that we have learnt valuable lessons that will hopefully prevent our country from being rejected for similar reasons in Round 9”, Hogan told The Lancet. “We are now taking active and bold steps to prepare and strengthen the Country Coordinating Mechanism to ensure that South Africa is in a position to submit a strong, evidence-based application to the GFATM for Round 9.”

Hogan's other main priority is to improve quality of care. In a bid to make inroads against maternal and child mortality, she says the government has identified 18 of the neediest districts for “accelerated quality interventions”. There have been big strides toward universal access to health care, including free care to children younger than 6 years and pregnant women. A school feeding programme reaches 6 million deprived children in 18 million schools. But, like education, the public-health system is overburdened, understaffed, and underfunded.

To try to rectify this, the ANC's manifesto promises to phase in a National Health Insurance System over the next 5 years. It vows to improve management and leader-

ship skills at all levels of the health system and to reduce long queues and waiting times. It also promises “specific targets for the provision of adequate numbers of workers at all levels of the health care system, including recruitment, training, and filling of vacant posts”. It wants to reopen nursing training colleges and improve working conditions and wages.

In the Health Systems Trust report, Uta Lehmann of the University of the Western Cape's School of Public Health, said the health force was now “substantially weaker” than in the mid 1990s, with fewer per head doctors and nurses available to the public sector, and huge regional disparities. In 1994 there were 25 doctors per 10 000 people, and this fell slightly to 24·4% in 2007. The number of nurses plummeted from 251 to 110 per 10 000. In 1989, 38% of doctors and 79% of nurses worked in the public sector, in 2007 it was 30% and 42%, respectively. Only 3% of registered nurses were younger than 30 years, and 40% were likely to retire in the next 5—10 years. There were serious shortcomings in education and training. “Generally health workers entering primary or community health care find themselves ill-prepared and poorly supported and resourced.” Lehmann's conclusion was frank. “Returning to the question of what progress has been made toward improving human resources for primary health care, the answer has to be very little.”

CHAPTER 6

AIDS AND POVERTY

SAM MHLONGO, *NEW AFRICAN*

Doctors in Africa appear to have forgotten that many of the sick they encounter have always satisfied the Bangui definition of AIDS.

That tuberculosis (TB) is a disease largely associated with destitution and poverty is beyond dispute. Its prevalence diminishes as social and economic conditions improve. Sub-standard housing, shacks and overcrowding favour the risk of massive infection or re-infection. Eighty per cent of South Africa can still be described in this way today since the inequalities of the imperialist and apartheid eras still define the country.

When one looks at the history of South Africa, it is difficult, if not impossible, not to conclude that the current debate on HIV/Aids is dominated by medicalisation of diseases of poverty. Doctors and most other health professionals find it difficult, if not impossible, to deal with health-related issues without medicalising them.

The HIV/Aids orthodoxy claims with little substantiation that what we are seeing in Africa since 1983 is new. Regrettably, insidiously and tragically, this helps all the guilty to forget the history of apartheid and three centuries of colonial conquest and imperialism. I shall confine myself to South Africa.

In a recent polemical review, Prof Peter Duesberg and Dr David Rasnick (both members of the Mbeki Aids Panel) returned to the now discarded drug hypothesis -that the use of recreational drugs is the common denominator of Aids in America and Europe.

They reminded us that before the popularisation of the virus--HIV/Aids hypothesis -- many American and some European investigators had postulated that the epidemic was a collection of drug and lifestyle diseases.

The correlation between immunodeficiency and poverty, malnutrition, poor sanitation, urban squalor and rural and urban unemployment cannot be denied. We have now had almost 20 years of HIV/Aids, and because of the almost exclusive biomedical approach, other questions are not being asked as frequently as they should.

Doctors in Africa appear to have forgotten that many of the sick they encounter have always satisfied the Bangui definition of AIDS (ie, chronic cough, diarrhoea, fever, TB and weight loss) even long before HIV.

Indeed undergraduate medical students and qualified health professionals read from their recommended manuals that immunodeficiency may be caused by malnutrition.

In Africa, the problem may even be worse than malnutrition -- ie, "chill penury" (destitution and poverty). Nutritionally Acquired Immune Dysfunction Syndrome (NAIDS) is well recognised in many medical textbooks.

The syndrome includes several other known conditions, which lead to immunodeficiency. It is known that starving and malnourished children mostly exposed to poor environmental conditions are particularly susceptible to respiratory and gastrointestinal infections and septicaemia.

With regard to the medical history of South Africa long before Luc Montagnier's HIV/Aids 'discovery", Prof John Reid of the Durban Medical School noted that 50% of black children in rural areas of South Africa died before the age of five. The commonest causes of death amongst these black infants were recorded as bronchopneumonia, dehydration and diarrhoea.

Reid's successor, Prof Moosa, reported that of black African schoolage children, 70% were underweight and 66% showed stunted growth due to under-nutrition and diseases associated with it.

The tables on the left illustrate the dangers and fallacy of the present preoccupation with the HIV causes AIDS and death hypothesis. Due to conditions of apartheid, it is suggested that the figures were not complete -- there was massive under-reporting.

What is amazing today is that both orthodox health professionals and many HIV/Aids dissidents either ignore these aspects or may not be aware of them -- hence the claim that they are seeing a new disease (Aids).

I would suggest strongly that all Aids researchers should visit this history which is still relevant since not much has changed in the daily disabilities that black Africans face in their lives.

It is difficult, in the light of the evidence and the history of South Africa, to accept that a single retrovirus largely explains the disease (Aids) which doctors encounter in their practices or hospitals.

TABLE I

TB Prevalence rates 1951 whole country

Africans	*Whites*	*Coloured*	*Asian*
19,392	1477	4586	1084

From *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1951*

Table II

Tuberculosis: reported cases, 1968

Africans	*Whites*	*Coloured*	*Asian*
61,292	921	7,481	990

From *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1968*

Table III

Leprosy, polio and typhoid: reported cases 1964

	Africans	*Whites*	*Coloured*	*Asians*
Leprosy	501	6	20	5
Polio	86	2	15	4
Typhoid	3,027	74	123	19

From *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1964*

Table IV

Infant mortality per 1000 live births, 1953/4

Africans	*Whites*	*Coloured*	*Asians*
210	33	134	66

From *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1953/4*

Table V

Kwashiokor: reported cases, 1964/5

Africans	*Whites*	*Coloured*	*Asians*
13,358	0	410	40

From *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1964/5*

Table VI

Percentage of children under 12 with stunted growth (including kwashiorkor) 1988

South Africa:

Eastern Cape	58%
Northern Cape	80%
Transvaal	49%

Neighbouring countries:

Mauritius	21%
Swaziland	10%
Zambia	19%

From *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1988*

CHAPTER 7

UNIONS TACKLING AIDS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

AMERICAN TEACHER

The AFT serves as a technical adviser to the U.S. government HIV and AIDS prevention and treatment project for South African teachers, which is a part of the AFT Educational Foundation. While in southern Africa, from March 24 to April2, to consult with human rights organizations in Zimbabwe about post-conflict stabilization, AFT secretary-treasurer Antonia Cortese and AFT Healthcare director Mary MacDonald traveled to Durban to meet the union's project partners at the South Africa AIDS Conference. Following is a report on the AFT's HIV and AIDS project by Smydge Perry, the South Africa project director.

The AFT began developing HIV and AIDS workplace programs with teacher unions in sub-Saharan Africa in 2000. Start-up money from the national AFT-Africa AIDS Campaign launched HIV prevention initiatives with teachers unions in Kenya, Swaziland, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The South Africa project was based on a 2005 report by South Africa's Human Science Research Council, "The Health of Our Educators" which found that approximately 50 percent of all teacher attrition in South Africa was linked to AIDS, which resulted in the death of 4,000 teachers in 2004.

These statistics were startling to the South African teachers unions, which recognized that the HIV/AIDS epidemic was severely affecting the supply and demand of educators in both primary and secondary schools. Without treatment, infected teachers eventually become chronically ill with increased absenteeism, and lower morale and productivity. Consequently, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provided a grant to the AFT Educational Fund, South African unions and other non-government partners to mitigate the effects of HIV and AIDS on the education sector. The project provides voluntary counseling and testing, peer education on prevention, condom access and treatment services exclusively for teachers.

South African teachers unions, which have a proven track record in implementing HIV and AIDS programs, execute the project under the leadership of the country's Education Labor Relations Council, of which they are all members.

During their visit, Cortese and MacDonald joined union leaders at the South African AIDS Conference in Durban. While it is too early to declare victory, there are some encouraging signs that the AIDS epidemic may have peaked. According to a 2007 study by the South African Department of Health, HIV prevalence among young women (ages 15- 24) showed a significant decline, although there were no notable declines for older women (ages 25-49). Given that a majority of the teacher population falls into the latter category, the activities of the teachers unions are strategically positioned to have an impact on this target population.

CHAPTER 8

EVERYBODY HAS GOT IT WRONG ABOUT MY COUNTRY

LIZ MCGREGOR, *NEW STATESMAN*

Even the left, which invested too much ideological hope in South Africa, sees it as a land of crime.

Next year, South Africa will celebrate its first decade of democracy. In April 1994, the world rejoiced at the overthrow of apartheid and at Nelson Mandela's accession to power. So why is there now such a strong sense of international disillusionment? The dominant view of South Africa abroad is that it is a lawless, unstable place, plagued by crime and corruption; that white people's days here are numbered, if they are not raped and murdered first; and that property rights are at best tenuous.

Having read such reports, I returned to South Africa from Britain at the end of last year with some trepidation. I have now learnt that the view from abroad is seriously distorted.

The reality of South Africa in late 2003 is that whites are more likely to die by their own hand than anyone else's - the suicide rate is higher than the murder rate, presumably a sign of an inability to adapt to the new order, given that the rate has soared since 1994. The highest proportion of murders is among young men, killed by other young men in drunken brawls - a murder profile that corresponds roughly to Britain's. Rape is less a random crime than a systemic enforcement of patriarchy: it is far more likely to affect poor and powerless women and girls than members of the middle class, to which most whites still belong.

Far from being unstable, South Africa is, if anything, too stable - given the huge racial inequalities in the distribution of land and wealth. The latest figures show that the average white person's income has increased since 1994, while the average black's has decreased, and the black middle class, though larger than before and very wealthy, is just a small elite. On a broader level, there is no danger of either the ruling African National Congress or the constitution being overturned in the foreseeable future. The rule of law is impeccably observed.

But South Africa's image in the outside world is imprisoned by its past. Many of the journalists who run newsrooms in Europe and North America today cut their political teeth in the anti-apartheid movement. On university campuses, it was the iconic struggle of the 1970s and 1980s; the emergence of a leader of Mandela's stature reinforced its righteousness. No other struggle offered quite such a simple opposition of good and evil. And many Britons and Americans could project anxieties about racial tensions in their own countries on to this larger canvas, in a land sufficiently distant to blur any inconsistencies.

Then revolution gave way to the grey reality of governance, with its inevitable compromises. Pragmatism often took precedence over principle. The South African government embraced neoliberal policies and the left - which had assumed that the ANC shared all its favourite causes, from comprehensive schooling to gay rights - felt let down.

The liberal left would have been better able to come to terms with the new South Africa if it had known the country better. But during apartheid, liberals faithfully observed sanctions, refusing to visit the country. They never developed a relationship with the real South Africa. Once the certainties of ideology and struggle were out of the equation, their attitude became one of puzzled disappointment. Their image of the country reverted to the European default mode of "darkest Africa" - a place incomprehensible, irrational, violent, anarchic.

Oddly, the right, which continued to visit South Africa throughout the bad years, developed a more intimate relationship. To be sure, the love affair was mostly with colonial Africa - the servants, the wildlife, G&Ts under an African sunset - but it was a genuine affection.

This was why Zimbabwe hit the headlines. Into the vacuum left by the anti-apartheid struggle came a new African drama, also starring whites - and whites have to be involved if white Britons are to engage with Africa at all. The white way of life in Africa, with all its colonial nostalgia, was under attack. Britain's right-wing media rallied to its defence. Even the liberal media climbed on the Zimbabwean bandwagon, especially once the issue expanded from white dispossession to Robert Mugabe's black victims.

So Southern Africa as a whole is now viewed through the prism of Zimbabwe. It is unjust, inaccurate and, yes, racist. But in the minds of busy desk editors, Africa quickly falls victim to stereotypes. As a freelance journalist writing for mostly British and American papers, I find that stories about rape, murder and dodgy Aids policies

sell easily. Anything more nuanced or about the complexities of change is much harder to place.

There is another influence on the negative perceptions of South Africa. Many newspapers and broadcasters have only one staff correspondent to cover the whole of Africa. So opinion-formers such as leader writers and columnists tend to derive their views of the continent from British-based NGOs running aid projects in Africa. And these agencies, splendid as they are, inevitably focus on misery and calamity.

What I find quite scary is that the preoccupations of the most recidivist in the white community here - crime, corruption and Zimbabwe - are the ones that tend to dominate foreign perceptions of the country. There are many white people who have bought into the new South Africa and are up for the adventure of nation-building. But there are many more who remain resolutely stuck in the past. You hear them on radio phone-ins and read them in newspaper letters columns. They are rabidly right-wing and they barely conceal their racism.

South Africa's negative image overseas is not a trivial issue. If all its people are to have jobs and eat well - the present unemployment rate is 40 per cent - it needs far more foreign investment. It will never get that as long as the country is viewed, wrongly, as a violent and unstable place.

The danger is that the distorted reality of the recidivist whites could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. A recent survey showed that 40 per cent of them will not vote in next year's general election because they feel alienated from the body politic. The danger is that ten years down the line, another, perhaps more volatile, populist leader, faced with the demands of a hungry new jobless generation, will take the same road as Mugabe and seek a scapegoat. And what better than a marginalised, privileged, racially discrete group which, like Zimbabwe's white farmers, can be turned on with impunity because the vast majority of the population won't care?

Perhaps the ten-year anniversary of the triumph over apartheid would be a good time for the left to reclaim the debate from the bigots and the neocolonialists. They will find there is far more to Africa than its lunatic fringes.

CHAPTER 9

SOUTH AFRICA'S 'RAINBOW PEOPLE,' NATIONAL PRIDE AND HAPPINESS MOLLER, DICKOW AND HARRIS, *SOCIAL INDICATORS RESEARCH*

ABSTRACT

Since the first free elections were held in April 1994, South Africans are popularly known as the "rainbow people". The paper inquires whether South Africans who experienced pride in their nation in the first years of democracy also perceived a greater sense of subjective well-being. It is proposed that national pride in post-apartheid South Africa might be fused with or work through self-esteem to lift levels of happiness. The paper traces the history of the new integrating civil religion of the rainbow people and the acceptance of the rainbow as a political symbol of unity among the diverse people of South Africa immediately after the 1994 elections and two years later. The proposed link between national pride and happiness was explored with data from two independent national surveys, the 1995 South African World Values Survey conducted by Markinor and a June 1996 MarkData syndicated omnibus survey. The study found that the appeal of the rainbow as political symbol was inclusive of all groups in society and that feelings of national pride and support for the rainbow ideal were positively associated with subjective well-being. As indicated by intensity and frequency measures, the majority of South Africans were proud of their country and could name a national achievement that inspired pride. Better-off South Africans tended to be happier and more satisfied with life but less proud, while the poor were less happy but fiercely proud of their country. Results suggest that belief in South Africa's "rainbow nation" ideal may have assisted in boosting happiness during the transition to a stable democracy, thereby preventing alienation among the losers under the new political dispensation. Supporters of the ideal of the rainbow nation were more optimistic than others about the future of their country.

INTRODUCTION

South Africans have been "walking tall" since South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994. A surge of national pride caught first time voters already in the run-up to the elections When the new government of national unity came into power, it ap-

pealed to citizens' sense of common purpose to forge a unified nation. Nobel peace laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu at a celebration commemorating the new nation introduced the rainbow over South Africa as a symbol of reconciliation and unity among all the diverse people in the nation. This spirit of unity is captured in the new identity adopted by South Africa as the nation of the "rainbow people". In the three years since the rainbow ceremony took place, South Africans have made the symbol of the rainbow their own. The rainbow is ubiquitous and competes with the flag as a national symbol which signifies pride. The "rainbow nation" has popular appeal as a catch phrase, political slogan and source of inspiration for group enterprise. The rainbow symbol has been exploited for commercial purposes as well as political ends. It features in the title of business and community enterprises and adorns products boasting South African origin from clothing to coffee cups to band-aids.

Research question.

This study explores the link between national pride and happiness among South Africans, taking into account the role of the national symbol of unity of the rainbow. The key question posed in the study is whether South Africans who experienced pride in their nation in the first years of democracy also perceived a greater sense of subjective well-being.

Theoretical Considerations

The rationale for the study came from considerations of South Africa's happiness deficit. People living in democratic societies, who generally enjoy a higher standard of living, tend to express higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction than people living in poorer countries and in circumstances of oppression. In South Africa under apartheid the majority of disenfranchised blacks expressed unhappiness while whites expressed contentment in happiness surveys. In the aftermath of the first democratic elections, levels of happiness and life satisfaction of formerly disenfranchised South Africans peaked, completely eliminating the happiness deficit of blacks (M0ller, 1994; M0ller and Hanf, 1995). The elation proved to be short-lived. Nevertheless, post-election euphoria - however fleeting - might be interpreted as an expression of pride as well as happiness, especially among first-time voters.

There are few studies which have researched national pride in relation to happiness; a reflection possibly of the fact that under normal conditions national issues tend to have little impact on subjective well-being. Andrews and Withey's (1976) pioneering study found that personal issues were more central for subjective well-being than peripheral issues of the state. Earlier studies of quality of life in South Africa (M0ller, 1988, 1995) confirmed that peripheral issues concerning community and na-

tional affairs tended to be evaluated much less positively than the more central domains of the family and the self. Central issues relating to family and the self were also more closely associated with overall personal well being. At the same time, it was observed that apartheid impacted on virtually every aspect of life to depress black quality of life including self worth ("yourself as a person") (Moller and Schlemmer, 1989; Moller, 1998).

Veenhoven's World Database on Happiness (1997) reports only a small number of studies which include attitudes to the nation, including satisfaction with life in one's country and its socio economic status. Correlations between these factors and happiness were for the most part positive. Of particular significance for this study is that the 14-country study undertaken by Cantril in the 1960s found higher positive correlations between national factors and happiness in societies which had recently undergone political upheavals. This finding suggests that under conditions of major political change, national agendas become fused with the personal. In short, national issues become personal ones.

Arguing along these lines, it is proposed that national pride in post-apartheid South Africa might have a personal dimension akin to self-esteem: the phenomenon of "walking tall" referred to at the outset. The working hypothesis put forward here is that in democratic South Africa national pride is positively correlated with happiness. Either national pride is fused with self-esteem or works through self-esteem to boost levels of happiness. Self-esteem, unlike attitudes to the nation, is regularly cited in the literature as a correlate of subjective well-being (Diener, 1994: 115).

While some might contend that national pride among first-time voters is an extension of personal pride, others might argue that national pride is displaced self-esteem. No matter which viewpoint is adopted, the anecdotal evidence is so strong there can be no doubt that black South Africans perceived the "election miracle" as personal as well as collective triumph after years of oppression. The argument that the national is fused with the personal is particularly cogent when applied to a collectivist society. Fundamental to collectivism is that individuals are bound together in interdepen dent entities (Triandis, 1995). The individual and the group derive their meaning from coexistence with each other. People are expected to place the common good before their personal interests. In individualistic societies, by contrast, individuals are loosely connected and expected to look after themselves. The African philosophy of ubuntu fits the definition of collectivism; its morality emphasises mutual respect and support as well as group cohesiveness. As will be outlined in greater detail below, the rainbow over South Africa is essentially a strong collectivist symbol which defines the group as

the entire nation in contrast to the racial groups defined by apartheid society. One might expect the rainbow symbolism to have a stronger appeal to collectivists than individualists.

The Report

The organisation of the report reflects the progression of the study. The first section traces the symbol of the rainbow back to its religious roots. Dickow (1997) describes the emergence of a new integrating civil religion of the rainbow nation and its following. Dickow, an eyewitness to the Thanksgiving Service which gave birth to the "rainbow nation" in 1994, placed a special item to determine the level of acceptance of the new civil religion. The second and third sections of the paper present results from nation wide surveys conducted in 1995 and 1996 which surveyed popular views on the rainbow symbol, happiness, national pride and sources of national pride. The fourth section of the paper establishes the link between national pride and happiness in the survey findings. A brief discussion of the main findings and recurrent themes concludes the paper.

Origins of the Civil Religion of the "Rainbow People

By way of introduction to the study, it may be useful to trace some of the roots of South Africa's new civil religion of the "rainbow people". Civil religions exist in many parts of the world. Robert N. Bellah, the "discoverer" of the American civil religion defines civil religion as "a genuine apprehension of universal and transcen dent religious reality as seen or, one could almost say, as revealed through the experience of the... people" (Bellah, 1967: 12). Dunbar Moodie, the premier analyst of Afrikaner civil religion, defines it more simply as the "religious dimension of the state" (1975: 296). Civil religions lend a religious aura to attempts to justify the existence of the state and legitimise the nation or, as in South Africa under apartheid, ethnic domination. Civil religions serve to integrate or segregate. In some instances the doctrines of a civil religion are very broad so as to enable people from diverse backgrounds to identify with it. In contrast, Afrikaner civil religion segregated by excluding all other groups.

All forms of civil religion draw inspiration from the Old Testament, adapting its accounts to the situation of the country in question. Pivotal events are the exodus and the arrival in the promised land. The people who have survived the exodus typically regard themselves as God's Chosen People. Like any other religion, civil religion makes use of ritual and symbols to maintain and strengthen the group's sense of community. Collective memories are used to mobilise people. Civil religion blurs the separation between religion and politics in that religion is used to implement political goals.

In her thesis on the rainbow people, Dickow (1996a) traces the roots of two distinct traditions of civil religions in South Africa: the Afrikaner civil religion which justified apartheid and the domination of one ethnic group over another and the civil religion of the struggle to end apartheid. There are striking parallels between the "National Party at prayer" and the "African National Congress at prayer" in the use of religious archetypes to legitimate existing domination and the establishment of a new political order. The non-ethnic civil religion of the "rainbow people" of the post-apartheid era embraces elements from both of these traditions. A brief description of the two earlier traditions and the birth of the new civil religion of the post-apartheid era follows.

The Afrikaner civil religion.

Afrikaner civil religion emerged from the traumatic experience of the Second South African War (1899 1902) and defeat by the English. The Afrikaner nation had been crushed in its own country. Thousands had lost their lives, either on the battlefield or in English concentration camps. Initially, the Afrikaner civil religion sought to segregate Afrikaners from their English-speaking compatriots to prepare the groundwork for gain ing power for the Afrikaners. This goal was achieved with the victory of the National Party in the 1948 elections. The emphasis then shifted from segregation against the "English" to segrega tion against "non-white" South Africans. Afrikaner civil religion teaches that the Afrikaners are God's Chosen People on the "black" continent. Every year on the 16th of December Afrikaners gather to renew their covenant with God. A unique characteristic of the Afrikaner civil religion is the almost complete coincidence between institutionalised religion and politics. Sunday sermons are political discourse just as political meetings resemble religious gatherings. An impressive summary of the principles of the Afrikaner civil reli gion is found in a quotation from an interview with Willem J. Lubbe, founder of the Afrikaanse Protestante Kerk, conducted by Dickow on September 11, 1991:

We believe that God created differences between nations. We remain true to what God has created. He created diversity among peoples and nations, which remains to the end of days. This is the path to heaven. We do not believe it is a coincidence that we are Afrikaners. We were created Afrikaners by God. And we remain what we were created. If God had wanted something else, he would have made something else. There are Xhosas, Zulus, etc., all with different political and cultural identities. We don't agree with all people being one. Our eyes tell us that people are different. We believe in an own church for each people as part of God's diversity.

In the Afrikaner civil religion, legitimacy of white rule is strengthened by appealing to a higher moral order. The sense of a divine mission and receipt of land from God opens the preamble to the 1983 constitution (Boulle, 1984: 231).

The anti-apartheid civil religion.

The African National Congress was founded in 1912 as a movement of civil protest against restric tions on the rights of blacks. Until well into the 1950s, all ANC leaders had attended Christian mission schools, at that time the only schools open to blacks. The language of protest had a clear Christian and biblical tone (Hanf, Weiland and Vierdag, 1981: 248). This did not change after the ANC formed an alliance with the South African Communist Party in 1950.

When apartheid became official policy, leaders of churches who did not support the Afrikaner civil religion protested against exclu sion. In 1957 the Catholic bishops wrote a pastoral letter pointing out that apartheid was incompatible with the teachings of Christ. As the Black Consciousness movement awoke in the 1960s, Christians were asked to follow Christ's example and practise civil disobedi ence. In 1968 the South African Council of Churches which repre sented all Protestant churches with the exception of the reformed churches, issued a Message to the People that there was a higher authority than the state.

After the banning of all political opposition movements in 1988, prohibited organisations took to using funerals as political rallies, above all the burials of the numerous young political activists who paid for their resistance with their lives. The anniversaries of the Sharpeville and Soweto massacres were recalled annually by the churches and the liberation movements while the National Party was in power and have since been declared national holidays. In South Africa, the churches opposed to apartheid found them selves playing a critical role precisely because there was no formal opposition. By assuming what they saw as a prophetic role, church leaders identified themselves more closely with the political demands of the African National Congress, and with the organi sation itself. When the anti-apartheid political organisations were banned in 1988, the churches were the only institutions in the country free to act and with the infrastructure to do so. Supporters of apartheid accused the South African Council of Churches and its member churches of interfering with politics - of being the "ANC at prayer" just as opponents of apartheid viewed the Reformed Churches as the "National Party at prayer".

The release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 and the unbanning of political parties ushered in a new era in South African history. Church leaders, such as Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, withdrew from politics. However, like many other

leading clergymen and politicians, he saw no problem in using religious symbolism to mobilise people and to further the new politics of integration.

The new integrating civil religion of the "rainbow nation".

It was Archbishop Desmond Tutu who rediscovered the Old Testament symbol of peace, the rainbow as a symbol of unity for South African people. He used the rainbow symbol for the first time at the march of church leaders to Parliament in Cape Town in 1988, and again at ANC leader Chris Hani's funeral in 1993. However, the rainbow symbol only gained widespread popularity after the National Thanksgiving Service held on May 8, 1994. The gather ing celebrated the peaceful elections and the birth of a new nation. Thousands of people from very different religious and political backgrounds gathered in solemn confession, mutual forgiveness and common reconciliation. In front of the crowd with the television cameras of the world trained on him, Archbishop Tutu announced: "*We are the rainbow people of God. We are free - all of us, black and white together!*" This was the birth of a new syncretistic civil religion to which all South Africans could subscribe.

The new civil religion of the post-apartheid era combines elements of the Afrikaner civil religion with the one developed in the years of the struggle against apartheid. Like any other civil reli gion it uses a certain set of biblical quotations, rituals and symbols to achieve the political goals of national unity and reconciliation. The symbol of the new civil religion, the rainbow, is borrowed from the Old Testament. Archbishop Tutu used the motif that expresses a covenant between God and humankind and all living creatures. The rainbow is the biblical symbol of reconciliation which affirms God's covenant with Noah after the flood. At the Thanksgiving ceremony referred to earlier, Tutu spoke not of a covenant with a Chosen People, but of a covenant with all South Africans, irrespec tive of origin, religion or colour. A few days later, Nelson Mandela again referred to the symbol of the rainbow at his inauguration as President of South Africa on 10 May, 1994. Since that day, South Africans have become known as the "rainbow people" at home and abroad.

METHOD

Data from two nationally representative sample surveys were used to explore the relationships between the political significance of the rainbow symbol, and national pride and happiness. The international World Values Study, in which some 50 countries participated in 1995, includes items on subjective well-being, national pride and identity which were extracted for this study. The South African survey for the World

Values Study was conducted by Markinor. With no prior knowledge of the results of the World Values Study, author Dickow placed an item on the political significance of the rainbow in the syndicated June 1996 MarkData Omnibus survey. Møller placed items on happiness and national pride for the Quality of Life Trends Study in the same omnibus survey. Both the World Values Study and the MarkData datasets feature a large number of social background items including socio-economic factors, political party affiliation and value orientation. The survey designs are described in greater detail in the endnotes.1

Data analysis proceeded in two stages. The items on the signif icance of the rainbow symbol, happiness, and national pride were correlated with social background factors and values to compile the profiles of supporters and opponents of the political interpretation of the rainbow symbol, and happy and proud South Africans. The second stage explored the linkage between pride-related factors and happiness.

RESULTS

I. Popular Support for the New Civil Religion of the "Rainbow People" The question designed to probe the political significance of the rainbow symbol was put to South Africans one month after the April 27 1994 elections and repeated two years later in June 1996. The item read: A lot2 has been said by religious and political leaders about the rainbow, symbol of peace, and about a new covenant with God as a sign for the future of South Africa. People differ in what they think about this. Which of the following opinions is closest to yours?

1. For me, it has no meaning at all.
2. For me, the covenant is a religious matter only and should not be used in politics.
3. I believe, that God has offered to all South Africans, black and white, a new covenant for a peaceful life in a common nation.

The third option, which refers to a new covenant offered to all South Africans, was taken as acceptance of the new civil reli gion. Respondents in this group were called the "political rainbow supporters" for easy reference. Respondents who believed the covenant was a religious matter only (option two) were referred to as "political rainbow opponents", and the remainder as "non-believers" (option one).

In 1994, a majority of 65% of South Africans were political rainbow supporters who accepted the new civil religion of the rainbow nation (see Table I). Two years later, in June 1996, the political rainbow supporters had dropped to slightly less than

half (48%), with the greatest loss of support among Indians, formerly the staunchest supporters of the covenant. In 1996, the idea of a new covenant symbolised by the rainbow still found its greatest accep tance among coloured people and blacks - a far less enthusiastic acceptance, however, than two years earlier. Among whites, who in 1994 were already less supportive than other groups, the loss of political rainbow supporters was less dramatic. Results indicated that substantial proportions of South Africans had shifted their inter pretation of the rainbow from the political to the religious sphere over the two-year period. The symbol had not suffered secularisation but had reverted to the religious sphere. Choice of the religious option, that is the "opponents" of the political interpretation of the rainbow, increased among all groups; most noticeably among Indians who were the strongest supporters of the political rainbow in 1994. The percentage of "non-believers", who saw no meaning in the symbol of the rainbow, increased most among blacks.

As discussed earlier, politics and religion are very closely linked in South Africa. The 1996 data show that there is a strong link between religious beliefs, religiosity and the acceptance of the new civil religion of the rainbow. On average, political rainbow supporters are those who believe in life after death, who feel they cannot live happily without believing in God, and who state that they try to live according to the teachings of their religion. Using a scale based on these items as well as a religious practice item, Dickow divided the total sample into four categories of religiosity: the very religious (comprising 40% of the total sample), the reli gious (47%), the inactive religious (5%), and the not religious (8%). Religiosity and support for the rainbow nation were significantly positively correlated. Over half (51%) of the "very religious" and the "religious" were rainbow supporters compared to only 24% of the "not religious". At the same time, the "very religious" were more likely than others to oppose the political use of the rainbow concept (41% versus 34% average), in that they believed the covenant was a religious matter only. Noteworthy is that support for the political meaning of the rainbow tended to be higher in regions where Christianity had been introduced first. A large pocket of non-believers was found among the Zulus (26% versus 18% average), who were more likely than others to be religious traditionalists. In contrast, only very small percentages of "non-believers" were affiliated to the Dutch Reformed Church (5%) and Islam (6%), both religious groups who regard the Old Testament as their holy book.

Support for the idea of the rainbow nation is associated with political affiliation. In 1996, as was the case two years earlier, African National Congress and National Party supporters were most likely to be political rainbow supporters. However, by

1996 the National Party was split between supporters and opponents of the rainbow concept. Opponents were most likely to be found in the ranks of the Freedom Front and to a lesser extent among National Party and Democratic Party supporters. "Non-believers" were most prominent among the Inkatha Freedom Party and Democratic Party supporters (see Table I).

Support for the new covenant might be an indication that people have made their peace with the new South Africa. The reserve exhib ited by the small group of Democratic Party members in 1996 may be motivated by other than religious considerations. In 1996,41 % of DP supporters endorsed the religious option compared to only 27% in 1994. Commenting on the 1994 findings, Dickow (1996a: 263) interpreted the lack of support for the rainbow nation (37% "non believers") among DP voters as resistance by secularised democrats to the legitimisation of the state by a new civil religion. This inter pretation may still hold in spite of the shift of opposition to the religious sphere. The opposition of mainly black Inkatha Freedom Party members may stem from their traditional beliefs as well as resentment of political domination by the ruling African National Congress. Among whites, opponents may resent the rainbow and the new covenant, and therefore opt for the religious use of the symbol only. Members of the Dutch Reformed Church and Conservative Party are overrepresented in this group.

The new spirit of reconciliation is perhaps best captured in the responses in the same survey to an item which probed feelings of socio-political integration versus alienation. A significantly higher percentage of supporters of the rainbow covenant (74%) than all others (67%) in the survey stated that they felt "closer to and more united with fellow South Africans" from diverse backgrounds since the 1994 elections rather than "dominated and pushed aside".3 It was also observed that political rainbow supporters leaned towards a more positive outlook on the future. For example, political rainbow supporters indicated greater confidence in their political leaders and their party. They were of the opinion that political leaders could improve the lives of ordinary people. Political rainbow supporters gave their vote to a political party in the belief that it would "work to improve the living conditions of the people".

Particularly important for this study is that the political rainbow supporters indicated that they were happier and more often proud than other South Africans. The results on happiness and national pride are discussed in the next sections of the paper.

II. Happiness and National Pride

Happiness in the 1995 South African World Values Study.

The 1995 World Values Study included two happiness indicators: life-as-a whole measured on a ten-point scale ranging from "dissatisfied" to "satisfied" and a global happiness indicator that read: "Taking all things together, would you say you are "very happy", "quite happy", "not very happy", or "not happy at all".

The 1995 World Values Study found that 35% were "very happy" and a further 37% were "quite happy" and that 48% were satisfied. Table H shows that blacks were least happy and satisfied, whites most happy and satisfied, with the levels of happiness among coloured people and Indians falling in between. Lower income earners were less happy and satisfied, while higher income groups were happier and more satisfied. This pattern of subjective well being apportioned according to position of privilege, a legacy of apartheid society, corresponds with that found in earlier studies of happiness in South Africa.

Further results showed that contentment with life was consist ently higher among the advantaged sectors of society. Respondents indicating higher levels of happiness and life satisfaction were better educated and came from upper class households and ones with access to a larger number of services and modern conveniences. Happiness and life satisfaction were more concentrated in urban than rural areas and among white, Indian and coloured South Africans, and supporters of the National Party, Democratic Party, Freedom Front, and the Conservative Party, all parties which attract white voters. Happier respondents were more likely to identify themselves as citizens of the world rather than local citizens.

National pride in the 1995 South African World Values Study.

The 1995 World Values Study inquired: "How proud are you to be South African?". Responses were recorded on a four point scale: "very proud", "quite proud", "not very proud", or "not at all proud."

The vast majority of South Africans, 83%, indicated they were "very proud" to be South African in 1995 (see Table H). Expressions of national pride were more pronounced among the survey cate gories: black, lower class, and ANC supporter. Persons expressing a higher degree of pride were more likely to see themselves as South African rather than a member of an ethnic group defined in terms of race, tribe, or language. Similarly, proud South Africans were more likely than others to choose a geographical identity which indicated they were citizens of South Africa or Africa rather than citizens of their local community, province or of global society.

Other findings from the 1995 World Values Study suggest that national pride and optimism for the future are closely associated. A survey item inquired whether respondents thought humanity had a "bright" or a "bleak" future. Between 19% and 20% expressing happiness and satisfaction saw the future as bleak compared to only 14% among the "very proud". In contrast, 75% of the "very proud" but only 69% and 70% of the "very happy" and satisfied, respectively, anticipated a bright future.

To sum up, results of the 1995 World Values Study indicate that better off South Africans were happier and satisfied than others but less proud to be South African. The poor were less inclined to be happy and satisfied than the better-off but were fiercely proud of their country.

Happiness in the 1996 Quality of Life Trends Study.

The measure of happiness applied in the second survey was the standard five point scale item used in the Quality of Life Trends Study since 1983 which reads: Taking all things together in your life, how would you say things are these days: Would you say you are "very happy", "happy", "neither/nor", "unhappy", or "very unhappy?" In the total sample, 57% indicated that they were happy ("very happy" or "happy") (see Table ni). The 1996 level of happiness was higher than in 1995 but lower than in the month after the 1994 elections when 84% of South Africans stated they were happy. The 1996 survey results suggest that happiness may on the rise again among blacks.

The pattern of happiness results obtained from the 1996 survey among racial and income groups was different from earlier ones. In 1996, for the first time ever, the black level of happiness surpassed that of whites although falling short of the highest level of happiness which was recorded among Indians. Happiness did not appear to be consistently related to income and standard of living variables as was the case in all earlier surveys conducted for the Quality of Life Trends study - including the post-election survey.

Table IV shows that low income earners scored consistently lower on happiness than high income earners in all the earlier surveys. In the 1996 MarkData survey low income earners scored on par with high income earners.

Supporters of the ruling African National Congress party were most likely to indicate happiness with 70% happy. Only one in two supporters of the National Party (52%) and one in five supporters of the Freedom Front (21%) stated they were happy. Among blacks, pockets of unhappiness were found among Inkatha Freedom Party supporters (29% happy, 53% "unhappy" and "very unhappy"). Among whites, Afrikaans speakers were less likely than English speakers to be happy with 48% versus 66%. Hap-

pier South Africans were more likely to agree with the statement that they felt closer and more united with fellow South Africans (77% versus 70% average), while unhappy South Africans were more likely to agree that they felt dominated by and alienated from others since the new government had come into power in 1994 (46% versus 30% average).

National pride in the 1996 Quality of Life Trends Study.

The survey question posed in the 1996 Quality of Life Trends Study focused on the frequency with which South Africans experienced pride in their nation while the 1995 World Values Study had inquired into the intensity of feelings of national pride. The ques tion put to survey respondents in 1996 read: "How often do you feel proud to be South African?" Responses were coded on a five point scale with the middle category indicating ambiguity: "Very often", "often", "sometimes I feel proud, sometimes not", "seldom", "never". Uncertain and don't know responses were recorded but later regrouped with the ambiguous middle category.

The frequency measure of national pride classified 65% of South Africans as proud ("very often/often") (see Table III), a much lower proportion than the 83% "very proud" identified by the intensity measure used in the World Values Study shown in Table II above. It is possible that election euphoria was still bolstering levels of national pride at the time when the South African World Values Study was in the field in 1995. Alternatively, the frequency measure of national pride is more discriminating than the intensity measure. Social desirability factors might play a role. Intensity of feelings might be considered a more personal challenge whereas the frequency of experience of such feelings might be attributed to factors beyond personal control. Regardless which interpretation is accepted, the split between 65% proud and 35% non-proud South Africans produced by the 1996 frequency measure yielded suitable material for exploring further the research questions posed at the outset.

National pride measured in the 1996 Quality of Life Trends Study tended to cut across the racial, education and income divides while favouring urban dwellers and those with a higher standard of living, a pattern very similar to that found in the South African World Values Study. Above-average levels of pride were found in black townships and shack areas. Supporters of the ruling African National Congress, with 74%, were most likely to feel proud often. Most likely to indicate they were "seldom" or "never" proud were supporters of the Conservative Party (42% versus 19% average), the Freedom Front (42%) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (39%). Lack of pride among blacks was concentrated among a group characterised by the overlapping survey categories of Zulu speaker (27%), hostel dweller (32%), and Inkatha Freedom Party sup-

porter (39%). The Inkatha Freedom Party draws its main support from the rural Zulu of KwaZulu-Natal Province including the residents of hostels for rural migrant workers in metropolitan areas. The fact that the Inkatha Freedom Party had lost the local government elections in the urban areas of KwaZulu-Natal shortly before the survey and was experiencing internal conflict at the time of the survey may partially account for the deficit in pride among its followers. Seventy percent of persons who felt united with and close to other South Africans compared to only 54% of persons who felt dominated indicated that they were often proud. There are signs that national pride is promoted through the media. Among the persons with access to television, regular viewers were more likely than others to express national pride.

III. South Africa's Achievements and National Pride

Assessments of national achievements in the 1996 Quality of Life Trends Study.

The survey item in the 1996 Quality of Life Trends Study that inquired how often respondents felt proud to be South African was followed by a question that probed the source of national pride: "Which of the following achievements have made you feel particularly proud to be South African?" Seven options were presented to respondents in the following order: Sporting achievements, the national flag/anthem, reconciliation and unity - the "rainbow nation", the Truth (and Reconciliation) Commission, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and world acceptance.

Only about 2% indicated a source of national pride beyond these options so it can safely be assumed that respondents were familiar with all of the options. Directly or indirectly all achieve ments could be construed as contributions to nation building. The pariah status attached to South African citizenship was reversed with the advent of democracy. Excluded from international sports during the apartheid era, South African teams returned to the international playing fields and scored a number of victories in their first year back in the world arena. The symbols of the new nation, the flag and national anthems, featured prominently at these sporting events. On returning home, the winners of the 1995 rugby World Cup received a heroes' welcome from President Mandela. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) had been introduced when the new government came into power to deliver services to the previously disadvantaged. The Constitution, which includes a Bill of Rights, was adopted on 8 May 1996, a month before the survey went into the field, and was amended later in the year. The Truth and Recon ciliation Commission (TRC) was established in the latter part of 1995 under the chairmanship of Archbishop Tutu to deal with investigations into gross human rights violations during the apartheid era. The TRC was holding

hearings in many parts of the country at the time of the survey, and the media gave daily reports on the proceedings.

The main reasons for feeling proud to be South Africa are shown in Figure 1. Achievements in sports attracted just under one quarter of responses, and the notion of reconciliation, unity and the "rainbow nation" a further 17%. World acceptance, the new government's Reconstruction and Development Programme, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission received slightly more than ten percent of votes each. Smaller percentages of respondents voted for the national symbols of the anthem and the flag, and the new Constitution. Only 6% of South Africans could not identify with an achievement which inspired pride.

Generally, the results suggest that South Africans experienced national pride in a number of different ways. As respondents were only allowed to choose one recent achievement that boosted their national pride, choices tended to follow the major divides in South African society. Broad brush sketches of the groupings are as follows:

Achievements in sports were nominated by persons belonging to survey categories indicating the social advantages of higher income, education, better material standard of living and urban residence. Whites, males, regular television viewers and persons who felt dominated by other groups since the 1994 elections were overrepresented in this response group.

Less affluent groups and blacks were most likely to select the Reconstruction and Development Programme and the symbols of the flag and the anthem as sources of pride. The choice between the two options appeared to be along party political and rural-urban distinctions. The RDP-choice cut across the urban-rural divide while the flag and anthem was mainly a rural choice. The RDP option was particularly attractive to African National Congress voters and to persons with political convictions leaning to the left, including the South African Communist Party and the Pan Africanist Congress, and by those feeling united with fellow South Africans. The flag and the anthem as symbols of national pride appeared to have more appeal to rural persons, particularly women, followers of the Pente costal and Apostolic faith, and Inkatha Freedom Party supporters. Although only a small proportion of persons who associated the flag and anthem with national pride had access to television, those who did were more likely to be regular viewers.

World acceptance was an important factor boosting national pride among the more affluent, in particular among Indians and urban dwellers.

The Constitution and Bill of Rights option appealed to a minor ity of predominantly younger people including regular newspaper readers and television viewers.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission option appealed mainly to blacks, the less affluent, and rural dwellers.

The thumbnail sketch of the group choosing the second most popular option is the least clear-cut of all which is in itself a signifi cant finding. Reconciliation, unity and the "rainbow nation" was the response category which held the widest appeal and attracted the broadest assortment of survey categories: Indian, coloured and black respondents; both lower and medium income groups; and African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party supporters. Persons choosing the rainbow nation option were more likely to feel closer to fellow South Africans than others. Whites, whose votes went mainly to the sports option, were slightly underrepresented among those opting for the "rainbow nation" as a source of pride.

Table V gives the three most frequently mentioned sources of national pride for racial and political groupings and the percentages voting for each option. As the survey categories vary enormously in size, the number of respondents and the number of seats occupied by political parties in the national parliament are indicated. The "rainbow nation" option is highlighted.

Reconciliation and unity symbolised by the "rainbow nation" concept was a source of pride for all racial groups. The "rainbow nation" option attracted the largest number of black votes, the second largest number of coloured and Indian votes and the third largest number of white votes. The idea of the "rainbow nation" also inspired national pride among the supporters of all the major political parties, including the parties of the ANC, NP and IFP which formed the first government of national unity after the elections.

Supporters of the liberal Democratic Party, who were more likely to oppose the rainbow covenant in Dickow's survey, were also less likely to vote for the rainbow nation as a source of pride. The scepticism of DP supporters with regard to nation building by means of slogans such as the "rainbow nation" appears to be confirmed. DP supporters were more likely than any others to state that they took pride in the foundation of South Africa's democracy: the new Constitution which encompasses all the basic values of liberals. Freedom Front supporters, on the political right, did not include the rainbow nation among their top three sources of national pride but did opt for the more controversial Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Freedom Front was among the political parties that encouraged its followers to testify before the Truth and Recon ciliation Commission. Only supporters of the Conservative Party, which did not contest the 1994 first open general elections, excluded all factors of national unity other than sports from their top three votes. Although absolute numbers are small, it

is telling that one in five Conservative Party supporters, the highest proportion of any constituency, indicated that "nothing" made them feel proud to be South African.

IV. National Pride and Happiness

In this last section we return to the question posed at the outset: Are proud South Africans happier than others? This section draws on results from the June 1996 MarkData survey, which included the items on the rainbow nation, happiness, national pride and the perceptions underpinning feelings of national pride.

The group which indicated acceptance of the "rainbow people" in response to the probe on the deeper meaning of the symbol and the group for whom the rainbow inspired national pride overlapped. However, owing to the choice among seven options of sources of national pride, the overlap accounted for only some 10% of the total sample. It is therefore instructive to inspect the levels of pride and happiness among the various survey categories which allude to national unity and reconciliation.

Table VI shows the percentages happy and proud among three response groups which indicate support for national unity. Further select response groups with extreme scores on national pride and happiness are shown for comparison purposes. Political rainbow supporters and persons who felt closer to and united to fellow Africans scored above average on both national pride and happiness. The smaller number of South Africans who opted for the "rainbow nation" as a source of pride scored close to average on national pride and happiness. Exceptionally high scorers on national pride and happiness were persons who took great pride in the RDP and the national symbols of the flag and anthem. Exceptionally low scorers on national pride and happiness were not prepared to acknowledge any national achievements.

If national pride promotes happiness or, alternatively, happiness radiates from national pride, the association between the two vari ables must be statistically significant. Tables VII and VIII show the percentages of South Africans who were happy in 1995 and 1996 and the tightness of association between the variables of national pride and happiness for racial and income groups.

In the 1995 South African World Values Study, the association between national pride and happiness is positive but statistically insignificant in most instances (Table VII). The exception is the significantly positive association between national pride and happi ness among whites and high income earners, precisely the groups with below-average national pride (see Tables II and III above).

The 1996 Quality of Life Trends Study used a measure of national pride which discriminated better for survey purposes. Here the association between national pride and happiness is significantly positive throughout with the single exception of the

small subsample of Indians who scored highest on happiness and national pride (See Table VIII).

The analysis this far appears to indicate that national pride and happiness are positively finked, provided that the values of the vari ables are not saturated as is the case with the Indian category in the 1996 MarkData survey. In the 1995 South African World Values survey national pride was saturated among all groupings except whites and high income earners.

A further detailed analysis of the national unity responses in the survey produced unexpected results. We next correlated national pride and happiness among 12 survey categories: supporters of the rainbow civil religion, religious opponents and "non-believers", supporters of the seven national achievements which inspire pride in South Africa, and feelings of unity with fellow citizens. Again, support for the two "rainbow" options and feelings of closeness and unity with fellow South Africans emerged as powerful boosters of both pride and happiness - but only among white South Africans.

Among whites, support for the rainbow civil religion increased pride by 16% above the subsample average. Feeling close to and united with fellow South Africans increased both pride and happi ness by 13% and 16% above the subsample average, respectively.

Endorsement of the "rainbow nation" as a national achievement, a minority response, pushed up pride by 17% and happiness by a full 44%. The most striking contrast in levels of happiness among whites was between pride in sports and pride in reconciliation, unity and the "rainbow nation". Only 41% of whites who viewed sports as a major national achievement were happy compared to 93% of those who took pride in the "rainbow nation".

The "rainbow" factor, as civil religion and national achievement, was the single most effective booster of happiness among coloured people. Among a small group of blacks, the national anthem and flag, and the RDP competed in boosting happiness to the highest levels in the survey. The sample size of Indians was too small for this analysis.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and national pride.

It comes as no surprise that national symbols such as the flag and anthem inspire pride; that is their main function. However, the close association between the RDP and subjective well-being raises a number of questions in view of the fact that mainly ANC supporters were among the group choosing the RDP option. Are RDP supporters proud to be among the few beneficiaries of a programme which is known to

have been slow to deliver, are they merely hopefuls, or does the RDP inspire patriotism as all political slogans do among loyal party supporters?

The RDP is the new government's ambitious programme to deliver basic services to the poor. Thus, citizens who are beneficia ries of programmes to bring clean water and electricity to rural areas could be proud of a caring government which is seen to deliver on the election promises of "a better life for all". Results of the 1996 survey generally suggest that access to basic services has a positive influence on pride and happiness. Among fifteen living standard items including modern appliances and basic services, electricity and water in the home were most closely associated with feelings of pride. Access to water was the only living standard item which was positively associated with happiness.

In the total sample, the group which attributed its feelings of national pride to South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Programme achieved the highest levels of pride and happiness with 78% happy and 70% proud (see Table VI above). The group opting for the RDP included approximately equal proportions of blacks with and without running water in the home. In the sample as a whole only a minority of 43% of blacks had access to piped water in the home. Noteworthy is that 61% of blacks with access to piped water compared to only 46% of those without access expressed both happiness and national pride. This finding suggests that servicing the basic needs of the rural poor may prove to be an important factor in boosting happiness. This idea would be compatible with research conducted cross-nationally which found that basic needs and income were better determinants of happiness in poorer than wealthier countries (Diener and Diener, 1995).

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The study reported here is an exploratory one based on sample survey data which is by design superficial. First results on the signif icance of the "rainbow nation" concept on personal quality of life from this study provide pointers which might usefully be pursued in further in-depth research. Our examination of two independent dataseis lends support to the proposition which guided the study. Results indicate that feelings of national pride are positively linked to happiness. As we cannot be certain of the direction of causality, the notion of national pride boosting happiness used in this report connotes only that political pride is a correlate of happiness. If one accepts that national pride and self-esteem are fused - the measure used in the World Values Study

more closely captures national pride as an extension of the self - one might tentatively conclude that national pride is also a constituent part of subjective well-being.

An earlier survey conducted in 1995 for the Quality of Life Trends Study already anticipated that happiness might be influenced by less tangible factors than socio-economic advantage. The present study suggests that in newly democratic South Africa, identification with the unifying civil religion of the "rainbow people" enhances subjective well-being. In 1996, the civil religion of the "rainbow people" had a following among one in two South Africans, in partic ular among the actively religious. Noteworthy is that even among the least religious, one quarter were supporters and believed in the political significance of the rainbow. The survey underscores the significance of symbols such as the rainbow and the national flag and anthem for an enhanced sense of well-being. Persons subscribing to the civil religion of the "rainbow people" and expressing pride in the rainbow nation found a group identity which encompasses the whole of South Africa. The fact that the rainbow as a political symbol appealed to almost one in two persons across the major racial and political divides in South African society suggests that the civil religion is inclusive. Although individualists, in particular, might shy away from patriotic sloganeering, our study suggests that not only collectivists are susceptible to the influence of symbols of national unity and harmony.

Alienated South Africans, who feel excluded from the nation building process and cannot come to terms with the new political order, appear to be most at risk of experiencing depressed well being during the transition. An important finding is that a minority of alienated South Africans who could not identify with national achievements were unhappy.

Consider that in a newly democratic society the negation of the rainbow as national symbol of unity and social harmony is likely to be judged as politically incorrect. The study showed that when other equally legitimate options were available, not all South Africans were ready to subscribe to a concept that appeared more myth. than reality to them. There were indications in the data that the civil religion of the rainbow and the "rainbow nation" as political slogan held less appeal to individualists, such as Democratic Party supporters, as was proposed at the outset. Among the seven motifs underlying national pride put to the respondents in the survey, world acceptance contains the fewest religious and political connotations, which may explain its greater appeal to secularised liberals, such as Democratic Party supporters, and higher income groups who engage in commerce and industry.

Opposition to the myth of the rainbow may also be a reflection of caution that racial harmony will not occur overnight in South Africa. A quick fix solution such as the rainbow imposed by the politicians may inadvertently compromise the achievement of a nonracial society and threaten the potential goodwill that the new order has brought. Schlemmer in an essay on the prospects for racial reconciliation in South Africa warned: "... the compelling depiction of the spirit of our transition is that of a rainbow over the South African battlefield, symbolising unity in a multi-coloured diversity and a sacred covenant binding us to a new harmony. Rainbows, however, are up in the sky" (1997: 21).

Contrary to popular opinion, world acceptance and sports - the latter in particular - do not appear to promote a sense of national pride and personal well-being to the extent that one would expect. Results from our study show that belief in the civil religion of the rainbow and feelings of fellowship constituted the more powerful means of enhancing personal quality of life. For political and reli gious conservatives among whites, the transition from the Afrikaner to the rainbow civil religion was indicative of acceptance of the new political order. It is particularly among whites, whose happiness has been on the decline in the nineties, that belief in the new civil reli gion of the rainbow and a sense of unity with fellow South Africans seemed to protect from pessimism and alienation.

It might be expected that the colourful and popular new South African flag and the new anthem would compete with the rainbow symbol of unity in promoting national pride and happiness among small segments of the population. It was not anticipated that "bread and butter" issues such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) would compete with an emotional one, such as the rainbow symbol of unity, in inspiring pride, happiness and optimism for the future. The finding that basic needs, such as clean water, signifies happiness among voters is of significance for the next round of national elections to be held in 1999. The appreciative attitude of beneficiaries of the reconstruction programme cannot be taken for granted. Rising expectations tend to dull positive reactions to government interventions to improve the lives of ordinary citizens. However, our finding that support for the RDP and happiness are linked may not be an isolated one. An earlier national Mark Data attitude survey commissioned by Information Update also found that perceptions of better service delivery were correlated with short-term happiness gains (Moller and Jackson, 1997).

A recurrent theme in the study is that optimism is associated with national pride and belief in the ideal society of the rainbow. Findings from the present study which relate belief in the rainbow and national pride with optimism are consistent with other

South African research. There are a number of recent socio-political surveys which indicate that optimism and confidence in the future are in limited supply among increasing numbers of alienated white South Africans but have gained strength mainly among black South Africans. Post-election results from Markinor's Socio-political Trends Study indicated that higher proportions of blacks than all other racial groups felt that their families were better off economically after 1994 and expected that their families would fare better in future (Harris, 1997). A study conducted for the Quality of Life Trends Study in 1995 found that white South Africans rated their current level of satisfaction lower than five years ago and anticipated life would get worse in future. Conversely, black South Africans rated current satisfaction low as in the past but anticipated that life would get better in future (M0ller, 1995).

The Markinor Socio-political Trends Study referred to above found that racial harmony indicated by confidence in a happy future for all races was at an all-time high in the months after the 1994 elections among all population groups. Thereafter, levels of confi dence declined most among whites and least among blacks with the other groups falling in between (Harris, 1997). A recent political survey reported that the majority of every racial group believed South Africans would become one nation over time, with almost one in five blacks insisting that they were already one nation now. However, 47% of whites averred that this would in fact never happen (Johnson, 1997).

Another recurrent theme which is related to that of optimism concerns the identity of proud South Africans. National pride and belief in the rainbow people appear to go hand in hand with strong feelings of South Africanness. Clearly the rainbow encourages national identity before ethnic identity. In some instances, South African identity tied with African identity suggesting that national pride might be extended to embrace the entire continent of Africa. This broader identity is in tune with the idea of an African renaissance which would inspire pride throughout Africa. South Africa is in the forefront of the movement which negates "Afropessimism" and seeks to encourage African countries to prove Africa's economic worth to the outside world.

Conclusion.

This study of national pride and happiness suggests that belief in national unity may be a vital ingredient of personal well being which also inspires confidence in the future. Perhaps the most important finding to emerge from the study is that two years after the first democratic elections, most South Africans could point to a national achievement in which they take pride. If national pride is able to further the cause of national unity and at the same time enhance well-being during the difficult years of the transition to a stable democracy, South Africa and its people will be well served.

The study showed that the unifying civil religion of the "rainbow people" is more than a superb feat of social engineering; it has captured the public imagination. It has promoted national unity and harmony, inspires happiness as well as pride, and commands a wide following among diverse groups in South African society. Moreover, supporters of the rainbow symbol of peace are also optimistic about the future. Even sceptics will have to concede that the new civil religion has played a special role in guiding a new nation to stability and prosperity.

CHAPTER 10

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, 2011
US STATE DEPARTMENT

Executive Summary

The constitution and other laws and policies protect religious freedom and, in practice, the government generally respected religious freedom. The government did not demonstrate a trend toward either improvement or deterioration in respect for and protection of the right to religious freedom.

There were few reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice. There were reports of cases involving verbal abuse, hate mail, and distribution of anti-Semitic literature in parts of the country.

The U.S. government discussed religious freedom with the government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights.

Section I. Religious Demography

The latest government census (2001) estimated 80 percent of the population is Christian. Hindus, Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and adherents of traditional African beliefs together constitute slightly less than 5 percent of the population. Approximately 15 percent of the population indicated it adhered to no particular religion or declined to indicate and affiliation. Many combine Christian and indigenous religious practices.

African Independent Churches (AICs) constitute the largest grouping of Christian churches. Among the AICs are the Zion Christian Church (which accounts for approximately 11 percent of the population), the Apostolic church (approximately 10 percent of the population), and a number of pentecostal/charismatic groups founded as breakaways from various missionary churches.

Other Christian groups include a variety of Protestant denominations (Methodist, Dutch Reformed, Anglican, Baptist, Congregational, Lutheran, and Presbyterian), the Roman Catholic Church, and Greek Orthodox, Scientology, and Seventh-day Adventist churches.

According to the 2001 census, followers of religions that are indigenous to the country constitute less than 0.5 percent of the population. It is likely, however, that some of the 15 percent of the population who claimed no religious affiliation in the 2001 census adhere to unaffiliated indigenous religions.

According to government estimates, there are approximately 1,275,000 ethnic Indian/Asian South Africans, accounting for 2.5% of the total population of the country. Roughly half of the ethnic Indian population practice Hinduism, and the majority of them reside in KwaZulu-Natal. The small Muslim community includes Cape Malays of Malayan-Indonesian descent and individuals of Indian or Pakistani origin.

There also is a significant population of Somali nationals and refugees. According to recent statistics from the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, the number of Somalis in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Gauteng and Limpopo provinces totals approximately 70,000. While Somalis have in the past been an at-risk population for xenophobic attacks, there was no indication of any anti-Muslim or religious component to these incidents.

The Jewish community is estimated at 75,000 to 80,000 people and concentrated in Johannesburg and Cape Town.

Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom

Legal/Policy Framework

The constitution and other laws and policies protect religious freedom.

The bill of rights prohibits the government from unfairly discriminating directly or indirectly against any individual based on religion; it states that persons belonging to a religious community may not be denied the right to practice their religion nor to form, join, and maintain religious associations with other members of that community. Cases of discrimination against persons on the grounds of religious freedom may be taken to the Constitutional Court, but there were no such cases during the year.

The constitution does not favor any religion. Leading government officials and ruling party members adhere to a variety of religious beliefs.

The 2000 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act prohibits unfair discrimination on grounds of religion.

The government does not require religious groups to be licensed or registered. Religious groups can qualify as public benefit organizations, which are exempt from paying income tax.

The government allows, but does not require, religious education in public schools; however, the advocacy of tenets of a particular religion is not permitted in public schools. The government makes special accommodations for individual religious groups' holy days in the scheduling of national examinations.

The government observes the following religious holidays as national holidays: Good Friday and Christmas.

Government Practices

There were no reports of abuses of religious freedom.

Prisoners and detainees had reasonable access to visitors and were permitted religious observances. There were no reports of abuse of the right to free religious practice by prisoners or detainees.

Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom

There were isolated reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice.

There were no reports of serious attacks on Jewish persons or property, and the Jewish Council of Deputies nongovernmental organization (NGO) reported a 40 percent drop in the number of anti-Semitic attacks as compared to the previous year. There were, however, reports of verbal abuse, hate mail, and distribution of anti-Semitic literature in parts of the country.

There were reports that persons accused of witchcraft were attacked, driven from their villages, and in some cases murdered, particularly in Limpopo, Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal, and Eastern Cape provinces. Incidents of suspected witchcraft sometimes resulted in assault, forced exile, and killings, particularly of elderly women. Traditional leaders generally cooperated with government educational programs and reported threats against persons suspected of witchcraft.

On March 21, a group stoned two women to death. Cynthia Lemaho (26) and Mupala Motopela (81) were stoned after they were accused of practicing witchcraft in Limpopo. The group dragged the two women from their home, stoned them, and dragged their bodies back into the house, which was then burned. The police responded swiftly and arrested 32 suspects, who appeared in the Naphuno Magistrate's Court on March 25. Two suspects were charged with murder and arson.

There are many ecumenical and interdenominational organizations among the various churches. The largest is the South African Council of Churches (SACC), which

represents the Methodist Church, the Church of the Province of South Africa (Anglican), the Roman Catholic Church, various Lutheran and Presbyterian churches, and the Congregational Church, among others. The major indigenous religious groups, most of the Afrikaans-language churches, and the Pentecostal and charismatic churches are not members of the SACC, and most have their own coordinating and liaison bodies.

The NGO National Religious Leaders' Forum represents the country's seven main religious communities (Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, African traditionalist, Buddhist, and Baha'i). The forum, in cooperation with the government, aims to leverage its grassroots networks to undertake social welfare initiatives such as poverty alleviation and combating HIV/AIDS. The National Interfaith Leaders Council, inclusive of all religions, was established in 2009 to partner with the government to tackle issues such as early childhood development and municipal service delivery problems with electricity, roads, and water. The National Religious Association for Social Development, established in 1997, also aims to strengthen the capacity and programming of religious organizations and networks working on community development projects.

Section IV. U.S. Government Policy

The U.S. government discussed religious freedom with the government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights.

The U.S. consulate general in Cape Town continued its support for the Cape Town Interfaith Initiative, which brings together Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Bahais, Buddhists, and African traditionalists.

CHAPTER 11

"WE MUST INFILTRATE THE TSOTSIS": SCHOOL POLITICS AND YOUTH IN SOWETO

CLIVE SLASER, *JOURNAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN STUDIES*

By the late 1960s, two major associative structures dominated youth culture in Soweto: the school and the gang. Despite secondary school expansion during the early 1970s, no more than a third of the teenage and adolescent population of Soweto attended school by the middle of the decade. Gangs, which offered a powerful alternative to schooling, attracted a large proportion of unemployed and non-schoolgoing male adolescents. While the gangs were absorbed by localised competition, a political culture gradually took root in Soweto's high schools. Conflict mounted between high schools and gangs in the lead-up to the 1976 uprising. It was an uprising of school students rather than 'the youth', a contemporary catch-all category which often obscures deep cultural divisions. School and university-based activists, recognising the political potential of gangs, made some attempt to draw the gang constituency into disciplined political activity but they were largely unsuccessful. Gangs participated spontaneously in the uprising but the Soweto Students Representative Council, in order to maintain credibility with a broader Soweto support base, distanced itself from all gang activity and even mounted anti-gang operations during late 1976 and 1977.

On 16 June, South Africans now enjoy a public holiday called Youth Day. It salutes 'the youth' of Soweto who in 1976 sparked a renaissance of political resistance to apartheid. But who exactly constituted 'the youth'? Contemporary iconography of the uprising tends to collapse the categories of 'youth' and 'students'. This is probably because the political movement which triggered the uprising developed almost entirely within the school system. Yet, even after the rapid expansion of secondary schooling in Soweto in the first half of the 1970s, school students represented perhaps a third of Sowetans aged between fourteen and twenty. What has generally been ignored is the extent to which young non-schoolgoing males in Soweto were involved in a gang subculture in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The relationship between school students and the gang constituency was fraught with tension in the lead-up to the Soweto upris-

ing. In fact the cultural and political traditions of the two worlds were so divergent that it becomes tenuous even to think of 'the youth' as a coherent category.

This article opens with an analysis of the political culture in Sowetan high schools which began to re-emerge in subtle forms as early as 1968. It argues that the link between the South African Students Organisation and the school-based South African Students Movement during the early 1970s greatly accelerated the politicisation process in high schools. Second, the article surveys the gang culture of Soweto during the late 1960s and early 1970s. It argues that tensions mounted between high school students and street gangs and that the two groups developed a heightened sense of separate identity during the 1970s. Third, it shows that, despite the eagerness of SASM and other Black Consciousness groups to politicise and embrace street gangs during the mid 1970s, the organisations made little concrete progress in this respect. Finally, it examines the role of gangs during the 1976/7 uprising itself and argues that no formal links between gangs and political organisations were established. Moreover, in order to enhance its credibility with the wider Soweto community, the Soweto Students Representative Council actively curbed gang involvement in political campaigns and even took upon itself the responsibility of combating gang crime during 1976/7.

Soweto High Schools: 1968-1976

The gathering grievances of Sowetans during the 1970s have been well documented: deterioratings ervices and rent increases under the West Rand AdministrationB oard, rising inflation, spiralling crime, intensified pass controls, poor quality mass schooling, job shortages for school-leavers.1 Despite socio-economic hardships and discrimination, the adults of Soweto remained politically compliant during the early 1970s. There was widespread fear of the Security Police and informers were perceived to be pervasive. Workers seemed concerned primarily to keep their jobs and stay out of trouble. The adults of the 1970s had experienced the political clampdown of the early 1960s, the banning of the ANC and PAC and the Rivonia trial. Politically demoralised, they held out little hope for substantial changes to the status quo. The teenagers of the 1970s were a fresh generation filled with dissatisfaction and unfamiliar with the bitterness of defeat. As school-based youths began to search for political expression they found most parents, even those sympathetic to their ideals, frequently unresponsive and fearful.2

From the late 1960s, an autonomous, albeit fledgling, political tradition began to emerge in several Sowetan high schools. As I have shown elsewhere, Morris Isaacson and Orlando High led the way.3 They were followed by Naledi, which was converted from a standard eight-level to a matric-level high school only in 1974. Sekano Ntoana

and Orlando West High were three or four years behind. Nozipho Diseko, in her study of SASM, is dismissive of Harold Wolpe' s suggestion that the high school environment provided a partially protected 'space' in which ideological opposition to the apartheid system could take hold. She points out, correctly, that the Department of Bantu Education was highly vigilant in keeping politics out of the schools. Nevertheless, Diseko under-estimates the more subtle forms of political space which schools offered. There were opportunities for discussion and debate, even if informal. High schools were also important in bringing together literate, inquisitive youths with similar social backgrounds and grievances. The state-run schools were not total institutions. Inspectors, however pervasive, could not be everywhere at once. Some teachers adopted cautiously critical approaches and students themselves could not be prevented from discussing what they read in books and newspapers. Moreover, Diseko fails to differentiate between Soweto's schools. There can be little doubt, for example, that more space for political expression existed in Morris Isaacson, Orlando High and Naledi Secondary than in other schools.

By the late 1960s, most of Soweto's secondary schools had active debating societies and christian youth groups. School debating societies were apolitical until about 1971 or 1972 but they were crucial early incubators of political ideas and student leadership. Inter-school debating meetings attracted good audiences and allowed participants to meet students from other schools. Although students debated innocuously apolitical topics, they developed confidence on public platforms and learnt important intellectual skills.

Perhaps the most important political space available to youth existed in the numerous church youth groups in Soweto. The Student Christian Movement (SCM), which was established in the mid to late 1960s, was a crucial early politicising influence in Soweto's schools. Although the SCM had many church contacts beyond the schools, it was a specifically high school-based church group organised entirely by students themselves. The movement was relatively well-funded through its church affiliation and actively encouraged by school administrations. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the SCM had attracted substantial membership in all the high and secondary schools of Soweto. The concerns of the SCM were primarily christian but it was increasingly exposed to, and intertwined with, Black Theology, the christian arm of the emerging Black Consciousness movement. The various SCM branches held regular, well-attended weekly or fortnightly meetings which included both hymn singing and discussions with socially relevant themes. Meetings at Naledi, for instance, attracted up to a hundred students. Christianity gave cover to mounting political awareness and

debate. Numerous respondents attest both to the pervasiveness of the SCM at Sowetan high schools during this period and to the penetration of political themes into its discourse.

In 1968, the African Students' Movement (ASM) was set up by a group of school students who attended various christian youth clubs in Soweto. The ASM was the first organisation in South Africa aimed specifically at representing secondary school students." It concentrated on educational issues and, because it had no explicit political agenda, was able to establish small branches in a number of Soweto's secondary and high schools from an early stage. The ASM attempted to raise money for bursaries and organised after-school and holiday classes to supplement ordinary teaching. In a 1971 Christmas circular, the ASM exhorted parents to prioritise their children's education rather than spend extravagantly on clothing and food in the festive season.' The ASM emerged as a response not only to poor educational conditions but also out of a perceived need to give voice to student grievances. Foremost amongst these, Diseko argues, were authoritarianism and corporal punishment. One of the ASM's key concerns was to institute SRCs at schools to enable students to air their grievances and negotiate changes.' The leaders of the organisation were politically vague between 1968 and 1970. Nevertheless, they read widely and were searching for ideas. They were increasingly exposed to Black Consciousness ideology through their christian links and, as I showed earlier, by 1971 they were eager to align themselves to the Black Consciousness movement.'

Outside the formal structures of debating societies, ASM and SCM branches, students were exposed to newspapers, particularly The World and Post, with politicising local and foreign news. Civil rights struggles and ghetto riots in the United States and anti-colonial struggles in Africa received regular news coverage. The newspapers even ran some penetrative local news and commentary which slipped through the censorship net. Informally and privately, then, many students discussed these issues.

The South African Students' Organisation (SASO), launched in 1968 under Steve Biko, represented the first significant instance of internally organised black political expression since the 1960 State of Emergency. SASO, along with the Black Theology movement, formed the core of the Black Consciousness movement. Between 1968 and 1971 the embryonic movement was based almost entirely in the rural bantustan colleges. From around 1971 it recognised the need to reach beyond the isolated campuses, to forge links with a wider black community. In 1971 SASO began to think seriously in terms of extending its influence to urban high schools.' It established close ties with the school-based ASM which was eager to participate in SASO’s community

programmes. SASO expressed enthusiasm about this link in its 1971 annual report.' By the following year ASM sent observers to SASO conferences and leadership seminars and the two organisations drew ever closer. Throughout 1973 and 1974 SASO placed a good deal of emphasis on a strategy for 'conscientising' high schools.'8 Noting the difficulty of penetrating Bantu Education Department schools, a 1973 SASO memorandum recommended organising student meetings initially outside school premises and establishing a core of active students.

During the second half of 1972 and 1973 a number of Black Consciousness-aligned ex-bush college students, particularly from the University of the North at Turfloop, were absorbed into Soweto schools as teachers. These teachers played a pivotal role in transmitting Black Consciousness ideology to the schools.

During Turfloop's 1972 graduation ceremony, Ongopotse Tiro, a member of the university SRC and SASO activist, instead of sounding the expected ceremonial platitudes, gave a rousing speech condemning apartheid and the education system. Tiro was summarily expelled, sparking a wave of protests and walk-outs in May and June. The 'student revolt' started at Turfloop when SRC president, Aubrey Mokoena, called for a boycott of lectures which then spread to other bush colleges around the country. Many more students were expelled for their role in the demonstrations. Unable to continue with their academic careers, most of the expelled students sought teaching jobs. Khehla Mthembu estimates that over thirty 'SASO dropouts' from around the country became high school teachers. Turfloop, at the centre of the disruptions, was the most heavily affected bantustan campus. Many of its students had Witwatersrand connections and a large proportiono f the SASO rejects filtered into Soweto, where schools were crying out for relatively qualified teachers. Some of these expelled students struggled to find jobs because they had been black-listed by the Department of Bantu Education. Nevertheless, school boards and headmasters, although answerable to the department, had a certain practical autonomy in making appointments and many less prominent individuals slipped through the net. Moreover, it was particularly difficult for the department to screen out the many early 1970s graduates, influenced by the protests and by Black Consciousness politics on campus, who had escaped expulsion or prosecution.

Undoubtedly the most controversial of the ex-Turfloop teaching appointees was Tiro himself. Morris Isaacson school, despite his blacklisting, appointed him as a history teacher. In October, a dispute broke out between the Department of Bantu Education and the Morris Isaacson school board over his post. The department refused to pay his salary but the Morris Isaacson school board and the headmaster, Lekgau Math-

abathe, continued stubbornly to employ Tiro, paying his salary out of private funds. Tiro carried on teaching at Morris Isaacson until early 1973 when he was forced to leave his post because of political pressure and persecution. Shortly thereafter he fled to Botswana where he became involved in exile politics until he was murdered by a parcel bomb in 1974.

During his short stay at Morris Isaacson, Tiro made a huge impact. Mary Mxadana, who studied and taught at the school, recalls that students talked enthusiastically about Tiro's teaching. He asserted the need to move away from rigid syllabi, 'to challenge the poison of Bantu Education'. There was great sorrow at the school when his assassination was announced.Tiro's influence seemed to stretch beyond Morris Isaacson itself. Khehla Mthembu,a student leader of the 1970s, recalls that Tiro was instrumentali n strengthening the South African Student Movement (SASM), which was the new name for ASM from around the middle of 1972. Emergent student leaders often consulted him and he was asked to be the guest speaker at SASM and SCM meetings. He was 'very forceful, very emotional.'

Jake Msimanga, who attended Sekano Ntoana High School during 1972, recalls that ex-Turfloop students played a key role in the 'conscientisation process'. 'There were about four or five young teachers from Turfloop; some had been expelled and some had graduated.' Despite the conservatism of the Sekano Ntoana headmaster, the young teachers were prominent in organising debates and public speaking and constantly introduced controversial topics. They became role models for many of the students. Through his contacts with other schools it became clear to Msimanga that young bush college graduates had made a similar impact at other Soweto schools. 'Wherever these guys were planted they seem to have brought this kind of awareness to the students they taught.'

School students were also exposed to bantustan campus politics through holiday teachers. Many university students, freshly armed with Black Consciousness ideology, returned during their holidays to help out with supplementary teaching at their old Soweto schools. Frank Chikane, for instance, taught at Naledi during his university holidays.2

Once the ASM made substantial contact with the Black Consciousness movement during 1971 and 1972 the organisation radicalised quite suddenly. The Black Conscious-ness-oriented teachers consolidated the links and strengthened the organisation generally. In early February1 972, ASM officially transformed itself into a nationwide body and changed its name to the South African Students' Movement. At its launch, SASM dedicated itself to instituting SRCs in schools, to promoting academic

support programmes and to spreading the concept of Black Consciousness. Unlike the ASM, membership was opened to coloured and Indian school students. This latter shift, like the name change, reflected the movement's strengthening ties with SASO. In line with SASO, SASM shed its 'African' identity for a more inclusive 'black' South African identity. SASM fought tirelessly to widen student representation at school. Mary Mxadana recalls that Morris Isaacson students, spurred on by SASM, became increasingly assertive in articulating their needs and grievances. By 1974, they insisted on being thoroughly consulted on any issue that concerned them, from administrative decisions through to corporal punishment and school uniform.30 By 1973/4, SASM had well organised branches at Morris Isaacson, Orlando High and Sekano Ntoana. SASM came somewhat later to Naledi, where a particularly assertive Student Christian Movement branch dominated political activity. Outside of the three strongholds, SASM had a smattering of support at other high and secondary schools. It sent delegates to SASO conferences from 1973 onwards and received a small financial grant from the university body. The movement published a newsletter which, in language that lacked the constraint, polish and professionalism of SASO, bluntly attacked apartheid and the Bantu Education system. In one article, for instance, it asserted: 'Truely (sic) speaking, we are schooled to please Baas Whitey more than to serve our Black Nation'. SASM's more overt political approach increasingly exposed it to Security Police repression and in 1974, in the wake of a series of Frelimo solidarity rallies, the movement was battered by detentions. Nevertheless, by then it had a grassroots momentum of its own which could not be stopped by simply removing its leadership.

From around 1972/3 debating societies became a central arena of political activism in the schools. This was particularly true at Morris Isaacson and Naledi, the two schools which, from around 1974, seemed to take the lead in Soweto school politics. Khotso Seathlolo, Isaac Motaung and Mike Siluma, all of whom overlapped at Naledi between 1973 and 1975, emphasise the importance of the debating society. By 1973, the society had been thoroughly penetrated by SCM and SASM activists. According to Motaung, 'People were saying that this was not in fact a debating society but really part of SASM but we were acting within school regulations'. The debates were infused with political issues. 'I can't remember a single debate', recalls Seathlolo, 'in which the topic wasn't political'. Debating encouraged intellectual inquisitiveness and research. Banned books were smuggled into the schools and passed around amongst members. For Seathlolo, 'debates were really enriching because you couldn't be a good debater if you didn't keep track of current events, if you weren't an avid reader'. As topics became more relevant and immediate to students so the popularity of the debating soci-

ety grew. Despite the fact that debates were held on Friday afternoons when students were free to go home, the meetings attracted crowds of two to three hundred, packing the school hall to capacity. The better debaters were recognised as leadership figures at the school; they tended to be well-read, forceful people with oratorical skills. They were even called on to make speeches at parties and informal gatherings.35

Fanyana Mazibuko recalls that the established debating society at Morris Isaacson transformed in the early 1970s. SASM members effectively took over the school's debating. They introduced political issues and dynamised debates. The debating society had always had its core of followers but once it became politicised students clamoured to participate. More wanted to join than the society could accommodate.36 SASM and SCM also dominated increasingly popular debating societies at Orlando High and Sekano Ntoana from around 1972. Politicised debating societies even flourished at some of the new secondary schools, such as Diepkloof Junior Secondary, during 1975 and early 1976. Linda Duma, who attended the school during those years, recalls that inter-school debates, which invariably discussed political issues, packed two full classrooms of spectators. Some even spilled out into the playground. The school also made crucial contacts with the bigger, more established high schools through debating.

Debating also provided a link between leadership figures from the various high schools. Both Motaung and Seathlolo, for instance, first encountered Morris Isaacson's 'leading light', Tsietsi Mashinini, through debating. Mashinini was the chairman of the Morris Isaacson debating society and a 'very powerful speaker'. According to Motaung, he 'dominated at Morris Isaacson; there's no question about that'. Both Mashinini and Seathlolo were later to become Soweto Student Representative Council presidents but Seathlolo, when he first met Mashinini, was not a member of SASM. Seathlolo was a leading figure in the Student Christian Movement and rejected SASM as too reformist; the two leaders had a fruitful 'exchange of ideas' through their debating contact and Seathlolo came to accept the validity of SASM's methods.

By 1974/5, there was a politicised core of between fifty and a hundred senior students at each of the leading Soweto high schools. Although the number of signed-up SASM members remained relatively small, SASM-organised activities attracted large audiences and levels of sympathy for the Black Consciousness Movement were high. Political ideas seeped through from Morris Isaacson, Naledi, Orlando High, Sekano Ntoana and Orlando West High to other secondary and high schools in Soweto. Links were made through debating societies, SASM, the Student Christian Movement and other christian youth groups. In the mid 1970s Black Consciousness ideology spread

rapidly in many of the new post- 1972 schools such as Lomula High, Diepkloof Junior Secondary, Phefeni Junior Secondary, Orlando North Secondary and Dr Vilakazi Secondary. Almost from their inception the new schools were exposed to an atmosphere of mounting political assertive-ness, unlike the older schools which had experienced many years of political vacuum.

Soweto Gang Culture, 1968-197642

Towards the end of the 1960s there was a striking resurgence of big gang culture in Soweto. During the mid-1960s it was possible to identify perhaps ten distinctive youth gangs in the Soweto area; by the early 1970s there were well over fifty. As in the 1950s and 1960s, the new gangs were fiercely territorial; numerous wars erupted as they competed over women and attempted to assert control over local streets and facilities. Each gang tended to have a core membership of between fifteen and thirty youths. The more influential gangs, though, had dozens of 'hangers-on' and seemed able to mobilise over a hundred followers in times of conflict and crisis. Their criminal activities were concentrated on transport routes and in the Johannesburg city centre. Far more than in the 1960s, gangs indulged in conspicuous consumption. They stole less in order to survive than to look good and acquire social status in their neighbourhoods. By the beginning of the 1970s, flash and display became fashionable again. The early 1970s, then, saw a shift not only in the range and intensity of gang conflict but also in the degree of concern with youth subcultural style. The Hazels of Mzimhlophe were the most famous and the most feared, and probably the most important subcultural role models, of this new wave of youth gangs.

The gangs were a young male peer group phenomenon. They emerged at the intersection of personal and territorial familiarity as teenage boys, with the social space to be independent and mobile, grew up together on the streets. Play networks gradually evolved into gangs as the sense of masculine competitiveness heightened in the congested neighbourhoods of Soweto. Local peer groups formed gangs and drifted out of them more or less simultaneously without reproducing themselves; gangs tended, consequently, to have a short life-span. They dissolved when core members went to jail for long periods, were killed or simply drifted out of gangsterism, usually in their mid- to late-twenties, when it was no longer fashionable to be a gang member. Girls, socialised into domesticity, were drawn only peripherally into the gang culture. It was a culture, in many respects defined in opposition to femininity, which subjected women to terrifying levels of coercion and sexual violence. When girls, or young women, sought a social space beyond the household, they were, not surprisingly, far more attracted to the school and church environments.

Most young males growing up in Soweto in the late 1960s and early 1970s had some exposure to gang culture. It was almost unavoidable once street networks shaded into gangs. Most of these youths felt a strong sense of neighbourhood loyalty and, by extension, some sense of loyalty to the local gang. Although only a fairly small minority were drawn into violent or criminal activity, the gangs were powerful, stylish role models widely admired by male teenagers. With extraordinarily high rates of urban juvenile unemployment, formal employment was a fairly marginal option, at least until youths reached their early twenties. By the 1970s, most Sowetan youths were exposed to at least some primary schooling but numbers dropped off rapidly, particularly among boys, in early high school. Whereas the gangs represented an almost exclusively male world, males and females were drawn together in the co-educational school system. Numerically, girls actually outnumbered boys in the schools, especially in junior secondary classes. Secondary schooling expanded dramatically in Soweto during the first half of the 1970s, almost tripling intake within five years. By 1976, roughly 34,000 students, one fifth of Soweto's schoolgoing population, were in secondary school. The bulk of these were concentrated at junior secondary level (standards six to eight.) Officially 109,000 Africans between the ages of fourteen and twenty resided in Johannesburg by 1970. At the height of Soweto's school intake, then, secondary school students represented roughly a third of their peer group.

Not surprisingly, antagonism mounted between street gangs and schools during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite the interaction of school and non-school youth at the neighbourhood level, the two groups had widely divergent aspirations and experiences. The gangs saw new schools as challenging their territorial prestige, particularly the higher primary and secondary schools which, unlike the junior schools with their narrow neighbourhood intake, drew together students from a wide geographical area. These schools ran against the grain of neighbourhood identity and competed with the gangs for membership and loyalty. In addition, more teenage girls were exposed to gang harassment as the new schools drew them out of their relatively protected neighbourhoods in increasing numbers. It was the harassment of schoolgirls, more than any other issue, that triggered violent clashes between school students and gangs.

Although the gangs often expressed spontaneous rage against the social order, historically they had kept their distance from political organisations. The peaceful and disciplined methods of organisations such as the ANC nonplussed youth gangs during the 1950s and early 1960s. They concentrated their attention on consolidating local prestige and on territorial feuding.

School and Street: 1972 to Early 1976

School and gang identities polarised during the 1970s. This is not to suggest that male youth identity divided neatly between schoolgoers and gang members. Rather, school and gang sharpened as two opposite poles in a continuum of possible masculine identities. At one end were committed, and increasingly politicised, high school students whose aspirations were based on education and professional achievement. At the other end were members of large and distinctive gangs, such as the Hazels and Dirty Dozen, who understood social prestige in terms of territory, physical prowess, street wisdom and style. Probably the majority of Sowetan male youths floated between these two poles. Identities were often blurred and ambiguous and shifted through time. There were a few gang members who attended school and there were probably many schoolgoers who admired gangs and even aspired to gang membership. These students, however, were unlikely to complete their primary schooling; polarisation made this sort of overlapping identity increasingly unlikely. Most of the ambiguity existed amongst the vast number of male school 'pushouts' who did not clearly associate with gangs. Many were employed and many aspired to return to school while simultaneously mixing at the neighbourhood level with both gang youths and students. The gang member and the committed senior student, each with his separate style and value system, acted as the most important alternative role models for the large floating majority of male youths.

We have seen that high school students in Soweto developed a strong sense of self-identity during the 1960s. If anything, school identities strengthened duringt he process of politicisation. Politics provided students with a new sense of common purpose; high school students were no longer united purely by their educational aspirations but also by political camaraderie. Young activists emerged as powerful new role models. There was growing participation in school-based political and cultural activities which continued well after teaching hours. Within the world of the high school it became increasingly fashionable to be politically active and knowledgeable. Clearly, students at Morris Isaacson, Orlando High, Naledi and Sekano Ntoana had developed a powerful sense of self-identity by 1972/3. School pushouts did not necessarily join hardened gangs and, even by early 1976, only an active minority of high school students were intensely involved in politics. Nevertheless, the worlds of the high school and the gang drew further apart.

Gang harassment of school students mounted steadily from the late 1960s and peaked during the phase of secondary school expansion between 1973 and 1976. Two Sowetan headmasters observed in October 1972 that students were staying away from

certain schools for fear of gang intimidation. By 1973, it was reported that several school students died at the hands of gangsters annually and 'the toll of brutally assaulted pupils' was 'on the increase'. Harassment solidified school identification as students came together to defend themselves and organise reprisals against troublesome gangs.

The tradition of anti-gang solidarity at Morris Isaacson and Orlando High continued into the 1970s. Mary Mxadana was impressed by the unity with which students 'disciplined' criminal elements during the 1970s. 'If you wore a school uniform you were really protected.... Often you'd come to school and one student or another had been waylaid somewhere. Students would be summoned and go and get revenge'. In February 1976, Morris Isaacson students made headlines when they beat up a youth who had allegedly been molesting students. Students resisted attempts by the police to intervene and proceed with official charges. They claimed that the police were ineffective and that students had their 'own courts' to deal with the youth. Orlando High retained its reputation for forceful reprisals against gangsters who molested schoolgirls. The school had relatively little trouble from gangs in the 1970s. Naledi High and Sekano Ntoana developed a similar reputation in the 1970s. At Naledi the students had a real sense of 'self-identity and solidarity'. If any student suffered at the hands of gangsters the student body would organise self-defense units to 'punish' the culprits. At Sekano Ntoana, Jake Msimanga recalls, the gangsters 'really lacked the guts to pounce on you. There would be no school for two or three days until they were apprehended. So they knew what it meant.... People had no faith in the police. People would go out, even teachers would go out together with the students, to hunt the thugs, apprehend the thugs, bring them back into the schoolyard and thrash these guys'.

Gangsters were killed and assaulted in a number of school offensives during the 1970s. In August 1972, sixteen Pimville school students appeared in court following the death of an X5 gang memberi n a school reprisal. In April 1974, a Zola youth, who had apparently been involved in ongoing gang harassment, was stoned to death by a group of students from the recently built Jabulani Junior Secondary School. The best publicised incident occurred in November 1974 when students from the Phiri Higher Primary School clashed with members of Phiri's most prominent gang, the ZX5. Two gangsters were killed and five injured after being cornered in a house by a large group of students. In early 1976, Diepkloof Junior Secondary School organised reprisals against the local Damarras gang. 'After the Damarras butchered one of our boys', an ex-student recalls, 'we went to their homes; we rounded them up and quite a lot of them were severely beaten up.... We were wild'. In another well publicised case in May

1976, two young men who were molesting a school teacher on her way to work were beaten to death by students in Orlando North.

These incidents illustrate the intensity of anger school students felt towards intimidatory gangs and the unity with which they responded to harassment.

Black Consciousness and the Non-school Youth

Beyond the schools Black Consciousness ideology had little impact on young Sowetans. Non-school youth had low levels of literacy and no institutional access to the ideas of the movement. The hardcore male pushouts, generally involved in neighbourhood gangs, were absorbed in immediate parochial rivalries. Although they felt anger over blocked mobility, pass controls and racial discrimination, they had no interest in politics and no sense of social or community responsibility. Apart from very localised loyalties, they chose their victims indiscriminately;t hey targetedt he most vulnerabler athert han the most prosperous or privileged.6

From as early as 1972, SASO recognised the need to penetrate and 'conscientise' the urban youth constituency beyond the schools. A resolution to this effect was carried unanimously at the 1972 General Students' Council. It noted that most black organisations had ignored 'the large number of black youth who have been condemned by the system to be virtual outcasts' and called for youth programmes aimed at 'instilling a sense of belonging in this group' and 're-orientating their basic values towards Black Consciousness and Black Solidarity'. The Cillie Commission noted that 'SASO decided as long ago as 1972 to infiltrate the tsotsi (young criminal/gangster) community so that they could propagate their objectives there and use the tsotsis in their struggle against the authorities'.

SASM, meanwhile, came independently to the conclusion that it was important to make contact with non-school youth. Between January and June 1973, SASM, in collaboration with SASO, set up first the Transvaal Youth Organisation (TRAYO) and then the National Youth Organisation (NAYO) primarily to organise amongst the non-school youth constituency. Khehla Mthembu, an ASM and SASM leader during the early 1970s, explains why SASM felt its constituency was too limited:

I come from a very tough area called Zola. Just to give you a perfect example: I think I am the only university graduate in my area. All my friends were just what you can call ordinary boys in the street.... So we felt a bit distanced [at] the Deep Soweto branch [of SASM] because this was not only me, all of us in Deep Soweto felt that we cannot be seen as just a student body out there. We want to have something that would include the other people in the community ... to have an organisation that includes all the youth and everybody ... that was the birth of [TRAYO and] NAYO....

These were formed after SASM, these were the projects of SASM. SASM said, we are the student movement but we feel we are incomplete, we need the so-called tsotsis, the so-called thugs, we need to involve them.... We wanted an organisation to relate to the youth irrespective of whether they were students or not.

Between 1973 and 1976 there was ongoing discussion within the Black Consciousness movement over the need to draw in the unemployed street youth. SASO's Commission on Community Development, for instance, addressed the issue of 'social drop-outs': 'Voluntary group workers and professional social workers and other relevant and interested parties should join in the recruitment of the so-called "Outcasts", towards redirecting their thinking towards Black Consciousness'. In July 1973, the Black Consciousness-affiliated People's Experimental Theatre stressed the importance of 'redirecting the energy of so-called juvenile delinquents into something positive'. From around 1974, the Black Conscious-ness movement began an internal debate over the use of violence in the resistance struggle. There tended to be a general move away from the idea of principled non-violence. Khotso Seathlolo recalls that, in the debate between the traditions of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, the movement tilted towards Malcolm X by the mid-1970s. Many Black Conscious-ness activists began calling for armed insurrection. At a SASO 'Formation School' in September 1974, Rubin Hare, SASO's Vice-President, argued that the Black Consciousness movement had to infiltrate the 'tsotsi element' in the cities and turn their criminal energy towards whites. In a later organisational report on the Formation School, the writer (possibly Hare himself) argued for the need to recruit members who are prepared to fight. 'Whilst we are intellectualising, the tsotsis are far more brilliant than us. If any infiltration is to be done, we must infiltrate the tsotsis.' Amos Masondo, who was a SASM national organiser until his arrest in September 1975, recalls that by 1975 the Black Consciousness leadership knew that it 'had to go down to the masses and grassroots conscientising. The high school students were not grassroots; the grassroots were those who weren't conscientised, organised to prepare for the next stage, to fight'.

In practice, Transvaal Youth Organisation and the National Youth Organisation seem to have concentrated on coordinating the activities of a number of youth clubs and associations, most of which were church-affiliated and already operational. The clubs may have drawn in non-school youth but there is little evidence to suggest that the organisations engaged substantially with the gang constituency. The Cillie Commission and Security Police memoranda point only to the intentions of the Black Consciousness organisations; none of their evidence suggests effective influence or recruitment within the gang constituency.

Seathlolo argues that many school pushouts were politicised 'outside of the schoolyard' through youth clubs and the church, but it is unlikely that he is referring to hardcore pushouts who had very few years of schooling. Fanyana Mazibuko does recall some gang members becoming politicised during the early to mid-1970s. Tiro, in particular, used to make an effort to engage with street youths who molested Morris Isaacson students. Occasionally, according to Mazibuko, a few gang members even came to BPC meetings in Soweto. They were always distinctive not only by their clothes but by their emotional and spontaneously 'unsophisticated' approach to political issues. It is probable that some individual gang members were 'converted' through neighbourhood or familial contacts. Black Consciousness activists at schools recognised that gang youths were social victims. During anti-gang reprisals they were uncomfortable with mere beatings; they always attempted to talk to the apprehended youths, to convince them that what they were doing was wrong, to redirect their energies positively.

Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, Black Consciousness groups made no systematic attempt to draw the street youth into political structures. SASO and SASM had a highly intellectual political tradition which was inaccessible to youths outside of school or university. Moreover, the Black Consciousness philosophy was 'best articulated in English'. The gang constituency spoke tsotsitaal (gangster argot) and was largely inarticulate in English. Few activists seemed able or willing to engage with gangsters in their own language. The Black Consciousness movement, it appears,d isapproved of tsotsitaal both because of its criminal connotations and because of its substantial Afrikaans component. The movement was also out of touch with the interests of the street youth; it concentrated on issues which affected students directly, such as student representation, corporal punishment and Afrikaans medium teaching. Even the homeland issue, which became an increasingly important focus of Black Consciousness once the Transkei received 'independence' in 1974, must have seemed rather remote to street youth. An ex-member of the Damarras of Diepkloof emphasises the remoteness of Black Consciousness politics to his own world during 1976:

I did not know why they were fighting. Some were saying it was because of the Afrikaans language. Aah, but I was no more at school so I never involved myself in those things. All I wanted for myself was just money, that's all. I would just go and do housebreaking and gain something. Then I wouldn't give anyone any trouble. All what the school kids were doing had nothing to do with me.

Student Protests in Soweto: April-June 1976

Recessionary cutbacks in Bantu Education spending occurred in the wake of great expansion and at a moment of heightened educational expectations. During 1973/4 the government began to alleviate urban secondary school overcrowding and under-resourcing, but this process slowed down significantly during the second half of 1975.79 Frustrations mounted within the increasingly politicised secondary school constituency.

In this context two converging issues brought student anger to a head in early 1976. First, following a policy decision in late 1972, the Department of Bantu Education implemented the abolition of Standard Six at the end of 1975, thus shortening primary education by one year. This caused a sudden bottleneck in the 1976 Form One intake. The space and teaching available were hopelessly inadequate to cope with an almost doubled intake. Moreover, teachers encountered students with widely divergent levels of prepared-ness and competence. Junior secondary schools, in particular, were thrown into chaos. Second, the Department of Bantu Education began to implement far more stringently the use of Afrikaans medium teaching in a number of subjects. For several years prior to 1976, the department had attempted to extend Afrikaans medium teaching through a mixture of persuasion and threat but with little tangible success. In 1976, junior secondaries came under tremendousp ressure to toe the departmental ine on the language issue and many of them began teaching subjects such as Maths and Science in Afrikaans. This caused massive dissatisfaction as difficult learning conditions were exacerbated by the adjustment. Teachers themselves often struggled to teach in Afrikaans and many resorted to reading out aloud from text books. Bantu Education officials persisted stubbornly with this policy despite vociferous criticism from students and some teachers.

In May, a series of protests and boycotts took place at Sowetan junior secondary schools in opposition to Afrikaans medium teaching. Orlando West Junior Secondary was joined spontaneously by several junior secondary, secondary and 'feeder' higher primary schools. New consignments of Afrikaans text books which had been sent to the schools were publicly burnt in what angry students called a 'braaivleis' (barbecue). SASM then decided to initiate solidarity boycotts at all its affiliated secondary schools. An affiliation drive was launched in an attempt to create a united student opposition to Afrikaans. On 13 June, SASM called a meeting which was attended by between three and four hundred students with representation from most secondary and higher primary schools in Soweto. An Action Committee was mandated to organise a massive protest march. Part of the Action Committee's brief was to draw in schools which had

not established SASM branches. The committee was chaired by Tsietsi Mashinini and included Seth Mazibuko, Bongi Mthembu (later Makhabela) and Murphy Morobe. The leadership felt there was adequate support to press ahead with the march only three days later on 16 June. The SASM meeting decided that the march should be peaceful, although students made it clear that they were prepared to defend themselves physically if the police attempted to stop their action. During those three days leaders went around to a variety of schools addressing mass meetings and canvassing last minute support. The student leaders had so little confidence in their parents' generation that they went ahead with preparations in secret. Seathlolo recalls that most of the parents in the early and mid 1970s used to say, 'Don't talk politics or you'll land up in prison'. This forced the students to 'talk politics in whispers'.

On the morning of 16 June four key high schools, Morris Isaacson, Naledi, Sekano Ntoana and Orlando High, coordinated separate marches which were to converge on Orlando West Junior Secondary, the school which had been out on boycott longest. The march, according to those who participated, was peaceful and well-coordinated.T he Action Committee only lost control of events once the police, feeling cornered and threatened, panicked and opened fire on the advancing crowd of singing children. Police violence changed the mood of the demonstration entirely. In the evening anger overflowed and riots, looting and arson broke out spontaneously. Over the following two weeks of unrest and repression the Action Committee transformed itself into a more permanent structure known as the Soweto Students' Representative Council. The council, which was elected by, and answerable to, a body made up of two representatives from virtually every secondary and higher primary school in Soweto, attempted to coordinate and direct student, and wider, political activity in Soweto.

The participants in the initial demonstration on 16 June were exclusively uniformed students. Hirson estimates that there were fifteen thousand students ranging in age from ten to twenty. After the shootings the picture became more confused. That evening students were central actors in a vengeful rampage against West Rand Administration Board property and anything identified as a symbol of 'the system'. But it is clear that street youth joined in at this point. According to the Cillie Report, 'tsotsis, skollies and vagrants in general showed a tendency towards crime and violence. Where they constituted a large proportion of a rioting group, their contempt for justice and the law and their urge to commit crime and demonstrate their power probably carried the others along to further and worse riots and violence'. One observer sug-

gests that gang members 'were often regarded as leaders' during attacks on government property 'because they knew how to fight'.

In the days and months that followed, looting and robbery became an increasingly prominent feature of the unrest. Criminal activity was dominated by the gang youth but it was by no means exclusive to them. There was a carnival atmosphere in Soweto as government authority in the area broke down. Residents helped themselves to large quantities of liquor which flowed from the shattered beerhalls. 'Liquor was free', recalls a Meadowlands resident, 'so they got gloriously drunk'. A Zola resident claims that, as a twenty-year-old, he 'started drinking on June 16; I drank everything I lay my hands on'. Goods trucks and delivery vans entering Soweto from Johannesburg were hijacked continuously; this became almost a sport for local youths which they dubbed 'sibamba ama targets' or 'catching targets'. Occasionally students joined in but this was primarily the sport of the gangs. The vans were stopped, the drivers forcibly ejected and the goods distributed freely to participants and passers-by. Attacks on beerhalls and West Rand Administration Board offices were primarily politically motivated but the tsotsis' were never far behind stealing money, liquor, furniture and anything else of value. An ex-Phefeni student relates a typical scene: 'Down the road a beerhall was destroyed and the youths found a safe which they struggled for hours to open. There was jubilation once they opened it and everyone was grabbing money, helping themselves to money. Kids were running past my house clutching notes'.

In the second major wave of unrest in August the pattern repeated itself. The World reported that there were clear instances of tsotsis' criminal activity when thousands of students poured into the streets to attack beerhalls. 'Eyewitnesses said the situation got out of hand when tsotsis joined the students.' In one incident, 'a dry-cleaner's van was hijacked by a mob of tsotsis who looted it and took clothing. They later overturned the van. It was then set alight'.

Political and criminal activity often became difficult to distinguish, as did the gang element from students. The usual spatial separation broke down once the students were on boycott. Although students initially wore uniform to demonstrate solidarity and unity, they came to realise that they were making themselves easy targets for the security forces and switched to the anonymity of civilian clothes. For anyone who lacked intimate local knowledge, it became extremely difficult to differentiate the various youth elements

Did youth gangs play a purely criminal role in the uprising? The general consensus amongst residents is that gangsters simply took advantage of the upheaval. The police were stretched to contain political opposition and gangs were protected by large

volatile crowds. Moreover,i n an atmosphere of racial polarisation, robbery of white-owned or 'collaborationist' property lost all criminal stigma in Soweto; it was seen almost as a positive act of symbolic revenge. Gangs, according to a Pimville resident, 'continued with their criminal activities in the name of the struggle'. In assessing the role of tsotsis the Cillie Report comments:' Some witnesses said that the scholars created a situation which was then exploited by the tsotsis. There is no doubt that, with their criminal tendencies, tsotsis welcomed the opportunities for violence, theft and looting that the situation offered them'. Mbulelo Mzamane, in his semi-autobiographical novel about the uprising, supportst his impression.' The attacks on the beer halls and bottle stores produced an interesting assortment of allies. The Hazels [gang of Mzimhlophe] came, already prepared with petrol cans, empty cardboard boxes and a truck the moment our boys approached the bottle store in Dube.'

The attitudes of the youth gangs during the uprising were, however, more complex than this picture suggests. Brooks and Brickhill are correct to point out the uneven response of the gangs: 'Countless tsotsis, like many unemployed youth (and how is one to draw a clear line between them?) were drawn to the side of the students'. In many instances the gangs displayed clear sympathies with the students. They could identify with immediate and violent political action. Gang participation in attacks on government and white-owned property was not always merely opportunistic. Many gangsters were expressing an anti-establishment rage and, for once, felt themselves in common cause with the wider youth constituency. Gangs also carried out numerous acts of spontaneous political sympathy in which they stood little to gain, such as confronting boycott breakers or other individuals perceived to be undermining black unity. They played a prominent role in waylaying and intimidating workers who ignored the stayaway calls. There can be little doubt that they contributed to the effectiveness of stayaways. Some gangs did apparently become more selective in their criminality by concentrating on 'white' targets or uncooperative local shop-owners. For instance, after a Diepkloof shop-owner refused to allow students to take refuge in his shop during a police offensive, the local Jaws gang, 'were at the forefront of the looting of the shop'. In the wake of the June and August shootings, students and street youth could identify most easily through their common hatred of the police. Students, following Malcolm X's dictum, were now prepared to defend themselves 'by any means necessary', something which the gangs had always taken for granted. Gang members joined in the stoning and petrol bombing of security force vehicles with relish.

The political links between students and gangs, it must be stressed, were informal and spontaneous. Gangs were never mobilised by the Soweto Students Represen-

tative Council (SSRC), nor were alliances negotiated. In fact, the official SSRC position was extremely antagonistict owards gangs. Nevertheless, a number of individual gang participants, particularly those few who attended school or had close familial ties with students, did convert to politics during the uprising.104 According to Snuki Zikalala, who was centrally involved in ANC recruitment in Botswana at the time, many of the exiles who fled from Soweto to the ANC camps during 1976/7 were 'raw' street youth. They were unsophisticated politically, but very willing military recruits. They often became very effective soldiers because 'they were not scared of death' and were prepared to take on dangerous assignments. They were, however, difficult to discipline because they were not interested in political education and were generally unable to shake off their addictions to dagga (cannabis) and alcohol. For many unemployed Sowetan youths who had wavered on the fringes of gang life, politics became 'more cool' than gangsterism. These youths looked increasingly to the SSRC for role models and leadership rather than big time gangs.

The 1976/7 Soweto Students' Representative Council

For more than a year after the 16 June upheaval the SSRC was the most effective political force in Soweto. This represented an astonishing shift in the balance of authority between parents and children, between young and old. For several years prior to the uprising antagonism had deepened between students and their parents, who were seen as quiescent to the point of being tools of the apartheid system. The determination and assertiveness of the students during the uprising, Frankel argues, 'produced a mixture of fear and awe in the townships' which shattered traditional family hierarchy. From 1976 onwards, youths took the political initiatives and set the rules for social and political conformity. An elderly Rockville resident recalls, for instance, that 'parents were dominated and punished by students.... No father could even leave his home and go and stay with another woman [without being] disciplined by the students'. During 1976, Murphy Morobe observes, 'We had a sense of power as youth and students'. The student leadership felt that they could act 'without the respect, consultation or guidance of older people'. The 1976 uprising marked an important turning point in the generational balance of power in Soweto, as in other urban centres. Parents, although often alarmed at the power invested in inexperienced youths with few responsibilities, generally accepted student leadership because, as one older resident puts it, 'they opened our eyes'. They knew that they had to support their children to win back their respect, particularly after so many youths had been killed in police shootings.

The SSRC, as its name suggests, was most effective within the school student constituency. It established a remarkably successful system of representation and communication within Soweto high schools. From its inception the SSRC's structure included two representatives from each Soweto secondary and higher primary school. There were regular secret SSRC meetings during 1976/7 attended usually by about 100 students from a wide spread of schools. The council was largely dependent on the school institution to mobilise students and disseminate information. In the early chaotic days of spontaneous boycotts following 16 June, the SSRC explicitly called for a return to school because it felt unable to regroup and organise outside of school networks. Amongst students, the SSRC was able to maintain a fairly disciplined and united support base, although serious temporary splits did emerge even within the student constituency over the boycott of examinations in 1977.

The SSRC recognised the importance of winning over the support of a wider community and of broadening its focus beyond educational issues. Prior to June 1976, SASM had some links with an older generation through the Black People's Convention and the allied Black Parents' Association (BPA). Through the BPA the SASM leadership had attempted to negotiate parental support for its educational demands. However, the BPA, rather than represent wider parent interests, consisted of a group of politically sympathetic parents. The SSRC had no ready channels of communication with older residents, trade unions, migrants or even non-student youth. Although it did make some attempts to negotiate and consult with non-student sections of the community, the council ultimately depended on taking political initiatives and hoping that Sowetans would accept its leadership through a mixture of moral persuasion and threats.

The initial strong approval which parents gave to the SSRC began to dilute during the series of stayaway calls between August and November 1976. The SSRC distributed pamphlets to parents and workers asking for their support, but failed to explain adequately what they stood to gain from risking their jobs.'16 Pamphlets were sometimes threatening. A pamphlet calling for a stayaway in September, for instance, concluded: 'N.B. Your sons and daughters and all Black leaders shall be on the watch-out for sell-outs and traitors of the Black struggle ‘UNITED WE STAND'. During December student-parent relations came under further strain as the SSRC called for a boycott of white-owned shops and, in respect for the dead, a sombre, ascetic Christmas season. The SSRC's tone became distinctly intimidatory. Soweto residents who ignored the buy at home campaign 'would regret it if found carrying goods bought in Johannesburg', a spokesman of the SSRC warned. This caused much dissatisfaction

amongst hardpressed workers since white-owned shops in Johannesburg were cheaper than the small Soweto stores.

Resentment built up between many adult residents and the students. Workers often felt that students disregarded their interests; that they were inadequately consulted. Many older residents began to resent being treated as equals by unmarried youths. The students, they argued, were too young, and had too few responsibilities, to wield such authority. Workers also complained of coercion. During stayaways, bands of youths often waylaid workers on their way to work and motorists were stopped at makeshift roadblocks. Shoppers were searched and often had their goods confiscated. The SSRC made genuine attempts to stop intimidation of workers by students and blamed the coercive excesses on the 'criminal element', over whom the council had no control. The council officially dissociated itself from coercive activity. Nevertheless, the blurring of students and tsotsis damaged the image of the SSRC in the eyes of most Sowetans.

The residents most antagonistic towards the SSRC were the migrant workers who lived in Soweto's hostels. In the early days of the uprising the students made no effort to communicate with the hostel residents. They were ignored entirely as a constituency. The students had preconceptions of them as apolitical and unsophisticated outsiders. Migrants were enraged by the August stayaway calls. They were the most vulnerable workers who stood the most to lose if fired; they felt unconsulted and neglected. Moreover, their more traditional attitudes made youth leadership and the apparent disrespect for elders all the more unpalatable. The involvement of tsotsis in looting and the coercion of workers enraged migrants, who had a long history of victimisation at the hands of youth gangs. Migrants drew no distinction between tsotsis and students and reacted violently and randomly against Soweto youth during August. Students defended themselves with stones and petrol bombs in a series of bloody clashes with the migrants. In September the students made a concerted effort to approach hostel leaders and discuss the clashes. Their efforts at reconciliation proved remarkably successful. It was important for the SSRC to stress its opposition to tsotsis' crime and coercion. Migrant hostility was largely neutralised; some migrants even came round to supporting the students' stand against apartheid.

Relations between the SSRC and non-student residents improved during the first half of 1977. Stayaways stopped and the council took up issues which affected the wider community. The SSRC's successful campaign against rent increases and its onslaught against the Urban Bantu Council system were both extremely popular. The anti-liquor campaign was more controversial but it was widely supported by wives

who resented the squandering of limited household income at shebeens and beerhalls. Later, the SSRC's apparent ability to curb crime also enhanced its credibility and authority in Soweto.

The relationship between the SSRC and the non-student youth was a complex one. Despite SASM and the Black Consciousness movement' s enthusiasm for the idea of mobilising and recruiting youth gangs, they made very little real progress in this regard. Certainly some attempts were made. Tsietsi Mashinini was apparently 'street-wise' and acquainted with many gang members in his area. He addressed several open-air meetings in the early days of the uprising and tried to win gangs over in a disciplined way. There is little evidence to suggest that he had any striking success. Mashinini fled into exile at a very early stage of the uprising and this probably set back much of the contact which had been achieved. The rapid turnover of SSRC leadership as a result of state repression (there were four SSRC presidents in the space of sixteen months) probably hampered the council's ability to build personal contacts and trust with gang leadership. Khotso Seathlolo, who succeeded Mashinini as the SSRC president, claims that, via neighbourhood networks, the council was able to disseminate information and instructions to youth beyond the schools; 'almost every street had someone who was at school'. School students felt a responsibility to keep other neighbourhood youths informed. Nevertheless, communications with gangs worked at best on an ad hoc basis; ties were never formalised and activities were never coordinated. The political participation of gangs throughout 1976/7 was spontaneous and sporadic.

As the uprising progressed the SSRC found itself increasingly forced to dissociate itself from gang activity. In fact, it was not long before it was declaring open hostility towards gangs. Like the Pan Africanist Congress during 1959/60, the Black Consciousness move-ment argued that an alliance with the street youth was essential. The gangs, as I have shown, were recognised to have great revolutionary potential. The intellectual influences of the American Black Power and Black Panther movements no doubt strengthened the BCM's attraction to the lumpen youth. Once the 1976 uprising was under way, however, the SSRC realised the political dangers of such an alliance. First, the gang constituency proved to be uncontrollable; almost by definition, the gangs rejected external disciplines. The language and codes of the gangs were too distant from those of the politicised students. Moreover, too many of the students' political demands seemed to be centred around educational issues which were of no concern to the street youth. The gangs could identify easily with the anti-establishment rage of the students but their methods and intellectual paradigms were worlds apart. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the SSRC began to find any association with

the gangs politically embarrassing and divisive. The SSRC, with remarkable political maturity, recognised the importance of forging township unity and consensus. Reconciliation with the migrants, for instance, would have been unthinkable without a clear declaration of hostility towards tsotsis. In order to retain sympathy with workers and parents, the SSRC had to curb coercive excesses; this involved discouraging gang participation in political activity and even at times apparently using tsotsis as scapegoats for its own internal breaches in political discipline. Third, the SSRC began to recognise the importance of crime as a popular grievance. By actively combating crime the SSRC could demonstrate its authority and community responsibility.

The SSRC formed special squads to prevent gang excesses during political campaigns and to curb gang crime generally. 'We didn't want our people being harassed', Seathlolo explains. The student squads disarmed 'out-of-control' youths and monitored gang involve-ment during campaigns.128 Of equal importance, the students cracked down on gang crime, in many ways taking over the patrol functions of the Makgotla civil guard movement. They were, however, more effective in 'disciplining' the gangs. The SSRC was able to mobilise on a larger scale than the Makgotla and the student activists could operate virtually full-time, particularly during the long months of school boycott. With fewer responsibilities and greater muscle, students, unlike middle-aged fathers, were prepared to engage in violent confrontation. Gangs throughout Soweto were thrown into retreat.129 Ex-member of the Bandido gang, Oupa Ndala, comments: '1976 stopped all our fun. These school kids started terrorising us as gangs. They started burning our houses. When the students turned against us I started realising that gangsterism was a bad thing. 1976 gave the students the power to do anything they wanted to do. Students used to hunt us and, if they do not get you, they burn your family house'.130 On one occasion, after receiving complaints that train passen-gers were being molested by criminal youths, two hundred students patrolled a Soweto station to protect commuters.131 Residents recall that there was a noticeable lull in crime and gang activity during the 1976/7 uprising. Students managed to achieve what the police and Makgotla could not. The Christmas of 1976 proved to be the most peaceful festive season in Soweto for many years.132 The drop in gang crime was primarily a result of student crackdowns. However, as I showed earlier, the political and community consciousness of the gangs was partially raised during the uprising. Some individual gang members did embrace the 'struggle' while many more at least became more scrupulous in their choice of victims.

Conclusion

Unlike the Black Panthers of the American inner city ghettoes, the SSRC, and the Black Consciousness movement generally, ultimately withdrew from any potential alliance with lumpen elements in 1976. The Black Panthers were aware that they could not realistically overthrow the American government. Perhaps out of despair, they dedicated themselves to defending black territory, encouraging something approaching ghetto secessionism. Gang territoriality and parochiality could therefore be harnessed effectively to their objectives. The Black Consciousness movement, by contrast, sensed that it could play a crucial role in defeating the apartheid government. Political victory was too realistic to allow for apocalyptic politics. Moreover, as the township revolt of 1976/7 unfolded, the Black Consciousness movement gradually came to understand that it had more in common with ordinary working class residents than it did with the gang subculture. Although Black Consciousness was primarily a political movement of black urban youth, cultural rifts within the youth constituency proved to be too wide to enable the movement to forge a common black youth identity. Like the ANC of the 1950s, the Black Consciousness movement, although sympathetic to the plight of the street youth, was too concerned with the creation of a broader township consensus to risk taking on board the volatile and feared gang constituency. Like the ANC in the 1950s, the Black Consciousness movement could only contemplate recruiting youths involved with gangs once the youths had undergone a process of 'rehabilitation'. Few politicians were able to accept or understand the cultural logic of the gangs in spite of the fact that they were associative structures of enormous importance in the everyday lives of thousands of urban youths.

The school and the gang spawned two very different traditions of political and social defiance. The high school provided a space for an intellectual and disciplined form of politics to emerge. Student activists were idealistic and broad in vision; they saw them-selves, by the mid-1970s, as the vanguard of a national black community. The gangs expressed themselves through subversive styles and through violent territorial opposition to outsiders, including police and administrators. Their objective was to maintain de facto control of their streets; to make their turf, in a sense, 'ungovernable'. They cordoned off and defended a space in which they were significant. Whereas the gang world was, almost by definition, internally divided and antagonistic, school knitted together a student identity. The cohesive tendency of the school environment, coupled with the sudden expansion in high school numbers, explains the dramatic rise in importance of Soweto' s student constituency during the first half of the 1970s.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s the Soweto Youth Congress, as well as other youth congresses, appear to have been more successful in attracting non-student

youth. This politicisation process began with the less hardened street youth in the 1976/7 period. The effective disciplining of the gangs probably forced non-student youth in the subsequent years to look increasingly to political movements for an alternative sense of belonging. Moreover, as the education crisis deepened with students almost perpetually out on boycott during the mid 1980s, the student-non-student divide blurred further. The 'Comrades', theoretically, embraced all youth. Gangs, however, did not disappear. Before long they re-emerged in the mapantsula subculture and the jackroller gangs of the 1980s and 1990s. The political incorporation of the gang subculture, though more advanced than during the 1970s, was uneven and unstable during the 1980s. It was during this period that the term 'com-tsotsi' came into vogue to describe ambiguously criminal and political youth. What it represented was the partial fusion of two historically divergent youth cultures. While youth politics broadened and school identity lost its sharpness, gangs became more politically conscious and participative. But this fusion, it appears, was transient; with political 'demobilisation' since 1990, criminal youth gangs, made up primarily of school pushouts, became resurgent.

CHAPTER 12

SMILE, BELOVED COUNTRY

SIMON ROBINSON, *TIME INTERNATIONAL*

For Nelson Mandela, April 27 will begin like any other day. If he sticks to the routine he developed during his 27 years in prison, the 85-year-old former President will wake around 4:30 a.m., exercise for half an hour or so, then read the newspapers over a bowl of porridge, a piece of fruit and a glass or two of milk. And then his day will take a turn. For even in a life still crowded with pomp and circumstance — public appearances and private meetings, peace negotiations and speeches, photo ops and fundraisers — April 27 will stand out. Mandela will head to South Africa's administrative capital, Pretoria, where he will join his fellow countrymen in celebrating their first 10 years of freedom, an ordinary citizen in a normal land. That in itself is extraordinary. When South Africa's first democratic election, in 1994, consigned apartheid to the dustbin of history and brought Mandela's African National Congress (A.N.C.) to power, many South Africans believed civil war to be inevitable. While his black supporters saw him as a savior who had led them to victory and majority rule, whites were unsure about the man who just a few years before had languished in prison, officially branded an enemy of the state. But the predicted bloodshed and chaos never came — and for that miracle South Africans credit Mandela, the one figure able to convince both blacks and whites that this wonderful experiment in rainbow-nation building could really work.

The success of Mandela's experiment has transformed the lives of millions. Mthunzi Mdwaba is one of them. When he was a child growing up in South Africa's Eastern Cape during the 1970s, Mdwaba's future was as bleak and impenetrable as the night sky above his tiny village. Isolated and desperately poor, Mdwaba's hamlet had no electricity, no lights, no windows on the future. "If you lived in a poor township, you could go and look at the lights in the rich neighborhoods and see a better world out there," he says now. "We didn't even know there were lights to look at." But Mdwaba was blessed with a sharp intellect and supportive parents, and he survived the oppressive apartheid education system and went on to study law. Today, at 36, he is executive chairman at Torque-IT, a training company that has contracts with firms such as Mi-

crosoft and Cisco. "Home is still much darker than where I am here," he says, sitting in his office in the leafy Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia. "The challenge for me is to take some light back home."

Ten years after South Africa began living Mandela's dream, much has changed — but too much still remains the same. The signal improvement is that all South Africans are free: to move where they want, say what they want, vote for the party they support. After a decade of liberation, it's too easy to forget that until Mandela won power, most South Africans had never done these things. Since those historic first elections, the country has been ruled by the A.N.C., which spent over 80 years fighting the racist system imposed by the government of the white minority. It now governs under Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki, who is expected to win a second five-year term in this week's national election and be sworn in on April 27 as part of the main day of festivities in a yearlong celebration. Heads of state from around the world will join the party — which will include local musicians and 6,000 guests, as thousands more around South Africa hold street parties to mark a decade of democracy.

There's plenty to celebrate. Black South Africans now sit on the country's corporate boards, play on its international sporting teams, edit its most important newspapers, and own some of its best restaurants. Parts of old black townships have been reborn — with new roads, new houses and supermarkets where once there were muddy fields. More blacks than whites now buy Jaguars, and a growing black middle class is fueling a housing boom.

Yet huge divisions remain: between white and black, rich and poor, urban and rural. There are too few Mthunzi Mdwabas and too many people struggling in the dark. Up to 20% of blacks now count themselves as among the middle class, but an estimated 40% of households still fall below the official poverty line of $53 per month, and the black townships remain among the worst of the country's slums. At stoplights in South Africa's cities, a haunting one-act play is performed hundreds of times a day. An expensive car pulls alongside a beggar holding a scrawled sign that reads: help. no food. family to feed. god bless. The beggar stares at the driver. Finally, the window opens a crack and a hand appears holding some change. These days there's an occasional twist to the scene: a black driver handing money to a white beggar. Mostly, though, the characters play to racial type. As Mbeki said in his state-of-the-nation speech two months ago. "We have not yet eradicated the cruel legacy we inherited."

To fix the economy and heal its society, Mbeki and the A.N.C. have put their faith in capitalism and in policies designed to expand the black middle class. But overturning decades of iniquity and inequality takes time, and the black majority — mostly poor, often without opportunity — remains frustrated and impatient. Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu, former Archbishop of [an error occurred while processing this directive] Cape Town, celebrates the progress but worries about "a huge gap growing between the rich and poor." The country's leaders, he told TIME, "must beware the siren song of affluence, huge mansions and big cars when the bulk of our people still live in poverty and squalor." Ten years on, South Africans have discovered that the revolution that brought democracy also raised expectations and false hopes.

No crisis confronting South Africa looms larger than AIDS. Until India passes it sometime in the next year, South Africa holds the dismal distinction of having more HIV-positive citizens than any country in the world: more than 5 million out of a population of 45 million. Instead of tackling the disease, Mbeki has questioned the link between HIV and AIDS and the worth of lifesaving drugs. Finally, last year the government announced it would begin a treatment program that will eventually provide antiretroviral drugs to more than a million people with the disease. But the government has dragged its feet on the drug rollout, leaving charities and private companies to take up the slack. "Sometimes it feels as if we have to run as fast as we can just to stand still," says journalist and aids activist Charlene Smith. "We still have a marathon to run."

Another persistent scourge is crime. South Africa has always been a high-crime society. In the apartheid era, lawlessness induced by poverty and desperation added to the charge book full of race-law infringements. But since the end of apartheid, the number of reported serious offenses has rocketed: armed robberies shot up from 84,785 in 1994-95 to 126,905 in 2002-03, and rapes and attempted rapes — which experts believe are still substantially underreported — rose from 44,751 to 52,425. During that time the homicide rate has actually declined from 67 per 100,000 people (many of them political killings) to 47 per 100,000, though it remains one of the highest in the world. "In most countries, the leading cause of nonnatural death is automobile accidents," says Ted Leggett, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria. "In South Africa, it's murder."

And nothing escapes the issue of race. For a country that officially embraces nonracialism, South African life is often still dictated by the color of one's skin. From the selection of a football team to relations with a neighboring regime, race is an unspoken but omnipresent factor. Occasionally old wounds reopen. Two months ago, a white farmer allegedly ordered his workers to beat a former black employee and feed him to a pack of lions. When the farmer appeared in court, protesters, including local A.N.C. supporters, chanted "Kill the farmer, kill the Boer [Afrikaner]" — a slogan the South African Human Rights Commission describes as "hate speech." For the most part, though, South Africa's two worlds get along. "If reconciliation means coming to love one another, it's not going to happen," says white writer and political scientist David Welsh. "But if reconciliation means staying off one another's necks, then that's largely happened."

It's not just black South Africans who are grappling with change. At the height of apartheid's power in the 1970s, the ruling Afrikaners seemed invincible. Africa's white tribe controlled the most potent military machine and economy on the continent; an Afrikaner surgeon had performed the world's first heart transplant; Afrikaner scientists were building nuclear weapons. Today, Afrikaners are out of office, out of favor and still searching for their place in the new South Africa. As the rest of the country celebrates a decade of freedom, apartheid's architects seem lost and besieged. Younger Afrikaners and businessmen have made peace and found places for themselves in the life of the country, but many of their elders have not. The Afrikaans language has almost disappeared from public life, and Afrikaner workers must now compete with the growing black middle class and affirmative-action policies that work against them. Most are still privileged compared with the black majority, but "the psychological devastation is remarkable," says Danie Goosen, spokesman for the Group of 63, a collective of Afrikaner academics and intellectuals. "It's amazing to see the extent to which the community has collapsed."

Even in the occasionally painful reality of daily coexistence there are moments of transcendence — and even romance. When white multimillionaire Mark Shuttleworth became the first African in space two years ago, his journey on a Russian spacecraft was tracked by millions of South Africans, black and white alike. Last year, they cheered for Sibusiso Vilane when he became the first black man to conquer Mount Everest (never mind that he was born in Swaziland). And there was more happy hysteria in February, when actress Charlize Theron triumphed at the Academy Awards. Back

home with her Best Actress Oscar, the blond beauty from working-class Benoni met with both Mbeki and Mandela. Mbeki called Theron, who at 15 saw her mother shoot her father dead in self-defense, "a grand metaphor of South Africa's move from agony to achievement." Theron welled up when Mandela said she had put the country "on the map." (It was, after all, Mandela who did that.) She started to cry, turned and hugged him tight. "I love you so much," she said. "I love you, too," said Mandela, with a look of gentle surprise.

Mapisto Hlaodi and Ray Evans are in love, and don't care who knows it. In the apartheid era, interracial relationships were barred. They are still rare: older folks stare when Hlaodi, 23, a black hairdresser, and Evans, 26, a white mobile-phone shop-worker, go out together in Johannesburg. But 14 months into their relationship, Hlaodi marvels at the fact that they can go out at all. "Fifteen years ago I would have been arrested or something," she says. "Now people, young people especially, are more cool about it."

As national confidence grows, South Africa is finally taking its rightful place in the world. The stench of apartheid had forced the country into virtual isolation. Today, free, democratic and one of the 25 biggest economies in the world, it is taken far more seriously. Within Africa, Mbeki has styled himself as a leader to remake the continent, while further afield, South Africa is now a powerful player among developing nations. Together with Brazil and India it has forged a formidable southern alliance that aims to keep rich countries honest in trade talks and at bodies like the United Nations. By drawing on its past, South Africa can make a difference in the world. "That's why I like living here," says Mpho Makwana, CEO of the Marketing Federation of Southern Africa. "This is one part of the world where you can make history rather than just read about it."

South Africa has always been a land of epic journeys. Black Africans migrated south across the continent's vast plains two millenniums ago. White settlers trekked north into the South African veld in the 18th century. Mandela, whose odyssey took him from prison cell to President's office, called his autobiography Long Walk to Freedom. "We have not taken the final step of our journey," he wrote toward the end of his book, "but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road." Ten years after the euphoria of liberation, the journeys ahead are personal as well as epic. Businessman Mthunzi Mdwaba likes to talk about a school project his son Litha, 9, recently com-

pleted. Litha had to write a letter to himself in 20 years' time. What had he achieved? What sort of person did he want to be? In his letter, Litha imagined he had finished school and university. "I want to make my parents proud and start my own company," he wrote. "I want to be a big success." "That's the miracle," says Mdwaba. "That I never dreamed of doing what I did, but it would never occur to my son that he can't."

CHAPTER 13

ANC HOLDS ON TO POWER BUT ITS SHARE OF VOTE IS REDUCED

CELEAN JACOBSON, *THE INDEPENDENT*

The party now faces the most serious challenge to its authority since it took control 15 years ago

South Africa's ruling ANC has won a huge victory in the country's election but fell short of the two-thirds of votes needed to ensure a parliamentary majority big enough to make sweeping constitutional changes unchallenged.

Official results from the election – which will see the African National Congress leader Jacob Zuma become President on 9 May – showed yesterday that the ruling party won 65.9 per cent of the vote.

The margin that would let the ANC change the constitution is largely symbolic. The party has repeatedly stressed that it has no intention of doing this.

However, Steven Friedman, a political analyst, said the result meant the ANC now had to worry more about the opposition than at any time since it took power 15 years ago. "The effect of them not getting the two-thirds, despite the euphoria, really underlines that there has been a drop in the ANC vote," he said.

Financial markets, wary of a policy shift to the left under a Zuma presidency, may welcome a limit on the party's power.

The Independent Electoral Commission released official results and said that the ANC would be allocated 264 seats in South Africa's 400-seat parliament after it won 11.65 million votes out of 17.68 million valid votes cast in Wednesday's election.

Although a newly formed party of ANC dissidents has failed to make a dramatic impact, the ruling party has seen its share of the vote fall for the first time since the end of apartheid in 1994. It won nearly 70 per cent in 2004.

The ANC also lost control of the Western Cape province, centre of the tourist industry, to the official opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), which is led by Helen Zille, a white woman.

But the ANC celebrated what was still an overwhelming victory under the leadership of Mr Zuma, who just three weeks ago succeeded in getting a court to drop corruption charges his supporters say were politically motivated. The party's credentials for

ending white minority rule were more important for many voters than its doubtful record on fighting poverty, violent crime and Aids.

The ANC's closest rival was the DA, with 16.66 per cent of the vote. The Congress of the People (Cope), formed by politicians who broke from the ruling party, stood at 7.42 per cent. The DA will get 67 seats in parliament and Cope 30. Support for the Inkatha Freedom Party waned to 4.56 per cent, down from 6.97 per cent in 2004, giving it 18 seats. The ANC also made inroads into the IFP's traditional support base in KwaZulu-Natal province, home to South Africa's Zulus, the biggest tribal group, of which Mr Zuma is a member. Electoral officials said that the turnout was 77.3 per cent, a little higher than in 2004.

Mr Zuma's supporters have been celebrating since shortly after the voting ended on Wednesday, as his party's victory had not been seriously in doubt. The ANC views Mr Zuma as the first leader who can energise voters since Nelson Mandela. But others say he is too beholden to unions and left-wingers.

At the end of the campaign, Mr Zuma was talking not about creating jobs, but staving off job losses. His personal charisma and rise from poverty to political prominence have drawn adoring crowds throughout the election campaign, although critics question whether he can implement his populist agenda amid the global economic meltdown.

CHAPTER 14

HE'LL TAKE IT FROM HERE

PUSCH COMMEY, *NEW AFRICAN*

The spoils of Nelson Mandela's phenomenal political legacy are going to be vigorously contested - on 22 April. The drama that has engulfed South Africa since his departure from active politics has had its twists and turns. For one, it is not the same party of Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. Today the ruling ANC is a house divided, driven apart by the long-running factional fight between the former president, Thabo Mbeki and his supporters on one side and Jacob Zuma and his supporters on the other, as well as capitalist greed.

Nor is it the first time that there has been a split. In 1959, a faction of the ANC split to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which stoked the embers of the anti-apartheid struggle that then took a landmark turn on 2 March 1960, when the apartheid police gunned down 60 PAC members protesting against the obnoxious pass law. It came to be popularly known as the Sharpeville Massacre.

The casualties of the divided house have been many, including Mbeki himself, who was unceremoniously pushed out of office in September last year. His sympathisers have rallied to form COPE (Congress Of the People) which is now contesting with the ANC for power. To secure Mandela's blessing and mantle, the ANC has been quick to take him to "one of their rallies on a chartered aircraft, leading to charges of endangering his health for political gain. A retired Mandela rarely makes public appearances these days.

COPE is by no means the only parry jostling with the dominant ANC which won 69.69% of the vote in the 2004 elections, and with it a two-thirds majority. There are the usual suspects. The Democratic Alliance (DA) remains the official opposition for now. Having won 12.37% of the vote to come second in 2004, the DA also runs the important Western Cape Province in a coalition government with other smaller parties. That is where its bite is most effective.

Throughout the rest of the country, the ANC rules. For the record, it has swallowed up the erstwhile National Party which instituted and ran apartheid for 48 years. Its former leader, Marthinus Van Schalkwyk serves as the current minister of tourism.

Championed by its feisty leader, Helen Zille, the mayor of Cape Town, the DA has struggled to shed an image of "defender of white privilege". This has made it extremely difficult for it to attract enough of the 80% black votes crucial to winning an election. It has been trying hard though to attract credible blacks while whites dominate its leadership. The DA's reference point is the late Helen Suzman, the veteran anti-apartheid parliamentarian whose progressive party battled apartheid in an all white parliament. Its failure to woo black votes has meant that it has had to spearhead an anti-ANC coalition in order to make any significant inroads into power.

Of sad note is the rapid decline of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the party that takes its inspiration from the ideals of Ghana's first president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. A major player before the end of apartheid, the PAC has been in terminal decline and now has only one member of parliament in the 400-seat chamber, having won just 0.73% of the vote in 2.004. Various attempts to position it as a major party have foundered, and the PAC continues to remain on the fringes. Its kindred spirit, AZAPO (or the Azanian Peoples Organisation), managed just 0.3% of the vote in 2004.

The PAC was seriously weakened by the exit of its best known firebrand, Patricia De-Lille, who decided to form her own party, the Independent Democrats (ID) before the 2004 election. The ID has attracted most votes from the Western Cape, one of nine provinces, and won 1.73% of the vote in 2004, doing better than the PAC. Other major parries incidentally are largely regional.

Chief among them is Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi's Inkhata Freedom Party, which won 6.97% of the votes in 2.004. The party, rooted in traditional Zulu culture, has gathered support largely from the Kwazulu Natal Province, where it has been battling with the ANC for power for decades. The warrior chief, Buthelezi, is now 80 years old, and has made a remarkable transition from the image of a Zulu warlord to an elder statesman, sometimes having to preach democracy to latter-day politicians.

There have been splinter groups aplenty. The United Democratic Front (UDM) was born our of the expultion from the ANC of the former general, Bantu Holomisa, the one-time leader of the Transkei bantustan during the turbulent 1980s. He was a major ANC supporter, and h is expulsion came largely as a result of his withering criticism of the party in the early 1990s. The UDM’s support is also largely based in the Eastern Cape. The party won 2.2.8% of the vote in 2004, and has continued to be a strong critic of the ANC. Holomisa's posters can be found on garbage bins, with a promise to clean up the mess in the country.

There is also the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) that commands a reasonable following, having won 1.6% of the vote in 2004. Its leader, the Rev Kenneth Meshoe, is well positioned to attract the Christian vote.

Then there are the splinter groups of the old order. The Freedom Front abandoned the sinking National Party and has maintained a one-man presence in parliament, sniping at the ANC from time to rime. There are also a myriad other provincial and municipal parties vying for part of the spoils.

This year witnessed a record number of registered political parties as well as a high voter registration. Already a court challenge has ruled chat registered voters living abroad can cast their ballots. The stage is set for a fierce campaign full of sound and fury.

Enter Jacob Zuma

How then will the 2009 elections shape up? The run-up gathered real steam in early March against the backdrop of the legal woes of the ANC president and candidate, Jacob Zuma. He has been slated to appear in court on 22 August to face charges of fraud, corruption, money laundering and tax evasion. He has also been granted leave in the constitutional court to appeal against a supreme court decision chat effectively reinstated charges against him. A high court ruling in his home province, Kwazulu-Natal, had effectively dismissed the charges.

Barring unforeseen circumstances, it is inevitable that Jacob Zuma will become president of the country. With presidential power comes the authority to change many things. The likelihood is that his legal problems will disappear like magic after his inauguration. Judges are also sensitive to political developments. They are only human. Already there are reports that the charges will be withdrawn.

The ANC's much-toured slogan of "a better life for all" has changed to "working together, we can do more". It is a sign of the times. The promise of entitlement has changed to that of a partnership between the individual and government. It is a more honest appraisal of the direction the country should go in than the creation of unrealistic expectations, a tinderbox for social unrest.

There are reports of several party heavyweights and political entrepreneurs jostling for the ear of Jacob Zuma. Chief among them have been his staunchest supporters in the South African Communist Party (SACP) and COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), leading to fears of a communist takeover. As a liberation party, the ANC's domination of the political landscape will remain unchanged. The crucial

question is how far its political support will be eroded by the arrival of COPE whose promoters and supporters are also steeped in the liberation struggle.

The founders of COPE, the ex-chairman of the ANC, Mosiuia Terror Lekota, and the former president of COSATU and premier of the rich Gauteng province, Mbhazima Shilowa, will not be leading the party into the election. At the COPE congress in February, the party elected a relatively unsung bishop of the Methodist Church, Mvume Dandala, to take the party into the election. Though a veteran of the struggle against apartheid, Dandala is not very well known. The rationale for his election seems like an attempt to seize the moral high ground. With most of the current and past players of the ANC tainted by one scandal or the other, Dandala appeals to the moral right, which would include the significant Christian right.

By early March, COPE was still struggling to find a voice while the other parties were out campaigning furiously. There were reports of party infighting for leadership positions. Significantly COPE reeled in some political heavyweights who publically pledged their support but stayed in the background. The growing list includes the 90-year-old Epainette Mbeki, mother of the President Mbeki; Phumzile Mlambo Ngcuka, the former deputy president under Mbeki; and Saki Makozoma, the prominent ANC member and multi-millionaire.

Mbeki is reputed to be lurking in the background as a backer of the anti-Zuma project that COPE is seen as. Alan Boesak, a prominent anti-apartheid activist, is COPE's candidate for premiership of the Western Cape. Another prominent ANC premier of the Limpopo Province, Sello Moloto, has joined the list of defections. COPE claims to have several closet supporters who don't want to be identified for fear of losing their government jobs. They also claim intimidation from the ruling ANC which, on the other hand, claims to have received back several defectors dissatisfied with the way COPE is being run. So the political tap dance goes on.

Taking votes

Who is taking votes from whom is the big issue. With the arrival of COPE, there has been a fresh injection of excitement into politics and voter turnout is likely to be high. COPE is expected to take votes away from the ANC. With Dandala at the head, COPE will also likely pinch votes from the religious right, and as a result from the ACDP. It also threatens to knock the DA from its perch as the official opposition. COPE will also be competitive in the Eastern Cape Province where the UDM draws its support. COPE's chief promoter, the former deputy defence minister, Mluleki George, hails from the province as well as Mbeki

The roughly 10% white vote will remain with the DA, but the DA's attempt to secure the black vote will take a serious hit as chose disaffected with the ANC will seek out COPE. Which party will come our on top is not in doubt. It is the size ANC's victory that is the question.

COPE has been unable to focus on ANC failures as its members were largely in government before the split. It is seen as the party of the black middle class and the well-heeled, which is a stark minority. COPE has, thus, been preaching charge of the rabble-rousers. COPE has broached the question of a morally compromised ANC president, Jacob Zuma, still facing charges of corruption.

On the other hand, the ANC is convinced that. COPE is a group of "sinister" politicians who tried to destroy Zuma by using the National Prosecution Authority and its now defunct investigative unit, The Scorpions, to hound him with unfounded charges - all in an attempt to stop the heir apparent from succeeding to the throne. It has been the raison d'etre for the seismic split.

The ANC cannot be attacked on the economy, hence the smaller parties have homed in on other issues like corruption, crime, housing, inequality and decay. Yet their message seems not to resonate with the majority of voters who happen to be black, poor, low income, unemployed, and simply identify with the ANC whose support is traditional and historical. Race and ethnicity plays a part in the bigger picture.

All the ANC has to do is to peddle more and more promises from Zuma whose background fits into the image of a champion of the poor. He likes to tell the people: "I grew up among people, not strangers. So I understand people's problems. And if you understand people's problems, it is not difficult to relate to them." That has been his appeal. With no formal education, an anti-apartheid hero, and very personable, Zuma is liked by the majority of the people who easily identify with him in dance, song, and politics.

Who gets the nod

To date, opinion polls have been inconclusive and are nor showing common trends. Many of the polls suffer from a high no-response rate. One poll has shown, for example, that a third of black voters and just under half of white voters are still undecided on who they will vote for. The ANC's service delivery record has been far more successful than is often acknowledged, and since a quarter of the population today depends on its largesse in the form of handouts, it is likely that the party will poll between 60% and 66% of the votes. It is ironical because that service delivery can also be credited to Mbeki 's administration.

How might the rest be divided? Pundit opinion differs. How much COPE will be able to peel off the ANC is of great interest. Some have pointed to the roughly 40% of support that Mbeki got within the party when he competed against Zuma for the ANC presidency in December 2007. But the delegates' conference in Polokwane is hardly a good indicator of mass voter appeal when the dynamics are different.

There have been various polls purring COPE's likely electoral strength at between 8% and 12%. The party is likely to benefit from the novelty factor. It has publicly stated that it is pitching for 51% of the vote, but that is a dream. Realistically, any showing between 10% and 20% will be a victory. The DA's support seems to have peaked at 12.5% and will most likely hover between 11% and 14%. The Inkata Freedom Party (IFP) is likely to haemorrhage some of the 7% of votes it received in 2004 and backing will likely drop to between 3% and 5%. Jacob Zuma, himself a prominent Zulu, will cut into the support base of the ageing Buthelezi. The ID will likely receive 1% to 2% of the vote. The other parties should split 6%, with the UDM and ACDP getting the lion's share.

Political violence during the election is a distinct possibility as COPE, the ANC and IFP have clashed on various occasions in the run-up. It is not new. The contest for black votes will inevitably stoke all that is ugly in politics. This has been aggravated by the open wound within the ANC. However, the country has ample experience in managing electoral violence.

But, ultimately; will the election be a referendum on Jacob Zuma as some people are saying? To some extent the answer is yes. His saga has captured the public imagination over the past several years. A large number of votes will fly in the direction of whether you hate him or love him. And yet another large number will come from those who are uncertain about the future. South Africa will be an interesting place this month.

CHAPTER 15

ZUMA'S FIRST YEAR

R. W. JOHNSON, *CURRENT HISTORY*

South African President Jacob Zuma has waged a long fight for political survival. In recent years his fight was joined by many who resented former President Thabo Mbeki's arrogant, manipulative, and Machiavellian style of rule. Thus it was widely assumed that Zuma's victory in elections a year ago would bring a fresh start in many directions.

Instead, a year into Zuma's presidency, factionalism in the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has worsened. Government paralysis has simply rigidified. And all of South Africa's old problems have re-presented themselves, aggravated in the past year by a deep recession.

Zuma's ANC approached the April 2009 general elections with several agendas. The first was to eliminate Mbeki's imprint from the party. Zuma had deposed Mbeki as party leader in late 2007 at an ANC conference at Polokwane; nearly a year later, Mbeki had been forced to retire from the nation's presidency when it became clear that he was almost constitutionally incapable of ceasing to conspire against Zuma. Now, through the ANC's decision to drop no fewer than 133 sitting parliament members from its candidate list, the transition was complete.

The second item on the agenda was to defeat the Congress of the People (COPE), a party that had splintered from the ANC with Mbeki's tacit support. A "war room" directed by Blade Nzimande, the leader of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and a key Zuma ally, was set up inside ANC headquarters at Luthuli House for this express purpose.

And finally, the ANC had to unite behind Zuma. Hence a number of odd names, some closely associated with Mbeki, appeared on the party's candidate list. These included Trevor Manuel, the Mbekiite former finance minister, who was placed at number 4 on the list despite the bitter hatred that his name provoked in the SACP and the Congress of South African Trade Unions; three of Mbeki's provincial premiers (though none retained his premiership); Mbeki's former health minister, the wholly discredited Manto Tshabalala-Msimang (though she was quickly appointed instead, to the horror of health experts, as an African Union goodwill ambassador whose brief was to

improve “mother and child health” in Africa as a whole); and Winnie Madikizela- Mandela, Nelson Mandela’s former wife (though her conviction on 43 counts of fraud should have made her ineligible to run, and she had been fined for non-attendance in her previous parliamentary term).

Muddled Opposition

For its part, COPE had chosen a Methodist bishop, Mvume Dandala, to lead its party list for the April elections. This was an attempt to take the moral high ground, but also to consolidate support in the Xhosa community in the Eastern Cape province by nominating a Xhosa to run against Zuma, a Zulu. (Mbeki, too, is a Xhosa.) The ANC, to counter this move, retained as many Xhosa heavyweights as it could, including not only Madikizela-Mandela but also Phathekile Holomisa, a leader of the traditional Xhosa chiefs; Enoch Godongwana, an Eastern Cape politician; and some key Mbeki clients, such as Charles Nqakula and Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula. The ANC’s electoral prospects were aided by COPE’s organizational shambles; the party could not even get its posters up until late in the campaign.

The traditional opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), also made the ANC’s task easier by concentrating almost all of its efforts on the Western Cape province, where Helen Zille was the R.W. Johnson is the author of South Africa’s Brave New World: The Beloved Country Since the End of Apartheid (Allen Lane, 2009). party’s candidate for premier. The DA did, however, manage to get South Africa’s Constitutional Court to grant the vote to registered expatriate voters, despite the opposition of the ANC and of the Independent Electoral Commission, which was full of ANC appointees.

The ANC won the elections handily, with 65.9 percent of the vote. This, however, was almost 4 percentage points below its 2004 showing, and the ruling party was left three seats short in the National Assembly of a two-thirds majority. The DA shot up to 16.7 percent, gaining over 1 million votes over its 2004 performance. In the Western Cape, where its vote more than doubled, the DA won an outright majority.

Early in the campaign, polls had shown COPE biting deep into the votes of both the ANC and the DA. But COPE’s ratings fell steadily as it became clear that the party was disorganized and also that it replicated many of the ANC’s failings. For all its anti-corruption rhetoric, COPE picked Allan Boesak, who had served a jail sentence for corruption, to head its Western Cape list after Boesak had set his price too high for Zuma. COPE ended up with 7.4 percent of the vote, scoring best in the Northern Cape (15.9 percent), the Eastern Cape (13.3 percent), and the Free State (11.1 percent). Most of

COPE's vote was taken away from the ANC, but it also gained at the expense of other smaller parties, which suffered a catastrophic drop.

The ANC, though it won the election, nonetheless suffered its first serious electoral reversal since 1994. It saw its votes decline, both in shares and absolute numbers, in all provinces save Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal. In Gauteng alone the ANC was down by 690,000 votes. What saved the day for the incumbent party was a massive turnout for Zuma among his fellow Zulus. A surge of Zulu nationalist fervor accounted for the ANC's gains in Mpumalanga (plus 173,000 votes) and, above all, in KwaZulu-Natal (plus 944,000 votes).

The Left Moves In

Zuma, after he was sworn in as president in May 2009, strived to keep together the coalition that had carried him to victory at Polokwane. It quickly became clear, however, that the coalition's disparate elements, no longer united by the need to evict Mbeki, would go their own way and often come into conflict.

The central group within the ANC consists of non-Communist African nationalists, many of them involved in a variety of economic activities that are parasitic on the ANC and the government. They have no real political ideology and just wish to be left alone to prosper, by hook and often by crook.

In addition, the government depends heavily on the traditional bureaucracies of the finance ministry, the reserve bank, and the revenue service— institutions that have not been much tampered with because they lay the golden eggs. Economic policy remains securely in the hands of this interlocking bureaucracy. And, much to the left's frustration, Zuma is keen to keep the flow of golden eggs intact. Manuel for long symbolized this bureaucracy; his successor, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, has also been captured by it.

The other principal faction in the ANC consists of the SACP and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). The latter has now openly declared its loyalties to dialectical materialism and proletarian socialist revolution— that is, it has discarded any remaining pretense that it is something more than an SACP union.

Both the union leadership and the SACP had clearly decided last year that they must adopt a vanguard role, driving the ANC along and, in effect, forcing the party to assent to their conception of the platform adopted at Polokwane. Toward this end the left achieved some success after the elections, provoking at least one observer to draw comparisons with the creeping communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948.

Both Nzimande and Jeremy Cronin, the SACP's top leaders, were given important government jobs, even though the SACP constitution stated that its office-holders

work full time, and are not available for other jobs. Rob Davies, another longtime SACP activist, was named minister for trade and industry. And, a week before the election, Cosatu got Zuma to agree that its nominee, Ebrahim Patel, would be given the new ministry for economic planning.

When Manuel, the finance minister from 1996 to 2009, emerged as the minister in charge of a new planning commission based inside the presidency, Cosatu tried all it could, both publicly and privately, to marginalize him and to insist that Patel be given primacy. Zuma finally ruled in favor of Cosatu, and Joel Netshitenzhe, an Mbeki confidant who had warned of growing interference by the far left in government, was quickly forced to resign.

At the same time, both Cosatu and the SACP began to make policy statements on their own. The SACP pushed forward a vague but extremely ambitious national health insurance scheme that foresaw the forced amalgamation of the public and private health systems, as well as a similar scheme for universal social security. It also demanded the nationalization of mines. The ANC endorsed the first two proposals and dithered on the last. (There is, of course, no money for either the health or the social security initiative, and no prospect of funding them in the foreseeable future.)

Zwelinzima Vavi, the general secretary of Cosatu, announced in June 2009 that Zuma would serve two presidential terms: "Two terms— and no discussions about it—and we are very happy." There was some grumbling about Cosatu's calling the shots this way, but the alternative—another bitter leadership battle in only three years time—did not suit anyone. Vavi also declared that "We are the policy makers—and government implements."

Gwede Mantashe, the SACP chairman, even insisted that the ANC (that is, himself) would evaluate and monitor the performance of ministers and call them to account. And this would apply even to Zuma himself. Vavi went further, and spoke of Cosatu "recalling" ministers. Cosatu had, he said, developed at least 70 percent of the Polokwane party platform, and henceforth the tripartite alliance (Cosatu, the SACP, and the ANC) would decide everything of importance at the national, provincial, and local levels of government. Vavi would himself be available to serve in a senior government position once he finished his current Cosatu term, he added.

Zuma, who wants to keep his coalition together and prefers to rule by consensus, did little last year to resist this determined leftward push. It has always been Zuma's style to listen long and hard and then come down in favor of whatever seems most likely to guarantee unity. Given Cosatu and the SACP's strength at the elite level of the ANC, this made it hard to adopt any line they opposed.

The trouble is, public opinion polls generally show only 2 percent of voters favoring the SACP, and Cosatu now has only 1.6 million members in a population of almost 50 million—an exceedingly narrow base on which to build radical change.

The Zulus' Turn

A less obvious but still fundamental motif in Zuma's first year in office has been ethnicity. Having waited patiently for the presidency, Zulus are in no hurry to give it up. Zuma's chief backer, Zweli Mkhize, who could easily have chosen a cabinet post, opted instead for the premiership of KwaZulu-Natal, the traditional home of the Zulu nation. Within the province there is an easy assumption that Mkhize might succeed Zuma as president and that, in any case, the leadership will hardly be allowed to escape again to another Xhosa (let alone to a mere Sotho or Venda).

The same considerations have put wind in the sails of other ambitious Zulu ministers, such as Jeff Radebe, the minister of justice and constitutional development, and Nzimande, the minister for higher education and training—both potential presidential aspirants. Zuma has also quietly appointed a Zulu minister of police, a Zulu police commissioner, and a Zulu chief justice.

When in October 2009 an aspirant black judge boldly opined that black lawyers would not really get anywhere until people like Zuma stopped choosing white lawyers to defend them, the new chief justice brusquely reprimanded her for showing disrespect to the president—for Zuma was now the great Zulu patriarch. Naturally, Zuma's own legal difficulties evaporated as soon as he became president, with judges and prosecutors all keen to hear no more of the corruption charges that had been levelled against him.

Before long, Zuma was, to the ANC's embarrassment, celebrating his marriage to a third wife (polygamy is a Zulu tradition). Then, in February 2010, he admitted he had sired a twentieth child, this one out of wedlock. These events prompted a good deal of criticism and ridicule. Zuma was routinely pictured dancing in leopard skins, and even when he mounted podiums he seemed to enjoy singing and dancing more than speech making. Meanwhile, at his home in Nkandla, unknown businessmen were contributing millions to build what was effectively a palace for the president, one befitting a Zulu king and his wives. Other businessmen have allegedly financed his wives and children, in return for what favors no one knows.

A Recession Budget

Much of the government today remains in a state of paralysis. A year after he took office, Zuma has yet to work out exactly what Patel's job is. There is little sense of initiative or leadership, and ministers do much as they please. Sometimes they openly

quarrel with one another, just as the different ANC factions have waged bitter disputes in public, entirely ignoring Zuma's anguished pleas for unity.

When Zuma delivered his state of the nation address to the parliament in February 2010, he spoke badly, made frequent mistakes, and ran into a gale of opposition criticism. Most cabinet ministers have largely abandoned the president, leaving only their junior ministers to support him.

The budget that the administration produced this year is—to the fury of Cosatu and the SACP— entirely orthodox. Crafted by Finance Minister Gordhan and praised by international observers, the budget seeks to avoid increasing the federal deficit and calls for deficit reductions in future years. It also retains the central bank's inflation target of 3 to 6 percent. As such, it shows that the labor unions and the Communists have had no impact, in fact, on economic policy making. Zuma has defended the budget, but without seeming to understand it, and it is clear that the finance ministry was acting in effect quite independently from him.

On entering office in 2009, Zuma promised to create 500,000 jobs. Instead, a recession over the past year eliminated 900,000 jobs. The ANC had parochially assumed that South Africa would escape the global economic downturn, and its election campaign was replete with promises of extra welfare spending. But the recession hit hard—gross domestic product shrank by 2.2 percent in 2009.

The left, despite its new ascendancy, clearly had little idea what to do under such circumstances, especially since its plans for health care, social security, and enhanced welfare all depended on extra spending that could no longer be afforded. Moreover, Zuma's creation of new government departments was costly, especially as the new ministers helped themselves to luxury cars and huge expense claims.

The left has promoted the notion of the "developmental state," according to which the government and parastatal spending programs and state policy itself provide the main motor of economic development. But this notion sits awkwardly with the fact that virtually all of South Africa's parastatals are losing money and have required billions in bailouts. Even Eskom, South Africa's electric utility, had to cut back on planned investment in new power stations, and it became painfully clear that state investment could not lead the way out of such difficulties; only renewed private investment could rescue the situation.

Most remarkable of all, the government's plan to deal with the recession was simply not implemented: The various ministries could not agree on who should do what, and the result was complete inaction, a paralysis born of sheer ineptitude and lack of leadership. The economy and the country last year drifted and rolled like a rudderless

ship in a storm. In October 2009, a commitment to extend child allowances (payments to mothers for each of their children) up to the age of 18 kicked in, an obligation for which money will have to be borrowed abroad.

From the outset, the Zuma government has faced continuous township agitation about inadequate delivery of basic services. Frequently over the past year these protests have become violent, with much destruction of property. Typically, mayors and councillors have been accused of corruption, usually quite accurately. But all too often, angry street actions have spilled over into xenophobic targeting of foreigners.

Corrupt to the Core

The government has responded mainly with words—warning that it would not stand for violent protest, that people must be more patient and wait a little longer, that municipalities must get their houses in order, and that corrupt mayors and councillors would not be tolerated. None of this has had any discernible impact. Almost every day has brought fresh revelations of utterly systemic corruption within the public service.

An audit report for 2007–2008, for example, found that many hundreds of millions of rands in tenders and other contracts had been awarded by some 2,319 civil servants who were either directors of companies or had a family member who played a leading role in them. Worse, absolutely nothing had been done about this by the end of 2009, so the officials in question knew they enjoyed impunity.

The same circumstances pertain at the provincial level. In 2006 the auditor general found that 60 percent of provincial public servants had private business interests, that 49 percent of parliament members were company directors (and 59 percent held shares in companies), and that between a third and a half of all provincial legislators had outside business interests. That is, public sector corruption is not just common—it is the norm, and the government has clearly balked at trying to do anything about it. It has been estimated that as much as 30 percent of all public spending is creamed off in various scams.

Naturally, the beneficiaries can be expected to support the left's notion of the developmental state, since that is the chief engine of their own enrichment. Indeed, this is the true meaning of "African socialism"—public sector theft erected into a way of life.

With headlines blaring every day the message that the political elite at the national and provincial levels is enriching itself by such means, and with the elite often advertising its status with Mercedeses and BMWs and by staying, with large retinues, in five-star hotels, it is ridiculous to think that sermons about how shack-dwellers

must be patient in putting up with bucket toilets will have any effect. It is equally ridiculous to think that lectures against corruption will prevent mayors and councillors from viewing their positions as essentially a means toward personal wealth rather than as an opportunity for community service.

Little wonder, then, that by March 2010 there was renewed speculation that Zuma would be a one-term president. ANC elders were quoted as saying that Zuma had done his job by getting rid of Mbeki, but that the country simply needed a leader with greater capacity. No obvious successor, however, has yet emerged. Indeed, so factionalized and divided is the ANC that it is not clear that either the party or the country is still governable.

CHAPTER 16

HOW THE ANC LOST ITS WAY

ALEX PERRY, *TIME*

It has been exactly 99 years and 11 months since the world's most storied liberation movement, the African National Congress, was born, and I am looking for its birthplace. In Bloemfontein, the old Boer capital on South Africa's central prairie, a white tourist-information officer points me to a building on the edge of town called Maphikela House — after Thomas Maphikela, who built it and who helped found the ANC. "I've never been there myself," the information officer says. "It's a township." Then she pulls out a map and circles another part of town that I am to avoid. "Dangerous," she says. She means "black people."

On Jan. 8, thousands of ANC supporters and 46 heads of state descend on Bloemfontein to celebrate the party's centenary. I've come early to explore the origins of the organization that gave the world Nelson Mandela and laid the foundations of modern South Africa — and Africa — by inspiring the overthrow of centuries of colonialism and racist deprivation. (PHOTOS: South Africa, Fifteen Years On)

At least that's ANC legend. I'm in Bloemfontein to measure that against reality. Because while South Africa has seen steady economic growth in the 17 years after apartheid, it has also experienced an abiding racial divide. That partition is expressed in enduring prejudice on both sides and persistent economic segregation. Remarkably, income inequality rose after apartheid ended: redistribution programs have mainly benefited a politically connected elite. Most whites and a few blacks live in the first world. But out of a total population of 50 million, 8.7 million South Africans, most of them black, earn $1.25 or less a day. Millions live in the same township shacks, travel in the same crowded minibuses (called taxis in South Africa) and, if they have jobs, work in the same white-owned homes and businesses they did under apartheid — all while coping with some of the world's worst violent crime and its biggest HIV/AIDS epidemic.

The ANC blames apartheid's legacy and, as party spokesman Keith Khoza describes it, "the reluctance of business to come to the party." But 17 years is almost a generation. The government's failure to transform South Africa from a country of black and white into a "rainbow nation," in Archbishop Desmond Tutu's phrase,

means black poverty is still the key political issue. A second, related one, however, is the ANC's dramatic loss of moral authority. At 93, Mandela is still among the most admired people on earth. But his party has become synonymous with failure — and not coincidentally, arrogance, infighting and corruption. Tutu, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and, at 80, still the nation's moral conscience, encapsulated South African political debate last year when he came out of retirement to give two speeches. In the first he asked whites to pay a wealth tax in recognition of their persistent advantage. In the second he called the ANC "worse than the apartheid government." (AUDIOSLIDE: Nelson Mandela's Life and Leadership)

Africa is littered with liberation movements that, upon victory, forgot the people in whose name they fought. That era is coming to an end as the continent becomes more democratic and prosperous. The International Monetary Fund says seven of the world's 10 fastest growing economies are African, despite holdovers like Zimbabwe. Is South Africa, the continent's economic and political powerhouse, a gateway to this bright future or a window on its unhappy past?

Across the Tracks

The short drive to Maphikela house crosses South Africa's divide. I start in leafy all-white suburbs, home to cafs, bookstores and the Hobbit Boutique Hotel, modeled on the fantasies of Bloemfontein's most famous son, J.R.R. Tolkien. Then I cross a railway track, and I'm in the township: no trees, full of potholes and all black. Where my tourist map indicates Maphikela House should be is instead an abandoned warehouse, the windows smashed, graffiti by its broken door announcing THUG MANSION.

The local metropolitan authority says unemployment is 56%, and 59% of those with jobs earn $100 or less a month. Hanging out on a corner opposite Thug Mansion is Tumelo Lekhooe, 20, who was out of work for a year after school before finding a job as a street sweeper. "The ANC is full of corruption," he says. "There are no good roads here, no parks, good schools or jobs. The ANC use connections to win government tenders, then spend the money on themselves." (LIST: The Top 10 Political Prisoners)

Lekhooe is describing a phenomenon in postapartheid South Africa: the growth of the tenderpreneur. The term describes those who get rich from government contracts or from dispensing them for kickbacks. Tenderpreneurs have turned government into a business. The national Special Investigating Unit, which targets corruption, reckons that up to a quarter of annual state spending — $3.8 billion — is wasted through overpayment and graft. The Auditor General says a third of all government departments have awarded contracts to companies owned by officials or their families;

in December it found that three-quarters of all tenders in one ANC-ruled province, the Eastern Cape, rewarded officials in this way. Those being investigated for suspected corruption include two ministers, the country's top policeman and the head of the ANC's Youth League, Julius Malema. (All deny the charges.)

Tenderpreneurs are just one chapter in the saga of ANC scandals. There are the perks, like the $550 million the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) claims ministers and their wives have spent on themselves since 2009. There is the state security minister whose wife was convicted of running an international drug ring, and the local government minister who used public money to fly first class to Switzerland to visit his girlfriend, also in prison for narcotics. There is the previous police chief, jailed for 15 years for taking bribes from the mob. And there is a corrupt $4.8 billion European arms deal that has haunted the ANC leadership since it was agreed to in 1999.

South African President Jacob Zuma declined to be interviewed for this article, but he can be candid about the ANC's poor record. "I have traveled to many parts of the country in recent months, monitoring the performance of government," he said at a business breakfast in Cape Town in November. "I come face to face with the triple scourge of poverty, inequality and unemployment." Zuma has taken action, however. He has sacked two ministers, suspended a raft of top officials, including the police chief, and set up an independent inquiry into the arms deal. He appropriated all the duties of a corrupt and inept ANC state government in Limpopo and dispatched his own officials to improve two more. He has already delivered one spectacular success to confound the skeptics: the 2010 soccer World Cup, the world's biggest sporting event, which went off with barely a hitch.

Zuma also has a vision of how to mend the government. In November he published a 19-year national plan that identified the nation's priorities as "corruption, divided communities, too few jobs, crumbling infrastructure, resource intensive economy, exclusive planning, poor education, high disease burden, public service [that is] uneven." By 2030, it pledges to have created 11 million jobs, built two more universities and several railway lines, privatized power, made private business illegal for bureaucrats, deployed up to 1.3 million community health workers and facilitated the installation of 5 million solar heaters. The plan is meant to inspire a party made complacent by a consistent two-thirds electoral majority. "We are too strong," Zuma told TIME in 2009, soon after becoming President. "You take things for granted."

It sounds impressive. Worryingly, that may be precisely the idea. "Eleven million jobs by 2030?" asks a Western diplomat in Pretoria. "Great. Excellent. From where?" After all, Zuma has made similar commitments before. In June 2009 he promised 4

million jobs by 2014 — ambitious then, unreachable now. He also pledged 80% coverage of antiretroviral treatment by 2011 (unlikely, given UNAIDS's figure of 25% for 2010) and an annual 7% to 10% annual cut in serious crime (against an actual 2011 — 12 fall of 5.75%). Critics say his purges of officials are less about corruption or ineptness than political vendettas. (MORE: In South Africa, Murder in Black and White)

Zuma himself is tainted by charges of corruption. He was linked to the arms deal through one of his financial advisers, who was jailed in 2005 for trying to solicit bribes on his behalf. Since Zuma was elected, the DA says the state has spent $50 million on refurbishing his homes. Tellingly, Zuma goes after those who would check his behavior. In November the ANC-led Parliament passed a law known as the "secrecy bill," which penalizes whistle-blowers or journalists in possession of secret documents and allows no public-interest defense. He has installed unqualified allies in top positions across the justice system. Meanwhile, internal party politicking, particularly Zuma's rivalry with Malema, has overshadowed government, something that will only increase in the run-up to a party conference in Bloemfontein in December at which Zuma is running for re-election as ANC President. "For the next 12 months, nobody will be running the country," says Fiona Forde, author of An Inconvenient Youth, about Malema.

Mythmaking

With such an underwhelming record in office, how does the ANC win elections? By invoking its legend. The centenary celebrations, like so many other ANC events, hammer home how much black South Africans owe the party. Using such a "powerful legacy" only makes electoral sense, concedes DA leader Helen Zille. "When you've fought a liberation struggle and suffered so much and a party is perceived to have given you back your dignity, that party becomes who you are. How are you going to turn your back on that?" On his street corner, Lekhooe says, "I don't know why we still vote for them," then corrects himself. "It's our grandparents. They say we are here only because of the ANC."

Zille based her last general election campaign on the message that the ANC betrayed Mandela's legacy. But how real is that inheritance? The central figure in ANC legend is Mandela, who reinvigorated the party in the 1940s and eventually led it to power in 1994. But as Mandela recounts in his autobiography, his transformation from rebel leader to global icon was, in part, a piece of imagemaking by the ANC. In 1980, after nearly four decades of fighting a regime that had not moved an inch, the party tried a new publicity strategy: personalizing its campaign with the slogan "Free Nelson Mandela." It was wildly effective. The slogan found its way onto T-shirts and

posters around the world, even into a pop song. But as it tends to, such mythmaking also distorted reality, not least in regard to Mandela's failing marriage to Winnie. "She married a man who soon left her, that man became a myth, and then that myth returned home and proved to be just a man after all," Mandela wrote in Long Walk to Freedom.

His remarkable ability to emerge from prison with forgiveness for his persecutors was a genuine wonder that averted a looming race war — and, for many, validated his myth. But if his reputation was merely enhanced, his party's was whitewashed. At the time that the ANC was becoming an international cause clbre, a 1984 internal party inquiry — the Stuart Commission — found that the ANC's training camps in Angola were "autocratic," "corrupt" and sadistic, run through a mix of torture, rape and execution. "There was a lot of corruption, a lot of thuggery," says Forde of the party's years in exile, pointing also to alliances with African leaders such as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi. "You see that coming to the fore again."

In Bloemfontein, corruption and mythmaking have combined for the ANC's birthday party. When I eventually find Maphikela House — a grand red-brick place with two stories and a porch — the old lady who lives there directs me instead to a second building in another rundown neighborhood closer to town. In 1992, Mandela celebrated the ANC's 80th anniversary at Maphikela House. But in 2002, National Museum historian Hannes Haasbroek discovered that the house was built in 1926, 14 years after the ANC was formed, and the party's true birthplace was a former Wesleyan church hall a few miles away, since converted into an auto-body-repair shop. Unperturbed by this uprooting and relocating of its nativity fable, the ANC city authority promptly bought the bare-brick, wood-frame, tin-roof building and began fixing it up — at a total taxpayer cost of $4 million. Bloemfontein DA leader Roy Jankielsohn accuses the party of an "abuse of state resources." ANC spokesman Khoza denies corruption and insists the party is paying the bulk of the centenary costs. But he sees nothing wrong with using state money to preserve the party's history. "The ANC should be treated as part of our collective heritage as a nation," he says.

As the Arab Spring showed, ruling parties that fail to distinguish their interests from those of the nation may also not spot their approaching fall. And the signs of the ANC's decline are there. The party is fragmented. Its support peaked at 69% at elections in 2004 and fell to 61% at local elections in 2011. And in December it lost three previously safe seats in local by-elections. Meanwhile, the DA is growing. Its support rose from 1.7% in a general election in 1996 to 16.7% in 2009, when it also took Western Cape province, and to 23.8% in 2011. Zille says her ambition is to take two more

provinces in the next general election in 2014 and the government in 2019. Like any other politician, she wants power. But she insists that removing the ANC is essential if South Africa is to finally enjoy genuine democracy. "Loyalty is a great trait, but if you are to hold political leaders to account, you can't be loyal to a political party," she says.

In a previous life, Zille was an antiapartheid journalist. Her ultimate goal, she says, is to make good on Tutu's vision of a Technicolor nation. But in South Africa's black-and-white present, Zille is only too aware that she has a "melanin deficit." Hence moves by the DA to recruit to its leadership a black-struggle legend of its own: Mamphela Ramphele, a former World Bank managing director and long-standing ANC critic. If the name is unfamiliar, that's because Ramphele never married her partner: Steve Biko.

CHAPTER 17

"I WILL NOT VOTE FOR THE ANC"

BISHOP DESMOND TUTU, *BBC NEWS AFRICA* AND *MAIL & GUARDIAN*

South Africa's Desmond Tutu: 'I will not vote for ANC'

South African elder statesman and Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu has said he would no longer vote for the ruling ANC.

"I would very sadly not be able to vote for them after the way things have gone," he wrote in South Africa's Mail and Guardian newspaper.

Inequality, violence and corruption are among the reasons costing the ANC his support, he added.

Archbishop Tutu, 81, was a strong supporter of the ANC's struggle against white minority rule.

Former African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela became the country's first black leader after all-race elections in 1994.

"The ANC was very good at leading us in the struggle to be free from oppression," Archbishop Tutu wrote.

"But it doesn't seem to me now that a freedom-fighting unit can easily make the transition to becoming a political party," he continued.

Describing South Africa as "the most unequal society in the world", he highlighted corruption, unaccountability and weaknesses in the constitution as key issues that need to be addressed.

Archbishop Tutu was also strongly critical of past decisions made by the ANC government at the UN, particularly on Zimbabwe.

"The things we have voted for or against have been a disgrace. It has been a total betrayal of our whole tradition."

Archbishop Tutu campaigned against white minority rule and was awarded the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize.

But he has been increasingly critical of the ruling party in recent years.

In 2011, he accused the ANC government of "kowtowing" to China, after the government delayed issuing a visa for the Dalai Lama, who had been invited to attend the archbishop's 80th birthday celebrations.

In the opinion piece, he also warned South Africa to prepare for Mr Mandela's death.

"My concern is that we are not preparing ourselves, as a nation, for the time when the inevitable happens."

"He's 94, he's had a rough time, and God has been very, very good in sparing him for us these many years. But the trauma of his passing is going to be very much intensified if we do not begin to prepare ourselves for the fact that this is going to happen at some time," he added.

Although officially retired, Archbishop Tutu continues to speak publicly about the world's injustices and domestic politics.

Mail and Guardian Article:

The news bulletins we are getting about Nelson Mandela indicate that there has been a resurgence of lung trouble. I haven't been to see him – I didn't think they would want to be bothered too greatly – but I sent a text message to his wife, Graça.

My concern is that we are not preparing ourselves, as a nation, for the time when the inevitable happens. He's 94, he's had a rough time, and God has been very, very good in sparing him for us these many years. But the trauma of his passing is going to be very much intensified if we do not begin to prepare ourselves for the fact that this is going to happen at some time.

At present, people who might want to offer criticisms about the political dispensation may be inhibited from doing so. People who might otherwise vote for different parties are constrained by the sense that it would be a slap in the face to Mandela. These issues are going to intensify what will, in any case, be a very traumatic experience.

We should be preparing ourselves by erecting a memorial to him, but not a physical one. The best memorial to Nelson Mandela would be a democracy that was really up and running; a democracy in which every single person in South Africa knew that they mattered, and where other people knew that each person mattered.

South Africa has the capacity to be one of the most vibrant countries in the world. We have some of the most wonderful people of all races that you could imagine. Our potential is immense. And it's an ache, it is a very huge ache, for oldies like me to see our country deteriorating and slowly sliding off what we thought belonged to us – the moral high ground. It's a great pain to see that we still have the kind of disparity we used to decry under the apartheid dispensation.

No one imagined we were going to have a paradise overnight, but we imagined that by now we would have made very considerable strides in bridging the gap between the poor and the well off.

Yet today South Africa is the most unequal society in the world. We can't hold our heads up with pride when you think of the levels of violence in our country.

During the struggle I think we were rather special. There was hardly anyone who would have said that they were in the struggle for self-aggrandisement; that they were looking for a reward. People were amazing in being so altruistic, so idealistic; committing themselves to freedom and saying that they were ready to lay down their lives. We imagined that this idealism and altruism would automatically carry over into the post-apartheid period.

But now one can point to so many instances of corruption, of unaccountability. Seeing how standards have dropped is so galling because it seems to give ammunition to those who would say: "We warned you that once you had a black majority government you would see a steady decline in standards."

There are things we've done that we should be proud of. We did a wonderful job of hosting the football World Cup – even the criminals went on holiday for two months. It showed our country what we have in us to become.

I'm not a card-carrying member of any political party. I have over the years voted for the ANC, but I would very sadly not be able to vote for them after the way things have gone.

We really need a change. The ANC was very good at leading us in the struggle to be free from oppression. They were a good freedom-fighting unit. But it doesn't seem to me now that a freedom-fighting unit can easily make the transition to becoming a political party.

And, unfortunately, we do have a weakness in our Constitution. It was important for our transition that we had proportional representation, so people were voting not for a particular candidate but for a party. We still have that system. The party that wins decides who will be its representatives, so everybody wants to get on to the party list.

You do not want to jeopardise your chances by being what you ought to be as a Member of Parliament – someone who ensures that the executive is accountable to the legislature.

The first thing the next Parliament must do is change our system so that you elect on the basis of a constituency, where you are voting for an individual who would be accountable to the electorate. Those in Parliament now are accountable to their party first rather than the electorate.

China has brought a lot of benefits to Africa, with the investments it has made and the building of infrastructure, but it has come at a cost. In South Africa, a lot of people in the textile industry have been thrown out of work because the country has been flooded with cheap Chinese goods. But what has been even more distressing for me is how our country has seemed to kowtow to Beijing.

A glaring example is what they did with the Dalai Lama, when the South African government dilly-dallied with his visa so that he couldn't come to my birthday.

The other example is our performance at the United Nations. The things we have voted for or against have been a disgrace. It has been a total betrayal of our whole tradition, and that's a very sad thing.

Deliberate decisions by politicians have caused the terrible situation in Zimbabwe, our neighbour. I keep thinking how it was one of our showpiece countries. Just a few years ago it was thriving, with a vibrant democracy and a president who was generally held in high regard.

Obviously, one is longing desperately that Zimbabwe can recover the glory of those days. It seems such utter, utter madness, the things that they've done there – destroying a very profitable agricultural sector, for example, by handing over farms to people who really weren't able to run them and who let equipment go to seed, as it were.

But people are very resilient, and I'm just hoping that one day that country can recover. One has to give the people considerable credit for still being able to smile, given that they've seen a beautiful country being turned into a nightmare.

It will be costly, but I think one day we will be able to look back and say: "Yes, it was a nightmare, but the nightmare is over."

South Africa has many gifted people who could lead our country but, at the present time, a great deal of political loyalty is based on the fact that these are the people who fought for the freedom we now enjoy.

Very many people are really voting with their hearts rather than their heads. Emotionally, you need a real turnaround to get them to see that when you vote for a political party you are voting for its policies. It is no longer something you can base on the emotional links we had with the people who strove for our freedom.

CHAPTER 18

SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY

PETER SCHRAEDER, *ROUND TABLE*

Although most observers have focused on the domestic impacts of South Africa's transition to democracy, most notably the dismantlement of its apartheid political system, this process has also entailed the transformation of South African foreign policy. As former President Nelson Mandela aptly explained in Foreign Affairs several months prior to victory in the presidential and legislative elections of

1994, he considered the charting of a new foreign policy as a 'key element' in the creation of a 'peaceful and prosperous' South Africa. The primary purpose of this article is to offer an assessment of the foreign policy adaptation strategies adopted by the Mandela and Mbeki administration s in their quest to further strengthen South Africa's ongoing transformation from an isolated international pariah to leader of the African renaissance. An initial sec tion outline s five strategies designed to adapt South African foreign policy to the new realities of the post-apartheid era: restoring civilian control over the security apparatus ; restructuring the foreign policy establishment; self promotion as the leader of the 'African renaissance'; adherence to the foreign policy principle of 'universality'; and assuming a leadership rôle in international organizations. Section two explores how the process of democratization has favoured the reemergence and strengthening of the rôles played by a wide variety of state and non-state actors within the foreign policymaking process. A final section sets out five issues that will continue to set the tone of debates over South African foreign policy well into the first decade of the new millennium. An import ant conclusion of th e article is that although the case study of South Africa in many respects constitutes a microcosm of the foreign policy challenges confronting other African countries, it also offers insight s into the foreign policy adaptation strategies pursued by emerging powers in other regions of the world.

From 1948 to 1994, South African foreign policy sought to justify and protect its authoritarian apartheid political system in which a white minority regime imposed racial segregation on a politically disenfranchised black majority. The foreign policy cost of this strategy was South Africa's branding as an international pariah within the Afri-

can continent and the wider international community, ultimately leading to what Deon Geldenhuys, a South African specialist of his country's foreign policy, aptly referred to as the 'diplomacy of isolation'. This pariah status ended in 1994 when Nelson Mandela was elected president in his country 's first multiracial, multiparty democratic elections, and South Africa emerged as the embodiment of the political-military and socioeconomic changes sweeping the African continent that are often referred to as the 'African renaissance'. Since Mandela's election, policymakers have overseen the transformation of South Africa's foreign policy apparatus, and in so doing have been confronted with the need to reexamine and restructure foreign policy practices and relationships. The primary purpose of this article is to explore how a variety of foreign policy adaptation strategies have sought to further strengthen South Africa's ongoing transformation from international pariah to leader of the African renaissance.

South Africa constitutes an excellent case study for understanding foreign policy adaptation in the post-Cold War era. Often referred to as a 'regional superpower', South Africa is without question the leading power on the African continent. Economically speaking, South Africa represents Africa's most industrialized economy , accounting for nearly 29 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the continent as a whole. South Africa also boasts the largest and best trained military on the African continent, including air and naval forces capable of projecting military power far beyond South African territory. In the political realm, South Africa serves as the embodiment of the democratic changes that have swept the African continent since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Dubbed the 'rainbow nation', South Africa is also a leader in the cultural realm as its leaders strive to create a society capable of resolving internal conflicts through the rule of law. Although in many respects representing a microcosm of the foreign policy challenges confronting other African countries, South Africa offers important insights into the foreign policy adaptation strategies pursued by emerging powers in other regions of the world.

The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. The first outlines five strategies designed to adapt South African foreign policy to the new realities of the post-apartheid era: restoring civilian control over the security apparatus; restructuring the foreign policy establishment; self promotion as the leader of the 'African renaissance'; adherence to the foreign policy principle of 'universality'; and assuming a leadership rôle in international organizations. Section two explores how the process of democratization has favoured the reemergence and strengthening of the rôles played by a wide variety of state and non-state actors within the foreign policymaking process. A

final section sets out five issues that will continue to set the tone of debates over South African foreign policy well into the first decade of the new millennium.

Foreign policy adaptation in the post-apartheid era

South Africa's presidential and legislative elections in April 1994 serve as one of the most heralded examples of African democratic transition. Voters of all races cast ballots in free and fair elections that ushered in South Africa's first multiracial, multi-ethnic, and multiparty democracy. Mandela, who spent nearly 28 years in prison under the apartheid system, was elected president, and the party he represents, the ANC, won 63 per cent of the popular vote, 252 of 400 seats in the National Assembly, and a majority share of seats in seven of the nine provincial legislatures. This so-called South African 'miracle' was repeated five years later when, as promised, Mandela voluntarily stepped down from power, and his administration's vice president, Thabo Mbeki, was elected president in free and fair elections in 1999 .

Although most observers have focused on the domestic impacts of South Africa's transition to democracy, most notably the dismantlement of its apartheid political system, this process has also entailed a complete reexamination and restructuring of South African foreign policy practices and relationships. As Mandela aptly explained in *Foreign Affairs* several months prior to the presidential and legislative elections of 1994, he considered the charting of a new foreign policy for South Africa as a 'key element in the creation of a peaceful and prosperous country'. Towards this end, South African policymakers during both the Mandela and Mbeki administrations can be credited with pursuing several strategies to adapt South African foreign policy to the new realities of the post-Cold War era.

Restoring civilian control over the security apparatus

One of the m ost delicate tasks was the process of demilitarization to restore civilian control over a security apparatus that had become too powerful in the formulation of South African domestic and foreign policies. An agreement reached between the military leaders of the apartheid-era SADF and the military wing of the ANC (Umkhontowe Sizwe) prior to the general elections of 1994 outlined the creation of a civilian-managed Ministry of Defense and civilian control over the military budget and approval of senior promotions and professional training. In recognition of the fact that military officers during t he apartheid era were responsible for actions deemed illegal

under both domestic and international law, the 1996 Constitution stipulates that all security forces 'must teach and require their members to act in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and international agreements binding on the Republic' (Article 5, Paragraph 6). The process of demilitarization also included profound changes in military doctrine. As opposed to the apartheid-era doctrine of being able to launch counterinsurgency wars and retaliatory strikes against neighbouring countries, current military doctrine emphasizes the overriding importance of national self-defence in which the South African military will be deployed internationally only under fairly restrictive circumstances, including internationally mandated peace-keeping operations, humanitarian relief exercises, and, as witnessed by South African military intervention (along with Botswana) in Lesotho in 1998, the restoration of democracy.

An important challenge that confronted the newly elected Mandela administration was the necessity of integrating previously opposed military forces into the newly created South African National Defense Force (SANDF), including 85 000 (largely white) SADF soldiers, 30 000 guerrilla fighters from Umkhontowe Sizwe, 6000 guerrilla fighters from the Azanian People's Liberation Arm y (the military wing of the PAC), and 7000 soldiers from four black 'homelands ' (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) granted independence by the former apartheid regime but never recognized by another country within the international system. Despite initial tensions over salaries and ranks, particularly among the newly integrated Umkhontowe Sizwe forces, an important reason for the success of this delicate process was the decision of Joe Modise, Minister of Defense under the Mandela Administration, to initially maintain an oversized SANDF of at least 70 000 soldiers, with the intention of gradually reducing this force over time through a natural process of attrition. As succinctly noted by Mbeki, 'We could hardly take 30 000 combatants from the ANC and throw them on the streets'. Similar to their counterparts from other portions of the SANDF , continued Mbeki , these guerrilla fighters we re 'proud of their rôle' in the struggle to create a multiracial and democratic South Africa and understandably 'wanted to keep their jobs in an economy where unemployment is high.'

Restructuring the foreign policy establishment

A second strategy to adapt South African foreign policy to the post-Cold War era was the complete restructuring of the foreign policymaking establishment. As discussed below, the 1996 Constitution has clearly established the formal rôles to be

played by a wide variety of institutional actors, with the creation and consolidation of democratic practices favouring the foreign policy inputs of numerous non-state actors as well. One of the most profound examples of institutional change revolved around the restructuring of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure that it once again assumes one of the leading rôles in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. An important step in this process was the creation of a new bureaucracy— the Department of Foreign Affairs— that would integrate the best and the brightest diplomats from the foreign service of the former apartheid regime (which numbered 1917), the ANC's Department of International Affairs (139 former members were absorbed), and the foreign ministries of the four homelands (415 former members were absorbed). This restructuring process, referred to as 'rationalization' within the South African policymaking community, has prompted heated interagency debates, not least of all because the Department of Foreign Affairs was the only bureaucracy allowed by the Public Service Commission (the gatekeeper for allotting all civil service positions) to expand by nearly 10 per cent in 1995 alone. However, as demonstrated by sim ply one indicator— the growth of South African diplomatic representation abroad from 25 embassies in 1985 to 43 embassies in 1995— South Africa's emergence from the shadows of its former 'diplomacy of isolation'13 at the bare minimum requires an enlarged Department of Foreign Affairs capable of responding to new foreign policy challenges and opportunities.

Self promotion as the leader of an 'African renaissance'

An emphasis on South Africa's unique position as the leader of the 'African renaissance'— the strengthening of democratic practices and economic liberalization throughout Africa since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 —constitutes a third important component of foreign policy adaptation in the post-C old War era. This foreign policy stance is designed to emphasize the centrality of the African continent in South African foreign policy, as well as the importance of South Africa as the em bod i m ent of Africa's future political and economic potential, and therefore the critical rôle of South Africa as an intermediary between the African continent and leading foreign powers in all other regions of the world. Interestingly enough, the African renaissance, arguably one of the most cited and debated themes in African politics at the beginning of the new millennium , was initially popularized due to repeated usage by then Vice President (and current President) Mbeki, and has emerged as the defining foreign policy concept of the Mbeki Administration.

The Mbeki Administration's strong attachment to the concept of the African renaissance reflects several classic African foreign policy concerns that have become integral to South African foreign policy. Among the most important of these are the promotion of regional integration and development, as witnessed by South Africa's membership and leadership rôle in the Southern African Development Community (SADC; formerly SADCC); unequivocal support for nuclear non-proliferation, as demonstrated by South Africa's renouncement and dismantling of a nuclear weapon s programme that successfully tested a nuclear device during the apartheid era, as well as the Mandela Administration's crucial rôle in convincing other Southern countries to accept an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; extreme sensitivity concerning the juridical rights of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, as most poignantly noted by Mandela's impassioned rejection of US demands that South Africa avoid diplomatic contact with Qadaffi's Libya and Castro's Cuba; and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, as personified by Mandela's willingness to serve as a third-party mediator in an attempt to resolve ethnic conflict in Burundi.

South Africa's interpretation of the African renaissance is also inclusive of several new themes in African foreign policy that are accepted in varying degrees throughout the African continent depending on the nature of the regime in power. A commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights has gathered strength throughout Africa since the Cold War's end, but nonetheless makes even some democratically elected African leaders uneasy due to its inevitable clash with the cherished principle of sovereignty. In the case of South Africa, the Mandela Administration's joint undertaking with Botswana of a military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 to restore democratic rule suggests an expansive interpretation of what means can be employed to promote democratic values and hum an rights.

A willingness to adopt the liberal economic model of free trade and investmet has also gathered strength in the post-Cold War era, and has been especially invoked by the more technocratically minded Mbeki Administration. Although recognizing that domestic reconstruction and development constitutes the singular priority of t he South African population, the Mbeki Administration, like its predecessor, has underscored the critical rôle of foreign trade and investment (not to mention foreign aid) in this process. Towards this end, the South African government's close cooperation with South African businesses has yielded enormous success in penetrating the Southern African market, as well as other regions of the African continent and the world in general.

Adherence to the foreign policy principle of 'universality'

A fourth adaptation strategy — adherence to the foreign policy principle of 'universality '— is designed to bridge the foreign policy gap between the apartheid and democratic eras, and in so doing ensure that the best of both eras is included in contemporary South African foreign policy. T he principle of universality underscores the willingness of South Africa to establish diplomatic relations with all countries of the world regardless of the domestic or the foreign policies of those countries. In the case of the Middle East, for example, the Mandela and Mbeki administrations have sought to strengthen diplomatic links with Israel (historically an ally of the apartheid regime) while at the same time establishing and strengthening diplomatic ties with Libya and Iran (historically supporters of the ANC 's guerrilla struggle). In some cases, such as the ongoing diplomatic battle between the People 's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan as to which capital— Beijing or Taipei— is recognized as the official seat of the Chinese government, South Africa's desire to maintain a two-China policy proved untenable, ultimately leading South Africa to choose Beijing largely due to economic reasons.

The willingness of the Mandela and Mbeki administrations to choose economic self-interest over regime type in the case of China (Taiwan is a democracy and the PRC remains an authoritarian dictatorship) has led to sharp critiques of South African foreign policy, most notably when one realizes that the ANC, during the period of guerrilla struggle, resoundingly denounced any government that emphasized the importance of economic self-interest in their refusals to implement comprehensive economic sanctions against the apartheid regime. In this regard, there has also bee n a tendency for the Mandela and Mbeki administrations to err on the side of maintaining close diplomatic ties with even authoritarian leaderships, such as Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba, that strongly supported the ANC during its guerrilla struggle. Needless to say, South Africa's diplomatic ties with Cuba and other countries considered by American policymakers to be 'terrorist' states within the international system (most notably Libya, Iran, and the Sudan), has caused repeated diplomatic tensions between Pretoria and Washington.

Assuming a leadership rôle in international organizations

A final strategy for adapting South African foreign policy to especially the international realities of the post-Cold War era has been a firm commitment to upholding and strengthening the international norms associated with the United Nations and its member agencies, as well as a wide range of other organizations, including (but not limited to) the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). One of the most important foreign policy objectives of the immediate post-apartheid era was to ensure that South African diplomats quickly reasserted South Africa's 'rightful place' as both a member and a leader within the international community of international organizations. Less than two months after the newly elected Mandela administration assumed the reins of power in 1994, South Africa was admitted to the OAU, joined the NAM, and was readmitted to the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations. South Africa has particularly focused on its United Nations membership, joining the governing councils of several specialized agencies and organs, such as the International Telecommunications Union and the Economic and Social Council. South African diplomats consistently argue that their country 's historic rôle in the United Nations (South Africa was one of the founding members), and current status as the embodiment of the African renaissance, make South Africa the perfect African candidate for a permanent seat on any enlarged United Nations Security Council. Indeed, South Africa's closest rivals for a permanent UN Security Council seat are often dismissed by South African diplomats as either undemocratic (Egypt and the Sudan), beset by internal conflict (Algeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), or lacking sufficient economic resources (Nigeria and Senegal).

Key sources of South African foreign policy

The study of the sources of African foreign policy traditionally has been dominated by three bodies of scholar ship. Whereas one body of research, often referred to as the 'big man' theory of African foreign policy, emphasizes the overriding importance of the personal whims of authoritarian leaders to explain the formulation and implementation of African foreign policies, a second body of scholarship focuses on the impact of the larger geopolitical setting of 'great power ' competition, most notably the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. A third body of scholarship emphasize s the constraints imposed on African foreign policies by the

continuation of 'dependency' relationships between African states and their former colonial powers.

In essence, these three sets of theories simplistically imply that one has only to focus on the whims and desires of either African leaders or foreign powers in order to understand the key sources of African foreign policy.

A critical argument of this article is that these explanations constitute at best exaggerations of more dynamic foreign policy processes, especially in those cases, such as South Africa, that have made transitions to democratic forms of governance. Specifically, the field of African foreign policy has neglected to explore the simple but logical hypothesis that the process of democratization, typically examined in terms of its impact on domestic politics, should also foster the democratization of African foreign policy establishments. The foreign policy implication of this trend, which calls into question existing theories, is that the process of democratization has favoured the reemergence and strengthening of a wide variety of state and non-state actors that are capable of influencing the foreign policies of African countries. The critical point here is that African democracies, including those newly established and in the process of consolidation, embody open political systems that should permit wider involvement in the foreign policymaking process.

Several state actors play an important rôle in the formulation and implementation of South African foreign policy during the democratic era (1994 – present). The Constitution of 1996 that formalized South Africa's entry into the community of democratic nations clearly stipulates the overriding importance of the president in the formulation of South African foreign policy. During the Mandela Administration (1994–99), this constitutional prerogative was further strengthened by what is often referred to as the 'Mandela effect'— Mandela's emergence from nearly 28 years of captivity in apartheid jails as one of the most celebrated, admired, and charismatic figures of the 20th century. Rather than seeking to punish his former jailers once he and the ANC emerged victorious in the 1994 elections, Mandela magnanimously extended the olive branch of cooperation to all ethnic and racial factions in South Africa, surrounding this former guerrilla leader with an aura of near sainthood within the international community. It is precisely for this reason, lament critics of the Mandela Administration, that South African foreign policy often followed Mandela's public statements, rather than his public statements reflecting the contours of a consensus opinion within the foreign policy establishment.

Although it will be up to future historians to sort out the long-term impact of the Mandela factor within the foreign policy realm, the election of the m ore technocratic

and less charismatic Mbeki as president in 1999 heralded a greater routinization and 'depersonalization' of South African foreign policy more in line with the 1996 Constitution. Having served as the Foreign Minister of the ANC during its years in exile, Mbeki is clearly familiar with the multitude of foreign policy issues confronting post-apartheid South Africa. Unlike his predecessor, however, Mbeki is reportedly more open to compromise and more willing to rely on the expertise of foreign policy experts within the executive branch, most notably the Coordination and Cooperation Unit — a sort of 'kitchen cabinet' directly answerable to Mbeki that is comprised of young and energetic, but (critics add) often inexperienced foreign policy staffers.

The foreign affairs bureaucracies of the executive branch also serve as an important source of South African foreign policy in the democratic era. A fascinating aspect of the emerging bureaucratic blueprint of South African foreign policy is that the existing foreign affairs bureaucracies, most notably the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, were completely transformed, often involving a synthesis of the personnel of the former apartheid regime, the guerrilla armies (most notably the ANC), and the black homelands. In this sense, the foreign affairs bureaucracies remained works in progress by the beginning of the Mbeki Administration (i.e., five years after the transition to democracy), with each attempting to further rationalize its administrative structures and organizational routines, more precisely set out organizational goals and priorities, recruit and train new personnel (as well as retrain absorbed personnel), and learn through trial and error the best means of ensuring a preferred foreign policy outcome via negotiations and bureaucratic competition with other members of the foreign policy establishment.

Several trends can be noted in the relative positions of power and influence of individual bureaucracies within the foreign policy hierarchy. The Department of Foreign Affairs has regained a substantial portion of the influence that it had lost during the apartheid years, although it continues to struggle to train enough capable diplomats to staff South Africa's quickly expanding diplomatic network. The department has also been plagued by critiques that its first head, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo (an ANC stalwart), was not proactive enough and in any case did not have the proper administrative credentials to be an effective leader (a percept ion somewhat altered by the more proactive policies of the current foreign minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). To the contrary, Modise , the first head of the Ministry of Defense, won praise from many quarters for his handling of the reorganization and integration of the new SANDF . This bureaucracy, however, has played a more restrictive foreign policy rôle due to the lingering suspicions associated with its overwhelming (and highly negative) influence

wielded during the apartheid era. South Africa's heavily trade-oriented policy not surprisingly has made the Department of Trade and Industry one of the most prominent bureaucracies within the foreign policymaking establishment. This bureaucracy finds itself in competition with the Department of Foreign Affairs, with critics suggesting that the two departments should be integrated in order to avoid unnecessary bureaucratic competition and to ensure a more integrated foreign policy approach.

The parliament is a final state actor that has emerged as an important foreign policy actor in the democratic era. This constitutionally independent branch of government plays an important oversight rôle that, although not as powerful as originally envisioned by ANC stalwarts and members of civil society, clearly goes beyond the foreign policy prerogatives enjoyed by legislatures during the apartheid (1948 –94) and pre-apartheid (pre-1948) eras. The leading legislative actor within the foreign policy realm is the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs. This committee holds well-attended legislative hearings at which established tradition now requires the appearance of executive branch officials to answer questions related to South African foreign policy. Interestingly enough, the Portfolio Committee has not hesitated to criticize executive branch policies, most notably those fashioned and implemented by the Department of Foreign Affairs, despite the fact that both the presidency and the parliament are controlled by the ANC. It is at least partially due to this criticism that the Department of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly responded in kind, leading to an often acrimonious relationship between these two organizations, particularly during the period when Raymond Sutter served as chair of the Portfolio Committee.

A Select Committee on Defense modelled after that of the German Bundestag is also charged with investigating and making recommendations concerning the SANDF's budget, organization, and policies. 'Under the National Party and the previous Westminster parliamentary system, the select committee on defense had proved little more than a rubber stamp for the executive,' explain Jakkie Cilliers and Lindy Heinecken, two specialists of civil–military relations in South Africa. 'Now, with its powers enshrined in the Constitution, Parliament has taken an active and vigorously independent role in monitoring defense relations and the military as a whole '. The Select Committee on Defense perceives itself as an 'active participant' in all major decisions undertaken by the Ministry of Defense, and has played a critical rôle in restoring civilian control over the South African military. It is precisely for this reason, conclude Cilliers and Heinecken, that the 'relative power and influence' of civilian managers within the Ministry of Defense in the near future 'will be comparable to that in most Western armed forces'.

A wide variety of non-state actors also play a significant rôle in the formulation of South African foreign policy. The ANC is particularly influential due to its status as the ruling party in both the executive branch and the parliament during the democratic era . The ANC's victory in two sets of legislative elections and the alternation of power between the Mandela and Mbeki administrations have even led some scholars to refer to South Africa as a 'dominant-party system' in which the ANC will continue to rule for the foreseeable future. Yet the ANC 's ideological stance on foreign policy issues, and therefore its foreign policy impact, have significantly changed since the party's inception in 1912. At least three phases can be discerned: liberal internationalist support for international law and international organizations (1912–60); pursuit of the socialist ideal of international revolution and redistribution (1960–93); and a pragmatist, more self-interested approach that emphasizes the importance of geoeconoics (1993–present).

Although Mbeki's election represented the strengthened position of adherents of the current pragmatist phase, many ANC members of parliament maintain strong attachments to socialism, and both groups in genera l share the ideological leanings of liberal internationalism. The ideological difference s between the ANC 's adherents in the executive and the parliament partly explain ongoing foreign policy tensions between these two branches of government. Some have even argued that the contradictory nature of South African foreign policy (i.e., the primacy of geoeconomics in some cases and the primacy of human rights concerns in others) is 'in no small part attributable to the push /pull effects of this competing triad of theoretical perspectives and the lack of consensus the tensions between them have generated within the ranks of the ruling partly'.

The South African labor movement, under the leadership of a nation-wide umbrella group, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), is also influential in the foreign policy realm . The foreign policy strength of this actor is derivative of its highly influential rôle in the transition to the democratic era and contribution to the electoral success of the ANC in national elections. Although principally focused on domestic priorities, such as the creation of a National Economic Forum (NEF) and the passage of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), COSATU's leadership (many of whom have positions within the ANC government) has actively pursued a wide variety of foreign policy initiatives, especially when supported by 'fraternal' unions in neighbouring countries. It has been argued, for example, that COSATU's pressures played an important rôle in the Mandela Administration's decision to actively seek a restoration of the democratically elected government of Ntsu Mokhehle in Leso-

tho. COSATU's lobbying efforts were also critical in the Mandela Administration's decision to place pressure on King Mswati to oversee a return to democracy in Swaziland. In both cases, COSATU's actions were driven by a desire to lend support to trade union movements that were taking the lead in calling for democratization in neighbouring countries.

A wide variety of international factors have also served as important sources of South African foreign policy. South African leaders especially have bee influenced by 'rôle expectations' within the African continent and the wider international community. As aptly summarized by Aziz Pahad, former deputy minister of foreign affairs, there exists a 'tremendous expectation' that South Africa will play a major rôle in fashioning and directing the new world order at the beginning of the new millennium. South Africa's special status is clearly captured by an academic literature which variously refers to the country as a 'regional', 'intermediary', 'middle', 'subimperial', or 'semiperipheral' power.

Whereas African countries expect South Africa to take the lead in promoting the most cherished aims of African foreign policy, the northern industrialized democracies expect South Africa to serve as a rôle model for economic and political reforms throughout the African continent. It therefore should come as no surprise that President Mbeki has made the African renaissance and South Africa's unique place at the intersection of the African continent and the northern industrialized democracies the cornerstone of South African foreign policy.

Foreign actors, particularly the northern industrialized democracies, also play an influential rôle in South African foreign policy. Struggling to overcome the disparities of the apartheid era that include a 35–45 per cent unemployment rate largely within the non-white majority population, South Africa has aggressively sought foreign aid, trade, and investment. In 1995, the first full year of democratic transition after Mandela's election, South Africa received $386 million in official development assistance (ODA) and exported $27 billion in South African goods and services. South Africa's leading economic partners are the member-states of the European Union (most notably Germany and the United Kingdom) and the United States. The importance of democratic transition is clearly demonstrated by the evolution of the year-end stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in what is often referred to as the African continent's most important emerging market: from $29 billion in 1993 (the year prior to transition) to $43 billion in 1995. Investment abroad by South Africans has also soared, from $59 billion in 1993 to $93 billion in 1995, due to the simple fact that wide-ranging sanctions legislation has been dropped now that South Africa is considered

within the international community to be a legitimate actor. The recognition among South African policymakers that access to the international economy and foreign aid and investment are crucial to successful internal reconstruction and development has definitively made South Africa a firm proponent of the neo-liberal model of development.

Towards the future

Several issues will continue to set the tone of debates over South African foreign policy for the near future. The first is the degree to which the South African policymaking establishment should be focusing on foreign affairs as opposed to the serious domestic challenges confronting South Africa's nascent democracy. Among the extraordinary domestic challenges inherited from the apartheid era include an extremely high 35–45 per cent unemployment rate among the majority black population (which constitutes 75 per cent of a total population of approximately 43 million people) and the impoverished nature of the historically neglected black township s in which 7.5 million citizens lack access to running water and 3 million citizens lack housing. To these apartheid-era remnants one can add the more recent but related challenges of an AIDS pandemic in which 4.2 million people are HIV positive, and a dramatic rise in criminality in which the murder rate is an astounding 58.5 killings per 100,000 South Africans (a rate nearly 10 times higher than the US rate of 6.3 murders per 100,000 Americans). In short, many South Africans who have yet to receive the benefits of the transition to democracy are increasingly prone to question the usefulness of spending precious, limited national resources on costly foreign policy initiatives when so much needs to be done at home to resolve the inequities of the apartheid era.

Even if a consensus is reached as to the proper balance between foreign and domestic policy initiatives, the South African foreign policymaking establishment remains in a process of permutation since the 1994 transition to democracy that limits its effectiveness in the foreign policy realm. Although the restructuring of the foreign policy apparatus has been largely completed, the interaction both within and between the various branches of government is far from regularized. For example, the balance of power between the executive branch and the parliament has yet to be defined, especially as parliamentarians increasingly balance an initial overwhelming focus on domestic affairs (i.e., reconstruction and development) with greater levels of interest in the realm of foreign affairs. Even within the executive branch, the interaction between the various foreign affairs bureaucracies remain extremely fluid as each seeks to more

clearly outline and master its area of foreign policy expertise. In short, the process of making South African foreign policy remains a work in progress .

The lack of consistency within the foreign policymaking process not surprisingly has fostered seemingly contradictory foreign policy outputs. Critics particularly underscore the current foreign policy tension between South African rhetoric over the need to promote human rights and democracy and the more apolitical demands associated with the principle of universality and the pursuit of economic self-interest (i.e., trade and investment). Needless to say, all countries must contend with competing foreign policy objectives and few, if any, are successful in creating a hierarchy of goals in which the most important is rigidly and consistently pursued. The Mandela administration's decision to recognize Beijing over Taiwan serves as one example of a wider and intensifying foreign policy debate over whether universality and economic self-interest should de facto serve as the guiding principles of South African foreign policy. Indeed, the unwillingness of the Mandela and Mbeki administrations to be outspoke n over the hum an rights violations of Castro's Cuba and other past supporters of the anti-apartheid struggle has prompted critics to charge that post-apartheid South Africa is guilty of doing exactly what it denounced others for doing during the apartheid era: turning a blind eye towards hum an right s violations in the name of promoting economic self-interest.

The regional context will be of particular salience to South Africa's emerging foreign policy rôle. Ongoing civil war in neighbouring Angola and heightened racial tensions in neighbouring Zimbabwe serve as important daily reminders of the precariousness of democratization in the Southern African region and Africa as a whole. Such conflicts not only hinder the prospect s for further regional integration (one of the cornerstones of regional foreign policy initiatives under both the Mandela and Mbeki administrations), but invariably have a direct effect on South Africa itself as refugees and armed groups cross its international boundaries, and, like it or not, South African policymakers are forced to respond. Moreover, rôle expectations associated with South Africa's status as a leader of the African renaissance have ensured foreign policy complications with its regional neighbours. In the case of the interstate war that has engulfed the Democratic Republic of the Congo — dubbed Africa's 'First World War' by many observers — South Africa's appeals for the cessation of international military involvement stands in sharp contrast to the direct military involvement of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Indeed, regional denunciations of South Africa's foreign policy approach to this conflict clearly demonstrate a degree of regional hostility once thought to be derivative of South Africa's hated apartheid system. In short, South Africa's new-

found status as a legitimate, post-apartheid foreign policy actor has in many respects complicated its regional relationships as smaller, less-powerful neighbours seek to limit the influence of what in essence constitutes a regional superpower .

The confounding nature of the regional security context raises the question as to what sort of balance should be sought in South Africa's links with Africa and the wider international community. From the day of his inauguration, Mandela sought to set the tone of his and future administrations by stating that South Africa was first and foremost an African country with responsibilities on the African continent. The vast majority of South Africa's economic and financial links, however, are with the major northern industrialized democracies. South African leaders are quick to note the overriding importance of promoting privileged economic access to the northern industrialized democracies as the best means of promoting successful internal reconstruction and development. The crucial (and unresolved) question is as follows: Should South Africa primarily focus on strengthening its links with the northern industrialized democracies, or does cultural solidarity demand a greater focus on the African continent and other developing countries within the southern hemisphere? Although some would argue the necessity of simultaneously expanding and strengthening links in all directions, others rightfully claim that the rational utilization of limited financial resources requires some kind of regional hierarchy. Only time will tell if South Africa emerges as the representative of African foreign policy issues and desires, a rising middle power reflective of the interests of the northern industrialized democracies that happens to be geographically located on the African continent, or some permutation of the two.

CHAPTER 19

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